F. Parkman

SIX

DISSERTATIONS

UPON

DIFFERENT SUBJECTS.

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BY THE LATE REVEREND

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DISSERTATION I.

ON THE DOCTRINES OF DIVINE ASSISTANCE AND HUMAN LIBERTY.

QUI FECIT TE SINE TE, NON POTEST SERVARE TE SINE TE.

DISSERTATION I.

ON THE DOCTRINES OF DIVINE ASSISTANCE AND HUMAN LIBERTY.

EPHES. ii. 5.

By grace ye are saved.

THERE is not one question in the whole compass of controversial divinity that hath caused greater and longer disputes and quarrels than that about irresistible grace, spiritual assistance, original or rather hereditary sin, absolute predestination, human liberty, and the natural powers of man.

The church for the first four hundred years was happily free from these debates, and Christians were pretty well agreed in believing that man was a free agent, that he was a weak, imperfect, and trespassing creature, and that God for the sake of Christ was ever willing to forgive and assist him, if he was not wanting to himself.

But about thirteen hundred years ago, a dissension arose concerning these points, and two parties were soon formed. The first maintained necessity, fatality, and absolute predestination, election, and reprobation; the second were defenders of conditional decrees, and

of human liberty and human power in the performance of moral good and evil; whilst others endeavoured to steer a middle course, and this our Church is thought by several learned persons to have intended in her articles.

The controversy, once roused, hath never gone to sleep since, but hath been carried on more or less in most parts of the Christian world.

Concerning the disputants themselves we may safely affirm that the defenders of the liberty of man and of the conditional decrees of God have been beyond all comparison the more learned, judicious, and moderate men; and that severity and oppression hath most appeared on the other side, which was a very absurd behaviour even upon their own principles: for if a man be a mere machine[a], to what purpose would you contend with him, or apply violence to him? To make him change his opinion, you will say. That is impossible. Upon your principles, a man hath no opinions, properly speaking; or they are necessary to him, and he cannot avoid them. And in fact it appears from history that God did not think fit to annex his irresistible grace to the excommunications, anathe-

[a] If a man never acts, but is always acted upon, it is the mover who is the author of all that the man seems to do. And indeed, upon this system, when a man says, *I think* or *I do* this and that, it is an illusion; there is no such thing as *I*; it is something else, some external agent, good or evil; the mind can exert no act at all, not even that of thinking and reflecting; and there is an end of personality.

mas, fines, banishments, imprisonments, and other such devices used formerly by the predestinarian fatalists to illuminate and convert their adversaries, who only spread themselves the more, the more they were discountenanced and oppressed.

As to the controversy, I would only ask two or three plain questions.

How can it be supposed that God should delude and deceive all mankind by making them believe that they are free agents? For all men think so, till by the help of some mistakes and quibbles they have learned to call it in question, though against their own inward sense and hourly experience.

Why are men encumbered with a conscience, approving, or condemning their past actions? Is it fit that a machine should have such sentiments? Not more than that a clock should be endued with a conscience to reprove and torment it for going wrong.

Why should the Scriptures propose rewards and punishments, promises and threatenings, to those who can do nothing at all? What should we think of a man who should preach to a nursery of trees, and propose rewards to those that should grow up straight, and punishments to those that should grow crooked?

Lastly, Whence comes it to pass that men are good or bad in such a variety of degrees? For if they were all good or bad by necessity, the good would be all equally good, and the bad would be all equally bad. Nature and grace must operate uniformly; even as gravitation operates uniformly upon matter; instinct upon

brutes; and those secret powers upon men by which the blood circulates, the pulse beats, the breath comes and goes, and other functions are continually performed in us without our knowledge and endeavour. From nature entirely corrupted nothing could proceed but evil; from overpowering grace nothing could proceed but good. Whence then this mixture of good and evil, of right and wrong, of defects and amendment, of depravation and improvement? It plainly ariseth from the liberty of man, and from his using or abusing it, and it can arise from nothing else.

How is it then that so many persons have agreed to contradict such plain notions, and, by establishing irresistible influences and unavoidable necessity, to destroy the very nature of moral good and evil, and the wisdom and justice of God's government?—Many causes concurred to lead them into these errors, namely:

The difficulty of reconciling the foreknowledge of God with the liberty of man:

The nature of human freedom itself, which, though sensibly felt, is not so easy to be accurately described and clearly comprehended:

A fear of ascribing too little to Almighty God, and too much to weak and sinful man in the work of amendment, improvement, perseverance, and salvation:

An abhorrence for the doctrine of the merits of saints, and works of supererogation, by which good men are supposed to have done more for themselves than reason and religion required. A just dis-

like of these notions frightened several unwary persons into the contrary extreme, taught them to look upon good works as a bugbear, and to hate the very sound of the words [b].

An injudicious method of interpreting the sacred writings, of expounding single texts and fragments of Scripture, without considering or understanding the system of Christianity and the scope and intention of the writer, and without giving fair play to human reason and natural religion, but ever flying for shelter to mystery and to implicit faith.

A superstitious deference to human authority, and to the judgement of men who happened to be in high repute and leaders of the multitude. It is actually the bare weight of two or three such names that introduced and established the doctrine of absolute predestination:

Lastly, The infelicity of the times when these notions came into fashion, times in which philosophy, morality, divinity, and the holy Scriptures were not so well understood as they are at present.

We may reason indeed with this sort of people; but the only answer we are to expect is, that these are profound mysteries; for this is the last refuge and retrenchment of men who are beaten out of the field by fair reasoning. There are three senses of the word mystery.

[b] Some writers of this sort contracted such a superstitious dread of relying on *good works*, that they would not make even a *good book*, or employ the carnal weapon of human reason.

First, By a mystery is too often meant a doctrine which is directly contrary to reason. In this sense, absolute predestination is really and truly a mystery.

Secondly, By mystery is meant a thing which is certainly true, but withall incomprehensible: reason sees plainly that it is and must be, but the imagination cannot conceive how and in what manner it is. In this sense the divine nature is mysterious. But predestination is not a mystery of this sort, since it cannot be proved to be true.

Thirdly, A mystery, in the usual Scripture sense of the word, is a thing which once was not revealed, and cannot be known till it is revealed. In this sense, predestination may perhaps pass for a mystery, so far as it is a doctrine not yet revealed to us; and when it is revealed, it will be time enough to believe it.

My text is one of those which hath been much insisted upon in this controversy. "By grace ye are saved." These words, and some other places of Scripture of the same kind, have been misunderstood by those who suppose that all men are by nature irresistibly led to evil, that God selects some of them to be the happy objects of his care and favour, that he bestows upon them his grace and assistance which they cannot abuse and reject, and thus secures to them everlasting life. According to these notions, the words before us ought to be thus explained; "Christians of Ephesus, you are now certain of eternal life, because the grace of God is conferred upon you, which no man can frustrate or resist." That the text must not be thus

understood I shall show distinctly in the following remarks, observing at present, that salvation here does not mean an infallible security of obtaining eternal life, and that the grace of which the apostle speaks, whatsoever be implied in it, is not a divine assistance working all in us in such a manner that we can do nothing for ourselves.

First, The word *saved*[c] doth not here signify the final and complete salvation which is obtained in heaven; but it means, to be put in a condition in which if we continue, we shall be saved. In the same sense it is said on the conversion of Zaccheus, "This day salvation is come to this house;" and in another place, "Baptism doth save us;" and again, "God added daily to his church, not such as should be saved, but such as were saved, or such as saved themselves." The persons thus spoken of were not then actually saved, but by embracing the Gospel they had chosen the way that led to salvation.

Secondly, the word *grace* means not an irresistible assistance, which performs all our duty in us and for us.

By the grace or the favour of God we are said to receive a new birth or being, and to be created in Christ, but, as the apostle adds, we are created to good works, which God ordained that we should walk in them; and those good works are so far as-

[c] S. Clarke, Serm. xxix, xxx, xxxi. on the grace of God.

cribed to us, that we are exhorted to work out our own salvation, and that a promise is made of glory and honour and immortality to every one that worketh good.

Therefore the text is to be thus interpreted; that you have had the Gospel preached to you, and thereby have been changed from a state of ignorance and vice to a state of knowledge and virtue, and that you are now happily placed in the way of salvation, in which if ye continue ye shall obtain eternal life; that ye are thus saved, is of grace, is to be ascribed entirely to the goodness and favour of God.

I shall now consider,

I. What is the meaning of the word *grace*;

II. How our salvation is owing to this *grace*;

III. How it is owing to our own endeavours.

I. The word *grace* properly signifies favour from a superior to an inferior. Grace is the mercy or goodness of a superior not requiring all that he has a right to require, or else conferring benefits upon another to which the receiver hath no claim. And because such favours may be done in various ways, hence the word *grace* in Scripture is applied in as various significations.

Sometimes it means the miraculous gifts of the Holy Ghost, by which the apostles were enabled to prove their mission, to preach with authority, to confute gainsayers, to confirm the believers, and to govern the churches. Those endowments were called *grace*, because they were not the fruits of their own natural abi-

lities, or the acquisitions of their own industry, but gifts of God distributed as God thought fit. So St. Paul says to the Romans; "By whom we have received grace and apostleship, for obedience to the faith among all nations:" that is, who hath been pleased to send forth us the apostles to preach, with mighty works and signs and wonders, and to call mankind to the knowledge of God and of Christ, and to the practice of righteousness. And again to the Ephesians; "Unto every one of us is given grace, according to the measure of the gift of Christ:" and what that grace was he declares in the following words;—"he gave some apostles, and some prophets, and some pastors and teachers."

Again, God promised to support his servants under heavy trials, so that they should not be tempted above what they were able to bear. This divine assistance may be called *grace*, though it is not usually so called in Scripture.

Thirdly, by the word *grace* is sometimes meant all righteousness in general, and every action good and praiseworthy, all those moral virtues to which the Gospel excites us, and the practice of which recommends us to the favour of God. Thus, in the epistle to the Ephesians; "Let no corrupt communication proceed out of your mouth, but that which is good to the use of edifying, that it may minister grace to the hearers;" that it may excite them to virtue. Thus St. Peter; "Grow in grace[d];" that is, in goodness.

[d] An exhortation extremely improper, upon the Calvinistical scheme.

After the same manner of speaking, St. Paul styles the liberality of the Macedonian churches to the poor, "the grace of God bestowed upon them;" and to persuade the Corinthians to do the like, he says; "Therefore as ye abound in every thing, in faith, in utterance, and knowledge, and in all diligence, see that ye abound in this grace also;" the grace of liberality and charity. In these and other places the word *grace* denotes the same as Christian or moral virtue: and all the good actions that Christians do are called *grace*, because they are the effects which the Gospel, together with the assistances that God bestows upon his faithful servants, are wont to produce in well-disposed minds.

Again, the word *grace* frequently means the mercy of God in pardoning sin upon repentance and amendment, and receiving such an offender into favour. In this sense St. Paul says of himself; "I am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church; but by the grace of God, or the mercy of God, I am what I am." So when the doctrine of Christ, in opposition to the law of Moses, is called *grace*, when the preaching of the apostles is called the *word of God's grace*, when St. Paul declares that repenting sinners are justified freely by *grace*, and condemns the wicked doctrine of those who thought that they might continue in sin, that grace might abound, the word *grace* signifies that merciful and compassionate disposition of the divine nature, whereby God doth not exert his right of punishing, and receives penitent sinners upon more gracious terms and to greater degrees of

favour than by the nature of justice he was bound to afford.

And here it may not be amiss to guard against an error into which some writers seem to have fallen, and that is, to represent the attributes of God as in some manner at variance with each other, his justice requiring one thing, and his mercy requiring the contrary. This error arises from mistaking the nature of justice: justice doth not require a person to do every thing that he justly may, but only to do nothing that is unjust, and to be just in exercising his power. But, to return:

Hence it is that the Gospel itself is frequently styled *grace*, and the *grace of God*, being a promulgation of God's mercy towards men displayed in the free pardon of sin upon the favourable terms of repentance and amendment: as in these texts; "Since the day that ye knew the grace of God in truth: Our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and God even our father hath given us hope through *grace*: Be strong in the *grace* that is in Christ Jesus." So the prophets are declared to have prophesied of the *grace* that should come; and some of the Galatians are said to have fallen from *grace*, or to have rejected the privileges of the Gospel, when they claimed to be justified by observing the ceremonies of the Jewish law. "Shall we sin," says St. Paul, "because we are not under the law, but under *grace*? Far be it. The *grace of God* hath been declared to all men, teaching us to live as we ought:" St. Paul speaks not of the *grace of God*

which worketh in them, but of that *grace* or gracious revelation which instructs them, "that denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, they should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world."

II. Let us now consider how our salvation is owing to *grace*. By grace ye are saved: that is, to the goodness and favour of God it must altogether be ascribed that ye have the means of obtaining eternal life.

We must therefore acknowledge that our existence and all our powers and faculties are the free gift of God, and that every additional sufficiency and assistance, every revealed method of obtaining religious wisdom, every new motive to virtue, and dissuasive from vice, every direction and guidance in the way of life, wholly proceeds from the same liberality: and that the promise of eternal happiness, as the reward of our imperfect endeavours, is merely an effect of God's transcendent goodness.

God is to us the only author of the powers and faculties which we commonly call natural. In him we live and move and have our being. From him we are endued with reason and understanding; with the ability of discerning between good and evil, with the power to will and to choose that which is right.

Besides the natural powers, God affords us moreover additional helps; such is the revelation of the Gospel, which is therefore so frequently called in Scripture the *grace of God*, and the *grace of God which bringeth salvation*.

Under which general grace are included more particularly, a clearer knowledge of our duty than could be collected by the bare light of reason and the efforts of philosophy, or had been communicated by preceding revelations; a plainer discovery of eternal life, by the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead and of a judgement to come; promises of eternal glory and happiness unspeakable laid up for the righteous, and a declaration of indignation and wrath for the workers of iniquity; the example of Christ in his holy life and patient sufferings, and the relation which he bears to us as redeemer, mediator, and king, and the benefits arising to us from this relation; an assurance of the forgiveness of sins upon repentance; the assistance of the divine spirit in the practice of our duty, suited to our situation and exigencies. By these means the Gospel in the most effectual manner teaches and enables men to lead good lives, and to them who are thus taught it is the *grace of God* which bringeth salvation. Thus it is that we are saved by *grace*; and thus much is acknowledged by those Christians who are the warmest advocates for human liberty. How then can they be fairly charged with denying the necessity of divine assistance, or with representing man as able to obtain salvation by his own strength and merits, as self-sufficient and independent of his Creator? No Christian in his right senses ever held such notions as these, though many Christians have been accused of it by their zealous adversaries: but intemperate zeal is blind, and calumny leads it about by the hand,

being appointed its constant guide and inseparable companion.

As to divine assistance [e], or the ordinary influence of the Holy Spirit upon the soul of man, it is not to be expected that we should determine how often and upon what occasions it is imparted, or explain in what manner it is performed, because it cannot be distinguished from the operations of the mind itself, as every ingenuous Christian will own. No one can show where the action of the human spirit ends, and where the action of the divine spirit begins. But as man is a rational creature, and as reason is the noblest of his faculties, we may justly conclude that the Holy Spirit acts upon him in a way conformable to his nature, and principally by strengthening and improving his understanding, which will naturally have a good effect upon his behaviour; and consequently the surest evidence a Christian can give of having this divine assistance, is *to reason justly*, and *to act honestly*. This, I say, is the best proof or test, though it be one which will by no means please or suit fanatics and enthusiasts.

III. Let us consider how our salvation is owing to our own endeavours.

Whilst we acknowledge the weakness of man, and the grace or mercy of God, we must be careful,

Not to make God the author of sin, and of our cor-

[e] See Stinstra's pastoral letter, which deserves the perusal of every Christian.

ruption, by virtue of decrees established by him; and not alterable by the conduct of man:

Not to represent him as dooming almost all his creatures to eternal damnation, for being in a condition which they cannot avoid, and out of which he will not help them:

Not to vilify our natural powers and faculties, as if they were good for nothing, and incapable of any thing that is useful and praise-worthy:

Not to talk contemptuously and injuriously of the light of nature, which is no other than the candle of the Lord shining in the breast of rational creatures, and almost the only light[f] which hath been afforded to so many inhabitants of this world:

Not to make a state of grace a state of fatality and fanaticism, in which men are supposed to be converted from sin and impelled to goodness, like mere machines by the application of weights and springs. This is transforming men from rational agents into talking brutes, or walking vegetables.

Whilst we take sober and pious care to render to almighty God, and to Jesus Christ, and to the holy and sanctifying Spirit their due honour and their just glory, we must also take care not to destroy the very nature of virtue and vice, of right and wrong, by imagining that we have no power to do any thing. We must acknowledge that, as the natural abilities, with which God hath originally endowed men, are

[f] Except tradition, which was corrupted more or less.

such as they can either use or neglect, according to their choice and inclination, so the supernatural assistances afforded to men by the revelation of the Gospel, and by the influence of the Spirit, are still in the nature of assistances, which may either be received or rejected. Eternal life, as it is a gift of God which men could not possibly merit or claim by virtue of their own deserts, so it is not a gift obtruded upon them whether they will or no, but the aid to obtain it is such an aid as requires the concurrence of their own endeavours in the use and application. For this reason St. Peter exhorts Christians to grow in grace, as a thing depending upon their own efforts, and St. Paul admonishes them, not to quench or to grieve the Holy Spirit of God, who will not forcibly strive with those who resist his good impressions; and men are frequently blamed in Scripture for receiving the grace of God in vain, for resisting the Holy Ghost, and for rejecting the counsel of God against themselves.

Therefore when the Scriptures tell us in some places that we are saved by *grace*, and in other places that good men work out their own salvation, there is no inconsistency in this. They are saved by *grace*, because, without God's favourable assistance and acceptance of their imperfect endeavours, they could not of themselves acquire eternal life; and at the same time it is no less true that they work out their own salvation, because unless they exert their own powers, the grace of God alone will in no wise force them to be saved. Thus God's working in or with us, and our

working together with God are easily reconciled. And so likewise are those places of Scripture in which the wicked are represented usually as hardening themselves, and sometimes as being hardened of God. They harden themselves, because it is by their own choice, by their own obstinacy and perverseness that they become obdurate; and they are hardened of God, not by any proper and immediate act of God depriving them of reason and liberty, or compelling them to do evil; but quite on the contrary, by his continuing to give them both motives and opportunities to do well, which gifts being rejected and abused, are the innocent cause, or the occasion of their greater wickedness, and in this sense they are hardened by the very goodness of God. Besides, in the style of the Scriptures, God is often said to do what he only permits to be done, and in all other languages also, the occasion is put for the cause, both as to persons and as to things. "I came not to send peace upon earth, but a sword," says our Lord; that is, my Gospel, though it ought to produce peace and love, will prove the occasion of strife and enmity.

Thus the doctrine of divine grace and the doctrine of free will, or human liberty, unite and conspire in a friendly manner to our everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith, and humility; the second to awaken our caution, and to quicken our diligence.

DISSERTATION II.

ON THE CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING PREDESTINATION AND GRACE.

STULTI MULTUM IIS PROSUNT QUI EORUM EXEMPLO SAPERE DISCUNT.

DISSERTATION II.

ON THE CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING PREDESTINATION AND GRACE.

ABOUT the beginning of the fifth century arose a religious quarrel between our countryman Pelagius, a defender of free will or human liberty, and Augustin, who was a fatalist; an obscure [a] and intricate controversy concerning divine assistance, or *grace*, as they called it, freedom of acting, and predestination,

> Fixt fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute;

a controversy, which after it once began, never ceased, but hath been carried on by Calvinists, Arminians, Jansenists, Jesuits, Fatalists, &c.

Augustin in the days of his youth had been seduced by the Manichæans: afterwards he saw through the errors and absurdities of the sect, and forsook it. But when he was become an orthodox bishop, he propagated and defended the doctrine of predestinarian fa-

[a] Our king James the first made an edict, that no divine, under the dignity of a bishop or a dean, should presume to preach upon the profound mysteries of Predestination. I shall leave it to the reader to make such remarks as he thinks proper upon this superannuated edict.

tality, and the doctrine of persecution; for which posterity is little obliged to him.

As to the affair of persecution, he seems to have been severe by religion, and gentle by temper; which shows how important and necessary it is to have reasonable principles, without which the best-natured man is capable of doing the most ill-natured actions. Upon many occasions he interceded for the mitigation of the penalties against Pagans, Heretics, and Schismatics, even when they deserved punishment for their seditions, riots, depredations, and murders. In this respect he was mild even to an excess; for as men should not be persecuted and oppressed for speculative opinions, so they, who, under the mask of religion, or through mere wickedness, rob, plunder, maim, wound, and assassinate, should never go unpunished, and should be made examples, for the security of the government, and the good of civil society. This foolish mildness was afterwards preached up and observed by several religious persons. Thus in the eighth century, when two brothers of Gregory, bishop of Utrecht, were murdered in a forest by some robbers, and the assassins were taken and sent to Gregory, to be treated as he thought fit, he clothed and fed and dismissed them, bidding them go and sin no more. Fleury, Hist. Eccl. ix. 479. The law of God says, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed:" but it hath been a common practice with superstitious Christians, to burn heretics, and to spare the vilest malefactors at the same time.

Augustin, speaking of the Stoical doctrine, that all sins are equal, treats it as *an insult upon common sense*[b]. And yet he could not see that his own system was more absurd than all the Stoical paradoxes put together. What would a Stoic have said, if he had heard a Christian philosopher affirm that an infant, dying the same day in which he was born, was eternally damned for the sin of Adam?

Non sani esse hominis non sanus juret Orestes.

This Stoical doctrine, at the bottom, was only a quibble. These philosophers meant by it, that all sins were so far alike, as they were deviations from the rule of reason; that all actions which are not right, are wrong, and equally deserve to be called so; just as all lines which are not straight, are crooked.

Their doctrine, that *pain is no evil*, is another quibble. They were not so absurd as to hold that pain was not painful and inconvenient; they only meant that it was no moral evil.

Faustus, a Semipelagian bishop, disputing against Augustin, says, "If one is doomed to life, and another to perdition, we are not born that we may be judged, but we are judged before we are born[c]". The remark is just, and ten Augustins and Calvins cannot answer it.

[b] De parilitate peccatorum soli ausi sunt disputare contra omnem sensum generis humani.

[c] Si ergo unus ad vitam, alter ad perditionem, ut asserunt, deputatus est, sicut quidam sanctorum dixit, Non judicandi nascimur, sed judicati. De Lib. Arb. i. 4.

Augustin fell into his predestinarian notions, as Le Clerc observes, first by retaining some of his Manichæism; secondly by meditating upon the epistles of St. Paul, which he understood not, having only a slender knowledge of the Greek tongue and of the ancient fathers; and thirdly by a special grace and illumination which he fancied to have been conferred upon himself.

This *doctor of grace* had another notion, which is productive of many bad consequences, namely, that heretics have no right to their own goods and chattels. See Barbeyrac Mor. des P. 297.

According to Du Pin, he had a fine genius, and much vivacity and penetration, and was a skilful disputant. From general principles he drew a vast variety of consequences, and formed a system which is tolerably well connected in all its parts. He often quitted the sentiments of those who had been before him, and struck out new methods and interpretations. He was, as Cicero said of himself, *magnus opinator*[d], a great advancer of sentiments which were only conjectures and probabilities. He had less learning than genius, was not skilled in the languages, and had read little of the ancients. His style was fluent, but not polite and elegant, nor free from barbarisms. He was full of repetitions, and eternally dwelling upon the same sub-

[d] As *opinator* is a man who proposes dubious opinions in a dubious manner, Augustin ought perhaps rather to be called, in scholastic Latin, *Magnus dogmatizator.*

jects. He hath discussed all sorts of points and questions, and from his writings was formed that body of theology which was adopted by the Latin fathers who arose after him, and in a great measure by the scholastic divines [e].

The style of Pelagius, says Du Pin, is dry and low. He had little science, but good sense enough; and his reflections are short and judicious.

If Pelagianism was a rejecting of divine assistance, it deserved to be rejected as a false doctrine; but whether the poor Pelagians had such notions, and ascribed too much to man and too little to God, this is quite another question, for the determining of which we must not at all rely upon the testimony of their ignorant, cruel, and boisterous adversaries. One thing seems to be extremely plain and undeniable, that what was afterwards called Semipelagianism was the very doctrine of all the Greek fathers, from Justin Martyr down to Chrysostom and the writers of the fifth century.

Tillemont, after having vainly endeavoured to show that Chrysostom (according to his notions of orthodoxy) was orthodox in this point, thus concludes; "This however is certain, that he was not chosen of God to make the church triumph over the Pelagian heresy, nor have the popes, councils, and tradition proposed

[e] See an epistle of Erasmus to Eckius, p. 397. in which he sets Augustin far below Jerom, and with great reason. Augustin, as he observes, is Scriptor et obscuræ subtilitatis, et parum amœnæ prolixitatis. Epist. 1000. Scriptor ἀπεραντολόγος. Epist. 1004.

him to us as the *doctor of grace*; and therefore they who should go and seek in his writings, what is the doctrine of the church concerning this article of faith, would be like those who should seek in Origen what we ought to think concerning the Trinity, instead of consulting St. Athanasius." H. E. xi 358.

This wants no commentary, and is much the same thing as saying more openly, *Cave canem*. Have a care of Chrysostom and of the Greek fathers, on the article of predestination. Submit yourselves humbly to the divine authority of popes, councils, and tradition.

S. Basnage, in his large account of the Pelagian heresy, Annal. iii. writes in the true spirit of a party-man. The historian disappears, and in his room you find the bigoted Calvinist. I shall therefore make little use of him upon this occasion.

"There is no one question which has raised greater controversies in the church, than that concerning the grace of God and the power of man. Some, in order to vindicate God from being the author of sin, have been so solicitous to maintain the perfect freedom of men's faculties, and their liberty of choosing good or evil, that they either have, or have been thought to have diminished from the absoluteness of the sovereignty, or from the efficacy of the grace of God. They have been thought, I say, to diminish from the grace of God: for whether they have really done so, or only by their adversaries have been represented as doing so, is not very evident. Others, in the contrary extreme,

that they might be sure not to ascribe too little to the efficacy of the divine grace, have supposed men to have no natural powers at all of acting or willing, no use of the original faculties given them at their creation, no liberty of will or freedom of choice in matters of morality and religion. By which doctrine they have consequently (even themselves seeing and acknowledging the consequence) introduced an absolute necessity and fatality upon men's actions. From whence it follows, in the next step of deduction (though this indeed they are not willing to see, but in truth it does necessarily and unavoidably follow) that God himself, and not man, will be the author of sin." S. Clarke, Serm. xxx.

"One cause of trouble of mind to melancholy pious persons, is an apprehension that possibly they may be excluded from mercy, by some positive decree and fore-appointment of God. From nature and reason this apprehension cannot arise, because it is absolutely contrary to all our natural notions of the divine attributes, to conceive that the infinitely merciful and good God, whose tender mercies are over all his works, should for his own pleasure, and not for any wickedness of theirs, eternally decree any of his creatures to be miserable. Neither in Scripture indeed, any more than in the reason of things (but only in the writings of some unskilful interpreters), is there any foundation for any such apprehension. For supposing there be some few obscure texts, which unstable persons may be apt to misinterpret to their own and others' disquiet;

yet is it not fit that the whole tenour, the whole design and perpetual aim of Scripture, should be the interpreter of particular passages? And is not this the whole current of Scripture from one end to the other, to declare that far be it from God, that he should do wickedness; and from the Almighty, that he should commit iniquity; for the work of a man shall he render unto him, and cause every man to find according to his ways? That the judge of all the earth will do what is right? That he will render to every man according to what he has done, whether it be good or evil? That with righteousness shall he judge the world and the people with equity? That God made not death, neither has he pleasure in the destruction of the living? And if this were not the whole tenour of Scripture, yet is it not undeniable, that the particular texts which speak after this manner, are infinitely clearer and plainer, and less possible to be misapplied than those which are imagined to look the contrary way? Does not God swear by himself; As I live, saith the Lord, I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, but rather that he should turn from his ways and live? Does not the apostle St. Peter declare, that God is not willing that any perish, but that all should come to repentance? And St. Paul, that God would have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth? And is it not fit that these plain texts which cannot be mistaken, should be the rule by which the obscurer ones are to be interpreted, rather than that the obscurer places should cause the plain

ones to be perverted or neglected? And yet indeed even the obscure ones are not so much so in themselves, as by our want of attending to their true meaning. The ninth chapter of the epistle to the Romans, which has sometimes perplexed the minds of well-meaning persons, was by all Christians in the first ages without difficulty, and is now again by all rational men, who attend to the scope of the apostle's argument, more than to the schemes of men's own inventing, clearly understood to be written, not concerning God's choosing some particular persons, and rejecting others from eternal salvation, but concerning his rejecting the nation of the Jews, and receiving in the Gentiles to be partakers of the benefits of the Gospel: and the elect there spoken of are the whole Christian church, whereof all nevertheless do not attain unto salvation; and the reprobate there mentioned, are the whole nation of the unbelieving Jews, whereof all nevertheless were not finally cast off: And where God's fore-determination of particular persons is spoken of, it is not a fore-appointment to eternal happiness or misery, but always to some temporal office or advantage only. Thus of Jacob and Esau it was determined, before either of them was born, or had done either good or evil, that the purpose of God according to election might stand, it was determined, what? only that the elder should be servant to the younger. And when it was fore-appointed that our Saviour should be betrayed, it was likewise fore-appointed, not that Judas should betray him, but that our Lord should choose

on purpose into the number of his apostles one such person as Judas, whose own wickedness he saw would make him a proper instrument of accomplishing that design. And when St. Paul asks, Who maketh thee to differ from another? he does not speak of moral dispositions, but of miraculous qualifications for offices and dignities in the church; as is evident from the context. And when God hardened Pharaoh's heart, it was not that God originally made him wicked, but his own obstinate wickedness made him worthy to be judicially hardened, and a fit person to be raised up by providence, for the manifestation of God's glory in his exemplary destruction." S. Clarke, Serm. clxxii.

The Pelagians were charged with holding that man was able to perform a perfect obedience. This was a nice point in the controversy; and the Pelagians reasoned about it thus:

When a man commits a sin, it is by his own fault, else he would contract no guilt, and deserve no punishment. He might therefore have abstained from it by his own natural powers, or by the assistance of God, which would have been granted to him if he had qualified himself to receive it. If this be so of any sin, and of each sin, it must hold true of all the sins which a man commits; and he might have avoided them.

Therefore it is naturally possible that a man may live without sin; but yet, morally speaking, all circumstances being considered, it is impossible for a man to offend in no instance; and it is a certain fact, that

there never was a man who performed an unsinning obedience, except Jesus Christ.

Such was the doctrine of the Pelagians; and thus, in the doctrine of chances, there are events which are barely possible, but improbable to such a degree, that it may be presumed they would not happen once in ten thousand experiments repeated for ten thousand years together.

'TOWARDS[f] the latter part of the fourth century, an infinite number of people used to go and visit the holy places in Palæstine, and this caused the works of Origen to be known in the west. Amongst others, Rufinus a presbyter of Aquileia, after having spent thirty years in the east, and studied under Evagrius an Origenist, not only imbibed the sentiments of Origen, but, returning into Italy, spread them every where by translating divers books of this father. It was from Rufinus that Pelagius and Cælestius learned at Rome those doctrines for which they were afterwards condemned. They were both of them monks of Great

[f] 'I drew up this *abridgment* of the history of Pelagius, whilst I was giving an extract of bishop Usher's book. The works of cardinal Noris, Garnier, and Pagi might be serviceable to correct many things in that history of Usher, particularly as to the chronology, which was not sufficiently cleared up in his days.' Le Clerc, Bibl. Chois. viii. 308.

I have here *abridged* this *abridgment* of Le Clerc, leaving out some of the theological part of it, and confining myself chiefly to the historical points, and adding several remarks of my own.

Britain; Cælestius of Scotland, and Pelagius of England. The second was called *Morgan*[5], i. e. *sea-born*, in Greek, Πελάγιος, which name he went by in foreign countries. If we may believe Jerom, Pelagius was a blockhead, who knew not how to express himself, and more worthy of pity than of envy, and Cælestius was a maker of solœcisms and a blunderer. But Augustin speaks of their abilities with esteem; and indeed from the fragments of their works we may see that they were not such dunces as Jerom represents them.

'Pelagius stayed a considerable time at Rome, where he acquired a great reputation by his works, and by his conduct; so that Augustin, bishop of Hippo, highly commended him, and wrote him a very obliging letter before the quarrel between them had commenced.

'Rome being taken by the Goths, Pelagius departed thence to go into the east, and stopped at Afric, but made no stay there. His disciple Cælestius remained at Carthage, and desired to be admitted a presbyter of that church; but as he made no scruple to maintain the sentiments of his master, he was accused by Paulinus, deacon of the church, at a council in which Aurelius, bishop of Carthage, presided, A. D. 412. Cælestius was there condemned, and excommunicated, as having maintained some propositions, relating to original sin and to human liberty, which were injurious

[5] See Colomesii Opuscula, cap. 29.

to the grace of God. Cælestius gave an answer to the objections; but we have only fragments of his reply, in the books of Augustin; that is to say, we have no other witnesses of his doctrine than his adversaries, who took no care to propose their own objections clearly, or to comprehend the sentiments of those whom they accused. Cælestius said, amongst other things, that as to the propagation of sin, he had heard it denied by several catholic presbyters, and particularly by Rufinus. He presented a petition to the council, in which he acknowledged that infants were redeemed by baptism. But notwithstanding this, he was condemned, and obliged to depart from Afric; and he withdrew to Sicily, where he wrote some treatises in his own defence. From Sicily were sent to St. Augustin some short questions which Cælestius had drawn up, to prove that man is not by his nature irresistibly impelled to do evil. These queries are contained in fourteen articles, which Usher hath set down.

'At the same time Pelagius, who was at Jerusalem, published several tracts, in which he explained his sentiments more fully. St. Augustin undertook to refute one of these treatises, in his book *of nature and grace.*

'Three years after the condemnation of Cælestius at Carthage, his master Pelagius was accused at Jerusalem of holding the same sentiments, and John, bishop of that city, summoned an assembly to examine him. That they might know what had been done in Afric against Cælestius, three Latin presbyters, Avitus, Vi-

talis, and Orosius were called to the assembly. The latter was then at Bethlehem, studying, as he says, at the feet of St. Jerom, to whom St. Augustin had recommended him. As he had been present in Afric at the time when Cælestius was condemned, he related to the assembly with what zeal the Carthaginian synod had proceeded against that heretic; and he added, that St. Augustin had written a book against Pelagius, and had also, in a letter sent to Sicily, refuted the questions of Cælestius. This letter he produced, and read it to the company; and then John desired that Pelagius might be introduced. This was permitted (says Orosius) either out of respect to that bishop, or because it was thought proper that this prelate should confute him to his face. Pelagius was asked whether he acknowledged that he had taught doctrines which Augustin, bishop of Hippo, had confuted. He instantly replied, "And who is this Augustin?" Upon which (says Orosius) all cried out that a man who blasphemed against a bishop, by whose mouth the Lord had preserved union in Afric, deserved to be banished not only from that assembly, but from the whole church. Yet John made him sit down amongst the catholic presbyters, though a lay-man and guilty of heresy; and then said to him, "I am Augustin;" to the end that acting in the name of that bishop, he might the more freely forgive Pelagius, and soften the irritated assembly. We all made answer (says Orosius), "If you represent here the person of Augustin, follow his sentiments."

'The council of Diospolis[h] having examined Pelagius, A.D.415, and heard and approved his answers, declared him worthy of the communion of the catholic church. His enemies accused him of having concealed his true sentiments, and imposed upon the Greek clergy; and St. Augustin says, that the answers of Pelagius were orthodox, as the fathers of the council understood them, and not in the sense of Pelagius. But they who have not so bad an opinion of Pelagius, observe that St. Augustin, who was ignorant of the Greek language, might also be mistaken himself, and could not possibly know what the Greek church held concerning this subject. If he had been able to read the Greek fathers, say they, he would have found that they spake exactly like Pelagius, as it may be proved by innumerable passages of St. Chrysostom, and his disciple St. Isidorus, whom some moderns have openly accused of Pelagianism. It is not therefore strange that the Greek bishops approved the expressions of the English monk.

'Before the acts of this council were published, Pelagius wrote to one of his friends, informing him that his sentiments had been approved by it, and published this letter. He also drew up a kind of apology for the council, A. D. 416, and sent it to the bishop of Hippo, who having received no other letter from Palæstine, would not trust to it. With some other Afri-

[h] Jerom calls them *a pitiful assembly*, for suffering themselves to be overreached by Pelagius: but they seem to me to have been prudent and moderate men.

can bishops, he wrote to John of Jerusalem, to have the very acts of the council of Diospolis. In the meantime St. Jerom, who had written against the Pelagians, and particularly against the bishop of Jerusalem, occasioned a disorder which happened at Bethlehem, in which a deacon was killed, and some monasteries were burnt. The bishop was accused of having excited this tumult; but they had not time to make him give an account of it, for he died in that year. St. Jerom, who had offended the bishops of Palæstine by despising their assembly, thought it expedient to wheedle[1] the African bishops, and make them his friends, though he was not altogether in their way of thinking, but held the opinions of the Semipelagians. Therefore he wrote to St. Augustin in these terms: "I am resolved to love you, to honour you, to reverence and admire you, and to defend your sayings as though they were my own."

'Pelagius was every where accused of denying altogether the assistance of grace. To justify himself he wrote a book on Free-will, in which he acknowledged six kinds of grace, one kind of which is thus represented by him: "I hold that grace consists not only in the law of God, but in the assistance of God. He assists us by his doctrine and revelation, by opening the eyes of the mind, by showing us things future, that the things present may not have dominion over

[1] Though, to do him justice, he was usually more given to biting than to fawning.

us, by discovering to us the snares of the devil, and by illuminating us with divers and ineffable gifts of his heavenly grace. Can you imagine," adds Pelagius, "that they who speak thus are deniers of grace? Do they not rather acknowledge at the same time both human liberty and divine grace?"

'St. Augustin on this occasion accuses Pelagius not of having absolutely deined grace, but of having denied the necessity of it, and of having said, that God gave it only to enable free agents to pursue good with more facility. This grace, indeed, according to Pelagius, did not infallibly and of itself produce a will to do right; it only made the performance of our duty more easy to us.

'Never was there a dispute more embarrassed than this; because each party, being pressed by some troublesome consequence, endeavoured to shun the difficulty, by using terms to which they gave a sense different from that which their adversaries ascribed to the same words. Thus the word *grace* did not signify the same thing with Pelagius, as with the bishop of Hippo; and the latter gave the name of *liberty* to that which is not usually so called. In short, many are of opinion that if we carefully examine the words which have been most used in this controversy, and the ideas which have been annexed to them, we shall hardly find one of these ideas to be clear and distinct. Some words, according to them, will be found, which have absolutely no meaning at all [k]: so that in some

[k] One of the school-men, whose name was Suicet, and who

parts of this dispute, the contenders might be compared to a Frenchman and an Arabian, each of them knowing only his mother-tongue, who should bawl in their turns as loud as they were able, and sometimes both at once, without understanding one another, and then boast that they had confuted their adversary [1].

'The year after the council of Diospolis, two councils were held in Afric concerning this affair, one at Carthage, the other at Milevum. Aurelius, bishop of Carthage, presided at the first, where sixty-seven bishops were assembled. They had not yet received in Afric the acts of Diospolis; but Eros and Lazarus had written them an account of these transactions, and had sent their letter by Orosius. Upon this report it was resolved to anathematize the opinions of Pelagius, lest they should spread; and then to anathematize both him and his disciple Cælestius, if they would not clearly condemn those errors. After this, they transmitted the acts of their council to pope Innocent, to engage him to condemn these opinions. The council of Milevum, consisting of sixty-one bishops, concurred with their brethren of Carthage. Besides the

passed for a very subtil disputant, when he was old, used to weep, because he did not understand what he had composed in the days of his youth. Hence arises a question, whether Suicet's intellects were improved or impaired by old age?

[1] It is all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation, who has no settled abode. Locke on Hum. Understanding.

synodal letters of these two councils, Innocent received private ones from some African bishops and from St. Augustin. The drift of all these letters was to induce the pope to condemn the doctrine ascribed to Pelagius, and to cite him also, to know whether he persisted in his errors; and therefore they insinuated that Pelagius had deceived the bishops of Palæstine, though they were afraid of affirming it positively, lest they should set the African and the Eastern churches at variance. Innocent, in the year following, sent an answer to the councils and to the private letters. He said that, in his opinion, Pelagius and Cælestius deserved to be excommunicated, and that the first could not have cleared himself at Diospolis, unless by ambiguous expressions and equivocations: but he added, that as he had not yet received any certain accounts from those parts, or knew how things had been transacted, he could not either approve or disapprove the conduct of the bishops of Palæstine. He also excused himself, as to the citing of Pelagius, on account of the distance of place. Innocent wrote these answers in the beginning of the year, and died soon after.

'After his death, St. Augustin and Alypius wrote to St. Paulinus, bishop of Nola, exhorting him to oppose Pelagianism in Italy, if there was danger of its making any progress there.

'In the mean time Cælestius came and presented himself, of his own accord, to Zosimus, who succeeded

Innocent, and offered to him a small treatise, in which he explained his own belief.

'In it he went through all the articles of Faith, from the Trinity to the Resurrection of the dead, and declared, that in all these points he held the opinions of the catholic church. To this he added, that if disputes had arisen concerning other subjects which were not articles of faith, he for his part had never assumed an authority to make them necessary doctrines, but rather chose to offer to the judgement and examination of Zosimus what he had collected concerning them from the prophets and apostles, that he might correct his own errors, if he was fallen into any. Lastly, he explained his notions concerning the controverted points, and he expressly denied that men were born sinners.

'Zosimus cited Cælestius to appear before him in the church of St. Clemens, where he ordered this writing to be read, and then asked the author, whether he believed what was contained in it. Cælestius affirmed it; and then Zosimus proposed some questions to him, which amounted to these; whether he condemned the doctrines which Paulinus, deacon of Carthage, had laid to his charge? He answered, that he could prove Paulinus to be a heretic, and that he would not condemn those doctrines of which he had been accused by him. The other question was, whether he would condemn what pope Innocent had condemned, and would follow the sentiments of the church of Rome? He answered that he would.

'After these formalities, Zosimus wrote to the African bishops a long letter, in which he relates to them how Cælestius had appeared before him, and how he had been examined; he then reproaches them for having acted in this affair with too much precipitation, and for having too lightly believed idle rumours, and certain letters of Eros and Lazarus[m], without sufficient evidence of their integrity. He, in conclusion, cites the accusers of Cælestius to appear at Rome within two months. Yet he thought it not proper to take off the excommunication which the African bishops had pronounced against Cælestius.

'As in those days the judgement of a synod, and even of a single bishop, particularly a bishop of Rome, was of great weight, howsoever it had been obtained, and as Zosimus was afterwards accused of prevarication in condemning Pelagius, whose doctrine he had before approved and justified, St. Augustin endeavoured to give the best turn he could to the conduct of Zosimus, as if this prelate had showed himself favourable to Cælestius out of mere pity, and in hopes[n]

[m] Zosimus tells Lazarus, that he was an old calumniator, who had been condemned by Proculus, bishop of Marseilles, in a synod, because he had falsely and maliciously accused Britius, bishop of Tours; and that after this, being ordained bishop of Aix by the favour of the tyrant and usurper Constantine, he had held the shadow of episcopacy whilst the power of that tyrant continued; and as to Eros, he reproaches him for having followed the same party, and committed acts of violence. Du Pin.

[n] In homine acerrimi ingenii, qui profecto, si corrigeretur, plurimis profuisset, voluntas emendationis, non falsitas dogmatis approbata est.

that, since Cælestius had not dogmatized, but proposed his opinions as points on which he wished to be instructed, it might not be difficult to bring him to a better mind. But, says Usher, the learned Vossius hath showed long ago, that this great bishop laboured in vain to justify Zosimus and to conceal his faults. From the letters which he wrote to the African bishops it is manifest that he considered Cælestius and Pelagius as men who had not departed from the catholic faith.

'Zosimus having sent his letter to Afric, received a packet from Palæstine directed to Innocent, whose death was not known there. It contained some letters from Praylus, bishop of Jerusalem, and an apology of Pelagius, and a small treatise in which he explained his sentiments very clearly. The bishop of Jerusalem openly espoused the cause of Pelagius. Zosimus ordered these letters and writings to be publicly read; and they were generally approved, as he soon after informed the African bishops: "Would to God (said he), my dearest brethren, that some of you had been present at the reading of these letters! how great was the joy of the holy men who heard them! how much were they admired by every one! Scarcely could some of the assembly refrain from tears. Is it possible that men whose faith is so pure should have been so calumniated? Is there any part of their writings in which they do not mention the divine grace and the divine assistance?"

'Besides this, he condemned in his letter Eros and Lazarus, the accusers of Pelagius and Cælestius, as

men guilty of great crimes, *erubescenda factis et damnationibus nomina*, and spake with much contempt of the rest of their prosecutors.

'Yet the African bishops had no regard to these remonstrances. They assembled again at Carthage, in number two hundred and fourteen, and again condemned Pelagius and Cælestius, till they should admit the necessity of grace in the same sense in which it was maintained in Afric, without recourse to their usual shufflings and evasions.

'This assembly was held in the year 418, and sent its constitutions, together with a letter, to Zosimus, in which these bishops exhort him to proceed against Pelagius according to their determinations. Their letter had the effect which they desired; and Zosimus with all his clergy, who once had so highly admired the writings of Pelagius in which he had so clearly set forth his opinions, yet "now (as St. Augustin relates it) giving attention to what was believed concerning it by the Romans, whose faith is to be praised in the Lord, found that their sentiments were unanimous and zealous for the Catholic truth against the errors of Pelagius." However, Zosimus, when he condemned him, did not speak with the same warmth which he had showed when he decided in his favour, as may be seen in Usher.

'The emperors Honorius and Theodosius received also the acts of the African council, and thought themselves obliged to strengthen them by their authority. They made an edict, which they sent to the three

præfects of the *prætorium*, to be published throughout the empire, by which they banished Pelagius and Cælestius from Rome, and condemned to perpetual exile and confiscation of estates all who should maintain their doctrines in any place; and they authorized all persons to inform against them and accuse them.

'The præfects accompanied this imperial law with edicts of their own, one of which is still extant, and runs thus:

'If [o] he, who is fallen into the infamous sentiments of this obscure heresy, be a laic or an ecclesiastic, and any one drag him before the judge, no exceptions to the person and character of the accuser shall be admitted, and the accused shall be stripped of all his possessions, and sent into perpetual banishment.

'Some will be inclined to suspect that this edict, conceived in terms so emphatical, must have been penned by some zealous ecclesiastic; but this is nothing in comparison with the imperial laws of Honorius and Theo-

[o] "Et si sit ille plebeius ac clericus, qui in caliginis hujus obscœna reciderit, a quocunque tractus ad judicem, sine accusatricis discretione personæ, facultatum publicatione nudatus, irrevocabile patietur exilium."

According to this righteous law, the testimony of one person, and any person, if an idiot, a lunatic, a cut-purse, a knight of the post, was sufficient to convict and condemn a man of Pelagianism! One would think that the emperors of those times had sworn to extinguish the Roman spirit, and the Christian spirit, and to turn all their subjects into spies, informers, bigots, fanatics, and persecutors.

dosius, which may be seen in Usher. They who are acquainted with the style of the preachers in those days, will easily believe that a man must have been long accustomed to such compositions, before he could have prefaced an imperial edict in these terms, which I shall not attempt to translate:

"Ad conturbandam Catholicæ simplicitatis lucem, puro semper splendore radiantem, dolosæ artis ingenio, novam subito emicuisse versutiam, pervulgatâ opinione cognovimus: quæ fallacis scientiæ obumbrata mendaciis, et furiato tantum debacchata luctamine, stabilem quietem cœlestis conatur attrectare fidei; dum novi acuminis commendata vento, insignem notam plebeiæ æstimat vilitatis sentire cum cunctis, ac prudentiæ singularis palmam fore, communiter approbata destruere, &c."

[Let us try, however, what a figure it will make in English.

We have been informed from common report, that, to disturb by the wit of deceitful artifice the light of Catholic simplicity, ever glittering with the purest splendor, a new subtility hath suddenly started forth, which, clouded with the lies of fallacious science, and only blustering with frantic struggles, attempts to lay rude hands on the stable quiet of heavenly faith; whilst recommended to [*or* by] the wind of new acuteness, it accounts it a mark of plebeian meanness to think with the many, and a trophy of singular prudence to destroy whatsoever enjoys the general approbation, &c.

Dark and uncouth as this is, yet we may discover in it the drift of the legislator, or rather of his secretary, which was first to compose a most elegant preamble, and secondly to throw dirt on a persecuted sect, and to make it odious. Though he could hardly be guilty of reading Cicero, he seems some way or other to have purloined a precept laid down by the orator: Qui semel verecundiæ fines transierit, eum bene et naviter oportet esse impudentem. "He who hath bid adieu to modesty, ought to be impudent to some purpose."

Hard was the fate of the Pelagians, to be insulted and crushed by such adversaries, who, though in their own conceits they were vessels of holiness, filled with spiritual gifts and graces, yet certainly had not the gift of good sense, or the graces of candour and moderation!]

'The rest is in the same style; and from this edict we may learn, that the spiritual methods for the conversion of heretics in the days of Honorius were not very different from those which have been used in these later ages.

'In the mean time the African bishops who had just condemned Pelagius, as yet not knowing any thing of the imperial edict which was dated the last of April, assembled on the day following, at Carthage, and condemned as Pelagian heresies, eight propositions, of which some had never been adopted by the Pelagians. But it hath been always the custom of councils, whilst they condemned the real opinions of heretics, to ana-

thematize also errors which no man alive ever maintained[p]: and this was done, perhaps, to inspire and excite a greater horror for heresy, and to deter men from the rash and dangerous attempt of protecting the persons of heretics. Thus, as St. Augustin expresses it, "by the vigilance of episcopal councils, and by the succour of our Lord and Saviour who defends his church [he should have added, *and by the powerful aid of imperial edicts*], Pelagius and Cælestius were condemned by all the Christian world, unless they should repent."

'But Pelagius, who was still at Jerusalem, being pressed by Pinianus and Melania, published a declaration concerning grace, which he acknowledged to be necessary for every action, and at every moment. He said also that he held the same opinion concerning baptism which he had delivered in his profession of faith to pope Innocent; namely, that children ought to be baptized, as it had been practised in the church. But whatsoever he might say, none believed that he meant it in the sense of the African church.

'At this time Julian, an Italian bishop, published, besides other treatises, four books against the first of St. Augustin *De concupiscentia et nuptiis*, in which he maintained the sentiments of Pelagius, and openly declared the African bishops to be seditious innovators, and said that certainly they could not have rea-

[p] Our ecclesiastical judges used the Lollards in the same manner. Burnet, Hist. of the Reform. vol. i. p. 29.

son on their side [q], since instead of using arguments they had recourse to violence, and terrified their opponents by imperial edicts, which might silence the timorous, but could never satisfy the wise. He accused Zosimus of prevarication, in condemning Pelagius after he had approved his doctrines. As to the African synods, he observed that they who had been condemned there had not been permitted to speak for themselves; that no man can be a proper judge of controverted points, unless he bring with him a mind free from pride, prejudice, affection, self-interest, wrath, and hatred; that the African prelates could not be impartial judges, because they had conceived a detestation for the sentiments of Pelagius, even before they knew any thing concerning them; and that votes ought not to be counted, but weighed. In short, he produced all the objections which are usually made to the *decrees* of *councils*.

Another assembly was held at Carthage, A. D. 419, consisting of two hundred and seventeen bishops, who ratified all that the former synods had done against Pelagius. And indeed, to use the words of St. Prosper, How could it possibly be otherwise, where Aurelius was the president, and Augustin the director?

Arte aliunde in finem potuit procedere sanctum
Concilium, cui dux Aurelius, ingeniumque
Augustinus erat?

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q ——laborare illam partem rationis inopiâ, quæ in disserendo dum tarnarem surrogat, nullum a prudentibus impetrat, sed cæcum a meticulosis extorquet assensum.

But the episcopal authority was again enforced on this occasion by the power of the emperors, who, in a letter to Aurelius, confirmed their former edict, and ordered that if any one knew in what place of the empire Pelagius and Cælestius were lurking, and should not discover them, or instantly drive them out, he should suffer the same punishments as were appointed for heretics. And to chastize the obstinacy of some bishops who connived at the maintainers of this heresy, or who did not openly attack it, Aurelius was commanded to see that they who would not sign the condemnation of Pelagianism should be deposed, excommunicated, and banished, and to publish this edict throughout Afric. These orders he executed punctually, sending with the edict a circular letter to the bishops, and exhorting all who had, or who had not, been present at the last council to sign its decrees. The bishops who were in the sentiments of Pelagius signed them with great reluctance, and eighteen of them wrote to the bishop of Thessalonica, to try whether they could gain over the eastern prelates to their side. To engage them the more easily, they accused their adversaries of Manichæism, because the Manichæans also held the inevitable necessity of sinning, and the natural corruption of man. This accusation was the more odious, as St. Augustin, their chief adversary, in his youth had been infected with the Manichæan notions, and then had abjured them, and opposed them on the very same principles which were held by the Pelagians; principles which he once

admitted, and now rejected and anathematized since he had been made a bishop.

On the other hand, Julian wrote to Rome, and Cælestius went to Constantinople, A. D. 419, to try if he could get friends there. But, after the imperial edicts which have been mentioned, there was small hope of success. Cælestius was ill received by Atticus the bishop. The Pelagians were also ill used at Ephesus and Sicily, as St. Prosper tells us; and Constantius, whom Honorius had adopted as partner in the empire, published an edict against those who should conceal Cælestius, A. D. 420.

St. Jerom died this year, and St. Augustin composed his four books addressed to Bonifacius, who succeeded Zosimus, and six against Julian, addressed to Claudius. In these he extols St. Jerom, and affirms that he was in the same sentiments with the African bishops: but St. Jerom, though he had indeed attacked the Pelagians, yet had employed neither the arguments nor the principles of St. Augustin [r].

Whilst Pelagius lay concealed in the East [s], and

[r] Jerom was for human liberty as well as the Pelagians, and acted in unhandsome and disingenuous part when he joined himself to their persecutors, who were Fatalists.

[s] The miserable Pelagius hid himself in some hole, and passed the rest of his days, like an owl or a bat, in obscurity, and probably never returned more to his native land. He was condemned by men who did not understand his meaning, as Stillingfleet candidly observes in his Origines Britannicæ. Molina, a Spanish Jesuit, and his disciples, used to say, that if the fathers who op-

held his peace, Julian wrote eight books against the second of Augustin *De concupiscentia et nuptiis*, having refuted the first in the four books which have been mentioned. St. Augustin, who had answered the first work of Julian, undertook to answer the second, but died before he had finished his reply.

'Julian gave a full scope to his resentment in these books, and seems to have designed, by insulting the adversaries of Pelagius, to revenge himself of the cruel edicts which they had obtained against the Pelagians. But he fared the worse for it; and Cælestinus bishop of Rome banished him from Italy, with all the prelates who were of that party.

'Yet it appears that Pelagianism spread itself, under all these difficulties, since the emperor Valentinian thought it necessary to purge Gaul of this heresy, by an edict, A. D. 425, in which he commanded Patroclus bishop of Arles to visit several bishops who followed the sentiments of Pelagius, and to declare to them that, if within twenty days they did not retract their errors, they should be banished from Gaul, and deprived of their bishoprics.

'Joannes Cassianus, who had been deacon to St. Chrysostom, and ordained presbyter by Innocent I, retiring to Marseilles, wrote some treatises, in which having softened the sentiments of Pelagius, whom in other respects he condemned as a heretic, he gave

posed Pelagius had considered what they were doing, and if Pelagius had defended himself in a proper manner, they never would have condemned him. Enriquez.

birth to a doctrine which hath since been called Semipelagianism.

'The difference between the Pelagians and the Semipelagians seems to have been only this, that the latter acknowledged a natural corruption of man in some degree, and insisted more upon the necessity of grace, at least in words.

'Yet they anathematized Pelagius, upon the supposition perhaps that he adopted all those opinions which the African councils had condemned, and laid to his charge.

'The notions of St. Augustin, opposed to those of the Pelagians and Semipelagians, may be found in his books of *predestination* and *perseverance*, and in the writings of St. Prosper.

'In the year 429, one Agricola, the son of a Pelagian bishop, carried Pelagianism into England. But St. Germanus, bishop of Auxerre, was sent thither by pope Cælestinus, or by the bishops of Gaul, to extirpate this heresy. Many miracles are said to have been wrought by him in his voyage, and during his abode in England, which may be found in bishop Usher. But if what Hector Boetius relates in his history of the Scots be true, Germanus made use of a method which is not less efficacious for the destruction of heresy; and *the Pelagians who would not retract their errors were burnt, by the care and order of the magistrates.*'

[Le Clerc hath passed over the wonderful works of Germanus; but I think they deserve to be laid before

the reader, as an important specimen of the miracles of the fifth century.

As Germanus was sailing to Britain, a horrible tempest arose, raised by the devil, as it afterwards plainly appeared. The saint was fast asleep in the ship; but being roused by the cries of the perishing crew, he rebuked the storm, and in the name of the Trinity sprinkled a few drops of holy oil upon the raging waves, and instantly there was a great calm.

A multitude of Britons were assembled together, expecting his arrival, for the devils had foretold his coming; and when he afterwards cast them out of dæmoniacs, they honestly owned that it was they who raised the storm.

When he landed, he disputed with the Pelagians, and by a torrent of eloquence, and the irresistible dint of demonstration, he so confuted them, that they had not one word to say for themselves, good or bad; insomuch that the populace was hardly restrained from assaulting these stubborn heretics, and beating their stupid brains out.

A man of quality had a blind daughter, and Germanus, calling on the Trinity, touched her eyes with some relics which he had in a box, and instantly she received her sight. Germanus put these relics into the tomb of St. Alban, for the benefit of the English, and in lieu of them took away what was as good, namely, a bit of earth where the blood of Alban had been shed.

The Picts and Saxons at that time invaded England;

but Germanus put himself at the head of the Britons, and procured a miraculous victory. Though he had grace irresistible and præternatural powers on his side, yet he thought it proper not to neglect the art military: he sent forth scouts to *reconnoitre* the enemy, and to know the nature of the ground, and he posted himself to the best advantage, and played the part of the saint and of the soldier;

Ἀμφότερον, ἱερεύς τ' ἀγαθὸς, κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.

In his return homewards he sprained his foot, and whilst he was confined in bed, a fire broke out, which burnt all the adjacent buildings, but had no power to hurt the saint, or even the house where he lay. S. Basnage relates these Calvinistical miracles, as a man somewhat inclined to believe them. Ann. iii. 328.

Germanus made a second visit to Britain, A. D. 446, to fight the Pelagians once more, and performed a multitude of miracles, and even raised the dead. He continued the trade of a wonder-worker to the end of his days. Fleury, H. E. tom. vi.

And yet, which is very strange, Germanus himself is suspected of having been a Semipelagian, and was intimate with Hilary of Arles, who was infected with those notions. Stillingfleet, Orig. Brit.]

'But whilst St. German was purging and purifying England, the seeds of Pelagianism were sprouting up in France, which had been sowed by Cassianus amongst the monks of Marseilles and in Gallia Narbonensis. St. Prosper and Hilary had written to St. Augustin

about it, and had informed him that many ecclesiastics in Gaul accounted his sentiments to be dangerous innovations. St. Augustin had answered their objections in the books which have been mentioned; but the Semipelagians, being protected by Hilary bishop of Riez, were unmolested, although they declared a great dislike of the doctrine of St. Augustin.

'Julian and the other bishops, who, as we observed, were expelled from Italy, repaired to Constantinople, where they importuned the emperor that they might be reestablished: but as they had been accused of heresy, he would grant them nothing, without first knowing the reasons for which they had been banished. Nestorius, bishop of Constantinople, wrote concerning this affair to pope Cælestinus, who sent him a rude answer, telling him that it was no concern of his to inquire into the causes for which these bishops had been condemned, and reproaching him at the same time for his own heterodoxies.'

[Julian, for defending free-will and conditional decrees in opposition to the African innovations, was anathematized, banished, deposed, and driven about from place to place, a vagabond and a fugitive. His declaring his sentiments so freely on these points, at the expense of his preferment, reputation, and repose, and against all his temporal interests, creates a favourable prejudice in his behalf. He was an Italian, and the son of a bishop, and in his youth he married a lady of a consular family. His wife, it is thought,

was dead before these calamities fell upon him, and he might have said, with old Evander,

Tuque, o sanctissima conjux,
Felix morte tua, neque in hunc servata dolorem!

The friendly hand of death removed this bishop beyond the reach of his inexorable enemies, about the year 455, after he had distributed all his goods to the poor in a time of famine, and had kept a little school, to get his bread. He was ingenious, and learned, and eloquent for those times, and well versed in the holy Scriptures, even his adversaries being judges, and he was commonly called the *Roman Demosthenes*. He is treated as an obstinate heretic by S. Basnage, Tillemont, Cave, Jenken in his *Defensio Augustini adversus Phereponum*, and many other moderns; but Du Pin speaks candidly of him.

Jenken in his *Defensio*, which is a mere panegyric upon Augustin, and an invective against Le Clerc, says of Julian; "At si Julianus qualis fuerit novit Phereponus, cur fœda ejus et verba et crimina non notavit? cur eum contra S. Augustinum audiendum censuit? Hac præsertim in re; qui et INCESTA LIBIDINE *in sororem suam lasciviret*, et obscœnis Augustinum convitiis insectaretur? Istud se Marius Mercator novisse affirmat.——Ea ignorare Phereponus non potuit, saltem non debuit: multo autem minus debuit infamis hæretici auctoritate, quæ nulla est, adversus catholicæ ecclesiæ episcopum pugnare."

As if any regard were to be paid to Mercator, a controversialist by trade, and a professed enemy and persecutor of Julian, who struck in with the violent party of those days, and insulted Theodorus Mopsuestenus, Nestorius, Julian, Theodoret, and the Pelagians, and who had the impudence to say of Theodoret that he was *inspired by the devil!* If Jenken was resolved at all adventures to believe him, he should, however, have examined his voucher, such as he was, a little more carefully; for even Mercator himself hath not charged Julian with *incestuous practices*, and Tillemont himself did not so understand the words of Mercator, which he hath translated H. E. xiii. 818. Mercator, speaking of Julian's sisters, who, as he says, had lost their reputation, (fine stuff to be inserted in religious controversies!) cries out, "Tu merito duas sorores tuas talibus disciplinis tui oris erudisti. Novimus, novimus quid tibi una earum, cum tu nimis severus in ejus ruinam pudoris insurgeres, objecerit vel exprobraverit: atque tu mutus illico non ausus ei ulterius censuræ tuæ ullas dolori ejus inferre molestias." This Mercator seems to have been a dealer in *hear-says* and *calumnies*; and I wonder that S. Basnage, having observed of him that he was extremely litigious, *in hæreticos pugnax*, should have added, *abundabat Mercator amore veritatis*. He might better have said, *amore rixarum*.]

'About the same time died St. Augustin, whose elogium may be seen in bishop Usher. Fulgentius calls him *an inspired man*,

'The council of Ephesus, composed of two hundred and ten bishops, assembled A. D. 431 to condemn Nestorius. Cyril of Alexandria presided there, and during their sessions John bishop of Antioch, with thirty bishops, met together, and made canons contrary to those of the council. What is remarkable is, that the two factions of Cyril and of John accused each other of Pelagianism; but the majority approved the deposing of Julian and of the other Italian bishops whom Nestorius had treated more gently. He himself was accused of holding Pelagian opinions, and of teaching that Jesus Christ, by the good use which he had made of his free-will, became the Son of God, and that God to reward his obedience had united him to the *eternal Word*. Therefore the council of Ephesus condemned Pelagianism and Nestorianism both together.'

[Cyril and his righteous comrades, within the space of one day, cited, examined, deposed, and delivered over to Satan the unfortunate Nestorius, who was absent and unheard. They condemned him in the most reviling manner, but not without shedding plenty of tears over him, as they themselves have told us, *lacrymis subinde perfusi*. The tears of these *Ephesian fathers* were like the tears of the *Ephesian matron*, soon dried up, and they had the consolation to kill old Nestorius afterwards with repeated cruelty and ill usage.

Nestorius was a man retired and studious, of a sober life and regular conversation, and of an impetuous

zeal against those who were called heretics, whom he harassed and oppressed whilst he had power and credit: so that if he had never disputed about some intricacies of metaphysical divinity, and the *titles* of the virgin Mary, we should have found him enrolled amongst the saints, and he and Cyril would have been a couple of *burning tapers* in the catholic church.]

'But notwithstanding all this violence, and the care of three popes, Cælestinus, Xystus III, and Leo I, Semipelagianism supported itself in Gaul. Perhaps the manner in which Cælestinus wrote to the French bishops contributed towards it; for though he warmly condemned Pelagius, and highly extolled St. Augustin, he said at the end of the letter, that as to the profound and difficult questions which were mixed with the controversy, and had been largely discussed by the Antipelagians, as he would not despise them, so neither could he think it necessary to determine any thing concerning them. We may see in Usher's account how St. Prosper, and Xystus, and Leo laboured to confute or destroy Pelagianism and Semipelagianism.

'A monk called Faustus had retired from England to France, and was made bishop of Riez, after Maximus. A council was held at Arles about the year 468, and another at Lions; and this Faustus, by their order, drew up his sentiments concerning the doctrine of grace, and made some additions to them, on an

count of certain new errors lately discovered. These errors were what the divines of Marseilles called the *predestinatian heresy*, which some think to have been a real heresy, and others judge to have been the very doctrine of St. Augustin.'

[It is much disputed whether these men were heretics. The Calvinists are not willing to own it, and say, that they were neither more nor less than the orthodox followers of the orthodox Augustin, who were called *predestinatians*, and treated as heretics by the Pelagians. S. Basnage contends for this, and justifies his old friends. He is right, I think, in determining that these were mere Augustinians. If Augustin then had wrong notions about grace and predestination, so had they.]

'This work of Faustus is still extant, and is entitled, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, adressed to Leontius archbishop of Arles, and it most manifestly contains the Semipelagian doctrines.

'Faustus sent the opinions of the second council of Arles to a predestinatian presbyter, one Lucidus, to oblige him to retract his errors, and subscribe to the doctrine of that council. We have his letter to Lucidus, and the answer of that presbyter addressed to the bishops assembled at Arles, in which he declares, "That he condemns the sentiments of those who thought that free-will was quite lost after the fall of the first man; that Christ did not die for all men; that some are predestinated to death, and others to life; that

from Adam to Jesus Christ no Pagan had been saved, by the first grace of God, that is, by the law of nature, because in our first father they lost free will," &c.

'Some have affirmed that Faustus exceeded his commission, and that many of those who assisted at the councils of Arles and of Lions would not have subscribed to his book. Yet it is hard to conceive that Faustus, a bishop in great esteem, as it appears from the commendations given to him by Sidonius Apollinaris and by Gennadius, should have had the assurance openly to ascribe to a council sentiments which most of its members held in abomination, and that they should suffer him to do so without expressing their resentment. They who say that Faustus on this occasion exceeded the bounds of his commission, have only this poor reason to offer for it, that there could not have been so many Semipelagians in Gaul.

'We may see in Usher the judgements which several learned men have passed upon Faustus, most of which are not at all favourable to him. Thus it happens now to the old Semipelagians, as it happened formerly to the Pelagians: many who are entirely in their sentiments, yet call them heretics, and condemn their persons, only because they were condemned by men who had more worldly interest and ecclesiastical authority than they.

'The book of Faustus remained not long unknown; it made its appearance at Constantinople, where the judgements were divided about it, some saying that it was orthodox, and others that it was heretical, as it

appears from a letter of Possessor, an African bishop, who was then at Constantinople, and who wrote about it to pope Hormisda, A. D. 520, to know his sentiments. Persons of the highest quality, and amongst them Vitalian, and Justinian who was afterwards emperor, desired to hear the opinion of the church of Rome. Hormisda declared himself against Faustus, and referred them for instruction to the books of St. Augustin of predestination and perseverance.

'There was then at Constantinople a monk called Joannes Maxentius, who wrote an answer to the letter of Hormisda, in which he compares the sentiments of Augustin with those of Faustus, and sharply censures Possessor, and those who maintained that the book of Faustus was orthodox. Hence it appears that Possessor was a Semipelagian, and consequently that the African councils had not yet been able to make all the bishops of that church submit to their decisions.

'During the heat of the Pelagian controversy the Vandals had seized Afric; and as they were Arians, they expelled a great number of bishops who adhered to the decisions of the Nicene council [t]. Thrasamond, king of the Vandals, banished sixty of them to Sardinia. They were consulted by the Easterns concerning the controversies about grace, rather to obtain a public declaration of their sentiments, than to receive instructions; for they who wrote to those prelates were already listed in a party, and in their letters con-

[t] This was severe; but it was paying them in their own coin, and serving them just as they had served other Christians.

demned both the Pelagians and the books of Faustus. Fulgentius answered them in the name of the rest, and delivered the sentiments of St. Augustin in his letter, and also a treatise addressed to Paulus Diaconus. He composed other books on this subject, and seven against Faustus.

'As Hilary and Leontius, archbishops of Arles, had favoured Semipelagianism; Cæsarius, who succeeded Leontius, favoured what the divines of Marseilles called Prædestinatianism, or the sentiments of St. Augustin. Under his direction was held the second council of Orange, A. D. 529, which approved the doctrines of St. Augustin. Soon after this a council was held at Valentia, which condemned Semipelagianism; and Bonifacius II, in the year 531, approved the acts of this council.

'Here endeth the history of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism, which yet was not extinguished in Gaul or in England by so many efforts and so many decrees of the defenders of grace. See the History of Godescalc, written by Usher.

'What can we now conclude from all these things, according to the principles of St. Augustin, but this, that God would not annex the blessing of his irresistible grace to the curses, the confiscations, the deprivations, and the banishments which pious emperors and holy councils made use of against the poor Pelagians?' Le Clerc, Bibl. Univ. viii. 174.

'A PRESBYTER, called Leporius, had fallen

into the opinion of some ecclesiastics of Treves, who maintained that all men might be without sin, though Jesus Christ alone had been really free from it. This Pelagian retracted his opinions, in Afric, A. D. 425, and his retractation is published in the *Opera Sirmondi.* So Leporius was absolved, and received again to the peace of the church. The common method in such cases was to oblige a man to sign certain words which they made use of without defining or understanding them.' Le Clerc, Bibl. A. & M. xxviii. 26[illegible].

'THE BISHOP of Meaux accuses Grotius of Semipelagianism. He must have had a small share of candour and sincerity when he thus presumed to censure and condemn this learned man[u] for an opinion which is approved, under another name, by the council of Trent, by the court of Rome, and by all the Antijansenists in France. To condemn the sentiments of Jansenius, or of St Augustin, which are one and the same, and to declare one's self against Semipelagianism, is a shameless and absurd inconsistency. They who speak sincerely, acknowledge that the doctrine of Melancthon upon predestination and grace, which the bishop of Meaux calls Semipelagianism, is the very doctrine of the Roman church and of the council of Trent; and they who speak thus, are, to say the least, men of as much erudition

[u] A man infinitely superior to a hundred Bossuets.

and authority as the bishop, namely cardinal Hosius, who presided at the council of Trent, and the Jesuit Petavius. It is true, indeed, that these men pretend to be of St. Augustin's opinions, though in truth they are not. But in the church of Rome, they who follow not this father are obliged to protest that they reverence and receive his doctrine; and they who receive it must declare that they anathematize the predestinating doctrines of Luther and Calvin, who yet were followers of Augustin.

'The bishop also accuses Grotius of ignorance concerning the progress in knowledge which St. Augustin had made, because Grotius had said that Augustin, when he disputed with the Pelagians, talked in a quite different way from his former sentiments. And yet the bishop cannot deny the fact.

'Hence it follows that St. Augustin, whilst he was a presbyter, and in the first years of his episcopacy, knew not the true and orthodox doctrine of predestination and grace, and yet thought himself fully qualified to perform the functions of an ecclesiastic, one of which is to explain the Scriptures. Strange! that doctrines which were to pass for articles of faith, and fundamentals, and which have made such a dreadful noise and confusion in the Christian world, were once so little known! St. Augustin was not only entirely ignorant of these points, but he held the very reverse, as it manifestly appears from the books which he wrote when he was a presbyter, and in which he maintains free-will, just as others did in those days.

'He says, indeed, in his book of the predestination of the saints, that whilst he was of another opinion, he had been convinced of his mistake, principally by 1 Cor. iv. 7; and that God had revealed this new doctrine to him. "Dixi hoc apostolico præcipue testimonio etiam me ipsum fuisse convictum, cum hac de re aliter saperem; quam mihi Deus, in hac quæstione solvenda, cum ad episcopum Simplicianum scriberem, revelavit." We see by this, that St. Augustin learned this doctrine, not by hearing others preach it, nor by any instruction that he had received from learned divines or ancient fathers, but by profoundly meditating upon St. Paul whom he understood not. He adds, according to custom, that *God had revealed it to him* [v]; which excludes all human instruction. And now let the French prelate go and boast of the uniform tradition of the Catholic church, upon an important and essential point, which a famous and a venerable father of the fifth century, who had studied divinity at least for six years from the time of his taking orders, could not know but by *revelation*!' Le Clerc, Bibl. Chois. v. 341.

I HAVE no inclination to trace the history of this controversy from the sixth century to the eighteenth, but shall only mention a few memorable things relating

[v] To all such pretenders to inspiration Erasmus gives a proper answer; Saltent igitur bonis avibus inter prophetas. Me nondum corripuit iste spiritus. Ubi corripuerit, fortasse dicar et ipse Saul inter prophetas. Epist. 650.

to it. The reader will find a good abstract of these disputes in the church of Rome, from the time of the council of Trent to the year 1689, in the Bibliothèque Universelle, by Le Clerc, tom. xiv. 139; who closes the account much after the following manner:

'The different views and interests of the court of Rome, or the factions which happened to be stronger or weaker, led her to absolve and to condemn the self-same doctrine under different denominations. Each party either magnified or despised her authority, according as they were treated by her, and pretended to hold in abomination the opinions which had been anathematized as heretical, for fear of offending her, whilst they really maintained them under other names and in other expressions. The church of Rome condemned St. Augustin and St. Thomas without being willing to do so, and defended the doctrines of the Semipelagians, or of the Reformed, without suffering it to be acknowledged. The divines, embarrassed by equivocal expressions, and full of perplexity, could not distinguish friends from foes. The people, stunned and heated with these disputes, took side, without knowing wherefore. The powers acted, as is usual, not with any discernment of the merits of the cause, but by interest and at the instigation of those in whom they confided, without any reason to depend upon their sincerity or their skill; and oppressed and condemned one side, without being informed of the truth, which if the ecclesiastical assemblies defended, it was by mere chance, as at other times they opposed

it no less at random. Their equivocal decisions were eluded by subtle distinctions which they dared not to discuss. Violence was employed to ruin a party, for fear of being treated in the same manner, if it prevailed: and all these unrighteous proceedings were masked with the godly pretence of maintaining orthodox doctrines, which want nothing besides liberty of conscience and a fair hearing, to satisfy reasonable persons and to plead their own cause. It is to be feared that Christians will pursue the same methods, of disputing about the means and helps to obtain moral goodness, without studying to practise the thing itself. This account, however, may be of some use to teach men how to behave in like circumstances, and to avoid the faults of others, without which a knowledge of those quarrelsome transactions will be of small importance.'

Thomas Aquinas, in the year 1265, composed a body of divinity, which was in great vogue at that time, and in the following centuries, till the Reformation.

Thomas held absolute predestination; and Luther, who in his youth had studied the system of Thomas, retained this doctrine[w], or rather carried it still further.

Calvin entered in the same sentiments, and was a follower of Augustin.

The Calvinists have generally adhered to Calvin's system; but the Lutherans, in this point, departed from their master.

[w] Which was also the doctrine of our Wickliff.

Erasmus was a Semipelagian, and wrote against Luther on this subject; and as he was of an open and ingenuous temper, he scrupled not to censure the Augustinian doctrines; in which, as in many other things, he did eminent service to religion. He informs us, that the Lutherans called him a Pelagian. Epist. dlxxxvii. p. 658.

The divines of the church of Rome in those days were divided; some were Thomists, or Predestinatians, others Semipelagians, or something extremely like it.

The council of Trent, A. D. 1547, condemned Luther's doctrine about predestination; but these fathers, who abounded more in worldly wisdom than in grace, endeavoured to express their own notions so as not to offend any party amongst the Papists.

The Jesuits, whose order was founded A. D. 1540, have, generally speaking, been Semipelagians, and no friends to Augustin, though they permitted their brethren to list themselves on either side. Bellarmin was an Augustinian.

About this time we had here a set of people called Gospellers.

'They thought that if they magnified Christ much, and depended on his merits and intercession, they could not perish which way soever they led their lives. The doctrine of predestination having been generally taught by the Reformers, many of this sect began to make strange inferences from it, reckoning that since every thing was decreed, and the decrees of God could not be frustrated, therefore men were to leave

themselves to be carried by these decrees. This drew some into great impiety of life, and others into desperation. The Germans soon saw the ill effects of this doctrine. Luther changed his mind about it, and Melancthon openly wrote against it; and since that time the whole stream of the Lutheran churches has run another way. But both Calvin and Bucer were still for maintaining the doctrine of these decrees; only they warned the people not to think much of them; since they were secrets which men could not penetrate into: but they did not so clearly show how these consequences did not follow from such opinions. Hooper and many other good writers did often dehort the people from entering into these curiosities; and a caveat to that same purpose was put afterwards into the article of the church about predestination.' Burnet, Hist. of the Ref.

It is to be feared that these notions will prevail once more, especially amongst the lower people, and that we shall again be plagued with a sect of Gospellers.

To reason with such persons signifies little: *reason*, as well as *learning* [x], is what they shun and disregard, and to all your arguments they will oppose their own feelings and experiences. To oppress and persecute them is scandalous in itself, and can produce no good effect. Never was any man beaten into a right under-

[x] Some of Luther's polite followers were thus represented by Erasmus: Hìc tui discipuli palam docebant, disciplinas humanas esse venenum pietatis, non esse discendas linguas, nisi Hebraicam.

standing, and never did God give a blessing to such proceedings. All that remains is to caution and exhort those who have not caught the infection, and to try if we can in some measure serve and secure the next generation.

Molina, a Spanish Jesuit, in the year 1588, defended the Semipelagian doctrines, which produced great quarrels between the Jesuits, and their enemies the Dominicans, and other religious orders.

A. D. 1605. Clemens VIII would have condemned the Jesuits as Pelagians, if he had not died this year. He used to go in sackcloth, and fast, and pray, that he might be directed to determine justly upon the controversy. One of the cardinals observed of him, that he would have been a saint, if he had not left so much money to his relations.

Jansenius, a Dutchman, was made bishop of Ipres by the Spanish court in 1635. He loved Augustin to a degree of infatuation and enthusiasm, and used to pore over him eternally. If the poor man had spent the same time and pains in studying classical authors, and the Holy Scriptures, and the ancient Greek fathers, he would probably have been a much better scholar, and no Fatalist. He composed a book of predestination and grace, upon the principles of his master, which he entitled *Augustinus*. In the opinion of unprejudiced men, he very fairly and fully represented the doctrines, and extracted the quintessence, of Augustin.

Messieurs of Port Royal went into his system, Ar-

nauld signalized himself in his defence, and his numerous followers in France are called Jansenists.

The Jansenists, faithful disciples of Augustin, would have degenerated, if they had not retained a taste for persecution. They wanted to *compel* the Jesuits *to come in* to their sentiments, or to draw down upon them ecclesiastical censures and excommunications: but the Jesuits were too useful to the see of Rome, and too well protected there, to be condemned, and worried, and treated as Pelagians.

Pope Urban VIII condemned the book of Jansenius, A. D. 1643.

Innocent X, by a bull, A. D. 1653, condemned the five propositions extracted from Jansenius. The reason of this severity seems to have been, that Jansenius had let fall some expressions in his book which derogated from the papal omnipotence. The French king, most imprudently, received this bull, and ordered it to be published in his dominions, and then Arnauld and the Jansenists were oppressed, and the sect hath been in tribulation almost ever since: but as they would have done the same to their adversaries, if they had enjoyed the power, they are the less to be pitied.

By this false step, the pope made the Jansenists his enemies, and necessitated them to maintain that Jansenius had taught no such doctrines as he had imagined, and consequently that popes, with their counsellors, are not infallible judges of facts, but only of doctrines; a position which at length must subvert the favourite notion of the infallibility of the church.

In the year 1656, a miracle was wrought amongst the Jansenists at Port Royal, a miracle extolled by the party, and as much derided by their adversaries.

Alexander VII, by a bull, A. D. 1657, confirmed that of Innocent, and condemned the five propositions; and the pope sent over to France a formulary, in which the subscribers were to swear by Almighty God that they condemned these five propositions. The king and the parliament confirmed it; and the French bishops, to make their court to the king and to the pope, compelled even young illiterate girls, who were nuns, to subscribe to the condemnation of Jansenism.

In the year 1707, pope Clemens XI published the bull or constitution called *Unigenitus*, in which he condemned Jansenius and his doctrines.

The abbé de Paris, a zealous Jansenist and opposer of the bull, died in 1725, and six years afterwards he wrought innumerable miracles[y] in support of his friends, against the pope, the Jesuits, and the court of Rome.

This was an old trick, which had been practised by one party of Christians against another from the fourth century downwards. St. Ambrose played it off with great success against the Arians, and confounded them by the miraculous relics of two new-discovered and

[y] All the arguments urged against Christianity, from the consideration of these pretended miracles, by unfair and inconsistent writers, have been fully confuted by Mr. Adams and Dr. Leland.

imaginary saints of a gigantic stature, Protasius and Gervasius, and by the aid of a set of dæmoniacs, who screamed, and howled, and performed their part to admiration. By this stratagem he won over the populace, and came off victorious. They who cannot digest such miracles, and yet are willing to justify Ambrose, must suppose that he himself was deceived by some under-actors, and must try to save his honour at the expense of his judgement.

In the beginning of the last century, the contest was vehement between the Remonstrants and the Calvinists in Holland. The latter engaged prince Maurice on their side, and artfully turned a religious into a political quarrel; and, being superior in power, overcame their antagonists, who surpassed them as much in judgement, learning, probity, and every thing that was commendable. They held a synod at Dort, and established their Calvinistical decrees by cruel insolence and oppression. Thus the Remonstrants were obliged to fly their country, and seek for refuge where they could find it, amongst the Papists, to shun the barbarity of their fellow-citizens, who had not learned from their own sufferings the rights of conscience, and the necessity of mutual forbearance. But these violent men trod in the steps of their own fathers; for the litigious temper of many of the Reformed in the Low Countries, their dogmatical decisions of unimportant speculations, their immortal hatred of toleration, their zeal for imposing confessions of faith, and the fanatical, ambitious, and turbulent spirit of several of their

ecclesiastics, make it a matter of wonder to posterity how the Protestant religion was ever established there. Nothing but the diabolical cruelty of the Spanish government, which became insupportable even to the Dutch Papists, could, humanly speaking, have brought about a Reformation.

At the same time there were warm contests upon an important point, whether the clergy assembled in councils and synods had a right to make and enforce ecclesiastical laws and articles of faith, without the leave of the civil magistrate. The Calvinists held the affirmative, the Remonstrants were of the contrary opinion; and Grotius, who was a Remonstrant, wrote against these petty tyrants his book, *De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra*; which was showed to some friends, but not published till after his death. Another question of no less moment was about the punishment of heretics, and the nature of toleration. Calvin and Beza, and most of their disciples, thought it right to burn heretics, or at least to apply the wholesome discipline of fines, jails, stripes, imprisonments, and banishments. The Remonstrants not only condemned such procedures, but declared that they would receive to their communion all those who allowed the Scriptures to be the only rule of faith, kept themselves from idolatry, declared their dislike of persecution, and promised that they would endeavour to live suitably to the Gospel of Jesus Christ.

The Contraremonstrants compelled not only ecclesiastics, professors, schoolmasters, and young students

to sign their articles, but even musicians. The organist of Harlem, who was an excellent performer, being commanded by the magistrates to subscribe, desired to be excused, but offered to serve them in his way, to set the words of their canons to music, and to play them in the church, if they liked it: upon which he was turned out. Brandt, who tells us this story, says that several musicians were expelled from the churches for refusing to comply; and that the organist of Utrecht immediately subscribed the canons, without reading them; and being exhorted by the imposers to peruse them once at least, he refused, saying, "It is needless. I know well enough that you, gentlemen, would not require me to do an ill thing."

Father Paul approved of the doctrines and proceedings of the synod of Dort, and wrote thus to Daniel Heinsius: "As the elect only participate of the divine grace, so none but they can be sensible of its efficacy and operation. For neither the world, nor the flesh, nor the night-raven, which has not sight strong enough, can bear the light. It is my opinion, not only that faith is the gift of God, but likewise that the true conception of faith, and its causes and effects, is not granted to the wise men of this world. Happy are you to whom the divine mysteries are revealed from heaven! Your Christian synod has had the skill to distinguish the doctrine of the apostles from carnal notions, and, condemning the latter, has piously embraced the former. And most prudently have the illustrious States proceeded in stopping the mouths of

your adversaries, by exerting that authority which is peculiar to sovereigns in ecclesiastical matters. But it is not strange that such people should join with your enemies. Errors that are most opposite and contradictory will more easily be reconciled to each other, than to the truth, though it lies in the middle, &c."

'From this letter we may observe two things: the first is, that father Paul adhered to the opinions of the Dominicans and the Contraremonstrants in the point of predestination; which is likewise obvious in his history of the council of Trent, concerning which the English divine, Heylin, write, "That the authority of father Paul, whatever credit he may deserve in historical matters, ought not to be admitted in doctrinal points, any further than it is supported by reason." In the next place, we may observe from his letter, what ill impressions Heinsius seems to have made on him in prejudice of the Remonstrants, by treating them as people who sided with the common enemy: but the falsity of this charge hath since appeared plainly enough. As for the rest of his letter, I leave it as I find it, and the reader may judge of it as he pleases.' Brandt, vol. iv. p. 80.

Every reasonable man must judge it to be excessively mean and fanatical, and altogether unworthy of father Paul. Daniel Heinsius was secretary to the synod, and treated the Remonstrants there with great unfairness and rudeness. He also wrote against them; and undertook a task for which he was very unfit;

which provoked them to attack his conduct and character, and to set him in a disadvantageous light.

The Contraremonstrants hated the memory of their countryman Erasmus, as much as they did the persons of Episcopius and Grotius, and wanted to have his statue pulled down. They could not bear the sight of this hero, even in brass: it had the same effect upon them as Statius supposes the image of Hercules to have had upon the Argives;

> Haud illum impavidi, quamvis et in ære, suumque
> Inachidæ videre decus [z].

Two of their divines, elated with victory, insulted a poor fellow who was a Remonstrant, and said, What are you thinking on, with that grave and woful face? I was thinking, gentlemen, said he, of a controverted question, Who was the author of sin? Adam shifted it off from himself, and laid it to his wife; she laid it to the serpent; the serpent, who was then young and bashful, had not a word to say for himself; but afterwards growing older and more audacious, he went to the synod of Dort, and there he had the assurance to charge it upon God. Brandt.

Bayle, in his disputes against the wisdom and the goodness of God, being pushed by his antagonists, and compelled to declare what sort of a Christian he pretended to be, professed himself a Predestinarian Protestant of the most rigid sort; but no Protestant of

[z] Theb. vi. 272.

any denomination ever was simple enough to believe him.

Bayle frequently took occasion to show his disapprobation of the Remonstrants. The true cause of his disgust seems to have been this: they endeavoured to prove the reasonableness of Christianity, and to vindicate the goodness of God, and would not give up the divine perfections as unintelligible and indefensible. 'They ought not,' says he, 'to have removed the bounds set up by their fathers.' I should have thought that the apostles and evangelists were to be looked upon as our Christian fathers, rather than the Calvins and the Bezas.

'They ought not,' says he, 'to have made disturbances.' But that was not their fault; it was the fault of those who quarrelled with them, and would not tolerate them. 'Their refinements,' says he, 'signified nothing, and they could not defend Christianity any better than the Calvinists; for it is all one, whether God be the author and the punisher of sin, or whether he foresees sin, and permits it, and then punishes it with eternal misery.' These and the rest of his objections, drawn up with such a profusion of words, and so much pains, and parade, and indecent language, were considered and fully confuted by Le Clerc in his Bibliothèque Chois.

The system of the Remonstrants, as he is pleased to observe, is full of considerable errors. This is the mean and spiteful remark of a man who knew al-

most as little of divinity as he did of natural philosophy.

In England, at the time of the synod of Dort, we also were much divided in our opinions concerning the controverted articles; but our divines having taken the liberty to think and judge for themselves, and the civil government not interposing, it hath come to pass that, from that time to this, almost all persons here of any note for learning and abilities have bid adieu to Calvinism, have sided with the Remonstrants, and have left the Fatalists to follow their own opinions, and to rejoice (since they can rejoice) in a religious system, consisting of human creatures without liberty, doctrines without sense, faith without reason, and a God without mercy.

This system, so far as it relates to the eternal misery of infants for the fault of Adam, is the very fable of the Wolf and the Lamb:

> Ante hos sex menses male, ait, dixisti mihi.
> Respondit agnus: Equidem natus non eram.
> Pater, hercule, tuus, inquit, maledixit mihi.

"Nothing burns in hell, but our own will." So says Bernard, a father, and a saint of the twelfth century: and he is highly to be commended for being the father of so good an aphorism, which is worth half his writings, and all his miracles.

Our dissenters, in the last century [a], were generally

[a] Justice and candour require us to except many of those of the present times.

absolute Predestinarians, and one of their constant clamours against the clergy of the church of England was that they were Arminians, a name which sounded as dreadfully in Supralapsarian ears, as that of Infidel, or Atheist.

Heylin wrote the history of the *five articles*, in which he endeavours to show that the church of England, though willing to tolerate the Calvinists, yet hath always been of the opinion of the Remonstrants in those points.

Whitby published some tracts on election, reprobation, and original sin; and in these treatises he confuted Calvinism even to a demonstration.

HE who is desirous to find religious truth must seek her in the Holy Scriptures, interpreted by good sense and sober criticism, and embrace no theological systems any further than as they are found consistent with the word of God, with right reason, and with themselves. A theological system is too often a temple consecrated to implicit faith, and he who enters in there to worship, instead of leaving his shoes, after the Eastern manner, must leave his understanding at the door; and it will be well if he find it when he comes out again.

DISSERTATION III.

ON THE DUTY OF JUDGING CANDIDLY AND FAVOURABLY OF OTHERS, AND OF HUMAN NATURE.

QUAM TEMERE IN NOSMET LEGEM SANCIMUS INIQUAM!

DISSERTATION III.

ON THE DUTY OF JUDGING CANDIDLY AND FAVOURABLY OF OTHERS, AND OF HUMAN NATURE.

1 Cor. xiii. 5.

Charity——thinketh no evil.

The meaning which several commentators have given to these words is, that charity is not censorious, that it thinketh favourably of others when there is room for it, and thinketh not hardly of them, unless a manifest reason requires it: and in this sense I shall at present take them, without entering into other interpretations.

In this sense they certainly represent to us a Christian duty, and we may boldly appeal to all the world, whether this be not an amiable disposition, and whether we should not be glad to find it in all those with whom we have any intercourse and acquaintance. And yet this part of charity, which consists in thinking no evil, hath not escaped censure, but hath been represented rather as an injudicious weakness than as a good quality. I shall produce the objection which hath

been made to it, and then show how weak, how foolish, and how wicked it is.

'The laws of Christian charity,' says this celebrated writer, 'which require us rather to give a favourable turn to the actions of our neighbour than an unfavourable one, are quite contrary to reason.

'For it is as certain as any thing can be, that man is infinitely more prone to evil than to good, and that there are infinitely more bad than good actions done in the world.

'It is therefore beyond degree more probable that an action is bad than that it is good, and that the secret motives which produce it are corrupted than that they are honest.

'According then to the dictates of reason, if we know that a man hath done an action, and are ignorant of his motive and intent, we should judge it to be far more probable that he acts from bad than from good causes.

'And yet the laws of charity require that, unless we have a very probable evidence of the wickedness of an action, we should rather conclude it to be good than bad.

'Thus charity directs us to do just the contrary to the dictates of reason: and indeed this is not the only sacrifice which religion requires us to make of our reason[a].'

[a] 'J'aurois bien des choses à dire, si je voulois examiner pourquoi les loix de la charité, qui nous engagent à donner plûtot un

Thus far goes the objection; upon which I shall just observe by the way, that when the author of it was represented by several persons as one who had no religion, he was extremely angry, and loudly complained of ill treatment; and yet this very argument of his proved, if it proved any thing, that he was only used according to the dictates of human reason, which bids us think ill of our neighbour. This is an honour to St. Paul's description of charity, that a man cannot contradict it without being taken in a contradiction himself. They who judge it reasonable to think ill of all others, hold it unreasonable that others should think ill of them; which surely is very absurd and ridiculous.

It hath been said that it is not prudent to propose difficulties which we cannot remove; but in the case before us there is no danger of that kind, and it seems no hard task to defend Christian charity, and St. Paul's account of it, against the cavils of men wise in their own conceits.

I shall therefore proceed to explain and to justify the character which St. Paul gives of charity, or of a charitable man, that he thinketh no evil, keeping the objection in view, and showing that it is groundless.

tour favorable aux actions de notre prochain, qu'un tour désavantageux, sont si contraires à la raison,' &c. Bayle, Lettres Crit. xii. p. 248. In which he endeavours to prove, that none can receive the Christian religion unless he will think and act contrary to reason; that is, in other words, unless he be fool or mad.

The objection is built upon an assertion that there is infinitely more evil than good done in all times and places; which, though confidently advanced as a thing undeniable, is utterly false, and shows a gross or a wilful ignorance of human nature and matter of fact: for men, bad as they are, with all their faults and frailties, are not so bad as these perverse writers have been pleased to represent them. As the objection takes in Christians as well as others, we will, without distinguishing or excepting them, consider how the case stands in general, and as it lies open every where to daily observation. But first let us consider the nature of man and of his actions.

Man is guided by two principles: by reason; and by passion, affection, or appetite; and it is his nature to act for the most part upon motives. Let us see then what motives he has to good and to evil.

His motives to good are many in number; they are these:

Reason, which approves what is right and condemns what is wrong; so that, when a man doth amiss, he commonly acts against his conscience, his knowledge, and his judgement. Reason and experience teach us also that good actions are usually profitable, and that bad actions are pernicious. Here the innate love of happiness joins with reason and experience, and prompts us to pursue that which is commendable, and just, and useful.

Education likewise generally gives men a good bent;

for in all civilized nations young persons are instructed to prefer virtue to vice.

The love of reputation, and the fear of disgrace or of punishment, have the same tendency.

Natural affection also, a love of parents, kindred, friends, and benefactors, prompts us to render ourselves useful and agreeable to them; which we cannot well accomplish without exercising the social and the civil duties.

Religion, to which belong the hope of future rewards and the dread of future punishments, is unquestionably a great motive to well-doing, and produces considerable effects; and if it makes not men so righteous as they should be, it certainly makes them far better than they else would be, and keeps them from a multitude of offences which they would otherwise have committed.

Let us see, on the contrary, what motives men have to commit evil.

It happens not unfrequently that virtue consists in undergoing present inconvenience, whilst the pleasure that it yields is more remote and follows at a distance; and that vice brings immediate pleasure, and is not attended with any sudden bad consequence that is felt. The passions and appetites of men, which, unless regulated by reason, pursue present pleasure, and shun present uneasiness, regardless of the future, and the temptations arising from outward objects, are motives to evil.

Add to this, a bent and propensity which most persons experience towards some particular fault, a predominant passion which easily degenerates and becomes a vice: add likewise the contagious influence of bad example. These are the general incitements to sin.

I have not spoken of those more latent causes of good and evil, of which mention is made sometimes in the Scriptures, as the seductions and temptations of evil spirits, and the favourable influence of the divine Spirit, or the aid of good spirits acting under his direction, and by his appointment: but in these secret causes, those which incite to good should be supposed the most powerful and prevalent, since greater is he who is for us than they who are against us.

Now from all these motives to good and to evil, it must follow that man will usually and generally be a fickle and changeable creature, not steady either to good or to bad, but passing from the one to the other, and often blending both together; yet however, upon the whole, performing more actions which are good, or innocent at least, than bad ones, because he hath far more inducements to the former than to the latter.

Such kind of reasoning, it may be replied, is deceitful and unsatisfactory, and it is experience at last that must decide the question, and not arguments drawn from the nature of man, and from the motives which may be supposed to influence him. Be it so: to experience we will appeal, and to matter of fact;

and we shall soon find that more good than evil is done in the world, else the world could not subsist, and civil society must disband.

Let us take for example one of a middle station, who passes his days quietly in all appearance, and lives in tolerable credit and repute; for of such persons the bulk of society consists.

He hath then a calling or occupation, in which he spends at least half of the waking hours of his life. Thus, at the very first account which we take of him, we must set down half of his actions as good, at least, not bad. I will not say that these are what we call moral virtues, or religious deeds; and yet so far as they are done honestly, in obedience to God and to society, and with a view to live reputably and without being a burthen to others, so far they undoubtedly partake of the nature of virtue.

He has a family, a wife, and children, and servants, and he takes care of them. A thousand good actions are necessary to perform this, and to live orderly and decently at home, which must be added to the account.

He has dealings with others who employ him and trust him; consequently he is in all probability honest in his dealings. Here likewise many good actions are to be supposed.

He has friends and acquaintances and relations who esteem him, and are willing to do him service: conse-

quently he behaves himself well towards them; else he would be deserted and slighted.

We may add to this, that he performs some acts of charity, that his heart has ached for the miseries of others, and his hand hath relieved them, that he has undertaken offices expensive and troublesome to himself, through friendship, or gratitude, or pity, or good nature, or honour.

Add to this, that he has religion, that he frequents the public worship of God, that when he commits faults he condemns himself, and is sensible of his deviations, and sorry for his defects.

Since the generality of men are nearly such as we have been representing, and perform many more good than bad actions, not only humanity and charity, but justice and common honesty, forbid us to say of mankind in general that they do far more evil than good. He who doth far more evil than good must be remarkably and scandalously wicked.

It may be said, that both writers of morality and the Scriptures themselves represent mankind in general as sinners and prone to evil, and, in a word, worse than we have described them. But then it must be observed, that they consider men in quite another view, namely, as obliged to live according to the dictates of right reason, and to the precepts of God, which when they do not they become sinners. For it is not the performing more good than bad actions that

denominates a man good in the moral and religious sense; and though he may frequently practise what is right, and honest, and humane, and honourable, and reasonable, yet if he persists in any one evil habit, and is wilfully deficient in any one moral duty, he is considered in a state of enmity with virtue and religion, till repentance and reformation restore him to the condition whence he is fallen. If he be a stubborn and a deliberate transgressor, he is considered as a violator of the law, and a despiser of the authority of the lawgiver; as in civil society, if a man commits a capital crime, his having observed all the rest of the law will not exempt him from punishment.

The Scriptures frequently forbid rash judgements, and censoriousness, and a misrepresentation of other men's actions, and hard thoughts concerning them; and yet teach all men, with relation to God and to his holy will and commandments, to acknowledge themselves sinners, and incapable of being justified in his sight by their own righteousness.

Therefore, though humility commands us to think lowly of ourselves, and of others, and of human nature, and to own that man is not worthy of the least of God's mercies, yet charity forbids us to think so ill of the whole race, as to suppose that they are always doing evil, and that their best actions proceed from bad motives.

Many who had no good will to revealed religion, have taken a perverse delight in blackening human

nature, and many weak and ignorant Christians have done and daily do the same thing; and thus with different views these sworn enemies have joined together, and assisted each other in abusing and slandering mankind.

The first often represents man as a most abject and despicable animal, whose vices are naturally woven in his constitution, and who is intended for no better purpose than to keep up a succession of generations upon earth, and then to sink into eternal oblivion. The second imagines that original or hereditary sin is an entire depravity, by which man is stripped both of power and of inclination to do any one good action; but that the Elect, of whom himself is always one, are saved by irresistible grace, and by a bare belief that they are elected, and so go to heaven upon very commodious terms, whilst all around them are doomed to perish everlastingly, to the honour of the supreme Being, and to the great comfort of his favourites. Now this total corruption of man is a mere fiction[b] and all that we can collect from the Scriptures concerning our depravity, is this, that after our first parents had fallen from a state of innocence, the temptations to sin were increased, but the natural powers to resist those temptations were not destroyed, and the favourable assistances of the divine Spirit were not withdrawn.

[b] In lord Bacon's language, *idolum cerebri.*

Thus God's fair creation, which he pronounced to be good and upright, hath been vilified by profane scoffers or injudicious Christians: but there have not been wanting able advocates, to make a proper apology for the sons of Adam, and the substance of what they have said amounts to this.

[c] God made man in his own image, and impressed upon him some characters of the divine original, the principal of which is goodness, though it be not the best preserved, for it is of a tender complexion, and delicate nature; and yet the lovely traces of it are still extant, and still shine, though oft-times faintly and with a faded lustre.

For goodness is universally approved; justice, equity, truth, sincerity, candour, beneficence, mercy, ever have passed, and ever will pass, for virtues.

There is no man who does not desire that others would exercise them towards him; even they who are deficient in the practice of them, yet pay them the decent respect to think and to speak well of them.

There is no man who does not condemn fraud, malice, cruelty, treachery, ingratitude, injustice, especially when he is made to experience the ill effects of them.

No man ever acted uprightly and honourably who did not feel a calm serenity, a complacency and satisfaction: none ever pursued wicked courses without

[c] Barrow; from whom some of the following remarks are borrowed.

some degree of shame and regret, and self-condemnation, and some struggles of expiring virtue.

None, except here and there a brute, ever received great favours and benefits, who had not, out of mere natural ingenuity, a grateful sense of them, and an intention to testify it, and to make somewhat of a return.

No man, except hardened by a long course of villany, even saw others in great pain, and want, and sorrow, and distress, and found not a disposition to come miserate and assist them, though he could expect from them no other return than thanks.

History abounds with examples of men who through natural inclination, through generosity and nobleness of mind, have done great services to their friends, to their country, to strangers, to foreigners, to mankind in general; who to accomplish these ends have denied themselves many advantages and pleasures, have encountered many inconveniencies, hardships, and dangers, and have even lost their lives, without a view to any worldly recompense, except perhaps that they hoped and expected to be honoured, living or dead, by those whom they had obliged, and by judicious and worthy persons. And this surely cannot greatly derogate from their virtuous deeds: it only shows that besides a natural sweetness of temper, and greatness of soul, they had also some regard to reputation, and a desire to stand fair in the opinion of the public, and to receive, what they justly deserved, the love and the

esteem of their fellow-creatures. And why not? since God himself requires our acknowledgements and our affections for his loving-kindness. Thus it hath ever been, and thus it is still in the world: instances are not wanting of constancy, of friendship, of fidelity, of gratitude, of compassion, of integrity, many of which escape the notice of the public, and are perhaps only observed of God and good angels, being seldom transacted in high life, and under splendid roofs and palaces.

The most judicious philosophers, and the most acute observers of the human frame and constitution, have pronounced man to be a creature naturally tame and gentle, and sociable and tractable, who by the help of good laws and good examples, and good teachers and governors, may be made good and useful to the world.

Our adversaries will not admit thus much. They have commonly, as no good opinion of God, so no favourable opinion of men: in short, some of them have no esteem of themselves; and finding little moral honesty at home, in their own breasts, they are willing to suppose the rest of the world to be no better. And this is probably one great motive which induces them to draw a hideous portrait of human nature, loaded with the ugly features of craft, baseness, malice, suspicion, selfishness, and dissimulation, by which they have transformed this earth into a hell, where as many men so many devils surround us.

Let us now see in what sense and in what instances charity thinketh no evil.

First of all, we should do the same justice to an apostle which we would do to other writers, that is, to interpret his words fairly, and not to strain them beyond the intention of the author. Supposing then that the apostle intended to recommend a candid disposition in forming a judgement concerning the actions of others, the meaning of his words must be this, that charity judgeth not hardly and severely, when there is room to think well, or when there is reason to suspend the judgement, and to remain uncertain.

There are a multitude of actions which are of an indifferent nature, and have nothing moral in them, and deserve neither praise nor blame. Setting these aside, the other actions of men are bad, or they are good, or have at least the appearance of goodness.

There are actions which are bad, and which all the world have agreed in condemning, and it cannot be supposed that charity requires us to think well of them. But herein the charitable differs from the censorious man: that he never aggravates the faults of others; that, if there be any circumstances mitigating the offence, he never willingly overlooks them; and that, in forming judgements of men, he considers their good as well as their bad qualities.

There are actions which appear to be, and which probably are, good; and concerning these it is that

charity thinketh no evil. And here lies the main of the dispute; for the adversaries of human nature will insist upon it that the good actions of men proceed from bad motives, and are only vices with a fair face. The contrary to this is very evident. Good actions, or actions which appear to be good, can scarcely proceed from any other than honest motives. Let any one consult his own heart, and he will find that the motives to well-doing are these, a love of goodness strengthened by education and custom, or a propensity to some particular virtue, or a view to please God, or a fear to offend him, or a hope of future rewards, or a dread of future punishments, or a desire to stand fair in the opinion of mankind, or a regard to some of the present advantages arising from a commendable behaviour. Of these motives some are more excellent than others; but not one of them is vicious, and capable of utterly spoiling a good action. It is not easy to name any case in which evil intentions produce actions apparently good, except one, which is this: there are persons who have wicked designs which they cannot execute without imposing upon the world, and pretending to virtues which they have not. Such persons may do things which are in themselves right and commendable, but for which they deserve no praise, because their views are bad. But it is unfair, on account of such dissemblers, to judge hardly in general of actions in which nothing blameable can be discerned.

If there be any persons whom it is reasonable to

suspect, they are those who pretend to more than ordinary sanctity and fervour, and to more than ordinary assistances of the Spirit, and are very severe and censorious in their judgements of others whose religion is less noisy, and whose zeal is more discreet. History informs us that such *saints* have done infinite mischief in the world, and cautions us to be upon our guard against them; and the Scriptures, which recommend to us so much candour and equitable fairness in our judgements, yet allow us to have some of the serpent's prudence, and to beware of those who either deceive or are deceived.

It is urged by those who depreciate mankind, that self-love is the corrupted fountain of all human virtues. And this is the principal argument on which they rest their cause: 'From this general fault,' say they, 'none are free, except those Christians in whom the grace of God overcomes the evil principle[d].' This is added by way of ridicule, or to throw dust in the eyes of the simple.

But here they ignorantly or wilfully confound two sorts of self-love, which both Scripture and reason teach us to distinguish. 'Wicked men shall be lovers of themselves,' say the Scriptures: here is vicious self-love. 'Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,' say the Scriptures: here is innocent self-love. The desire of happiness and the love of ourselves are natural affections, and therefore, like other passions, they are

[d] See the Discourse prefixed to Rochefoucault's Maxims.

harmless; but when they are suffered to go beyond their bounds, and to encroach upon the love which is due to God and to our neighbour, and to weaken or destroy it, then they become vicious in various degrees, and not before.

To consider ourselves as what we really are, a part of the creation, and to desire the share of happiness which is designed for us; to consider other beings also as what they really are, and to do to them as we could reasonably wish they should do to us; to promote the happiness and lessen the misery of all creatures, as far as we can; this is morality and virtue: a morality built upon our own interest distinct from that of others, is a doctrine not fit even for the schools of Pagan philosophers, but for the dens of boors and savages.

To conclude: Charity thinketh no evil of others, since usually it thinketh not at all about them, that is, about their faults. There is a disposition which the writers of the New Testament often reprimand and condemn, and that is a pragmatical impertinence in meddling with the concerns and characters of other people. The charitable man is free from this fault. He has work to do of his own; it is enough for him to watch over his own conduct. He is not curious to know how others act, and in what they are deficient, and is neither a spreader nor a receiver of idle reports concerning them; he has no leisure and no genius for such mean occupations, but studies to be quiet, and to mind his own business.

DISSERTATION IV.

ON THE LOVE OF PRAISE AND REPUTATION, AND THE PROPER BOUNDS AND DEGREE OF THAT LOVE.

PROFUNDA SUPRA NOS ALTITUDO TEMPORIS VENIET: PAUCA INGENIA CAPUT EXSERENT, ET IN IDEM QUANDOQUE SILENTIUM ABITURA, OBLIVIONI RESISTENT, AC SE DIU VINDICABUNT.

DISSERTATION IV.

ON THE LOVE OF PRAISE AND REPUTATION, AND THE PROPER BOUNDS AND DEGREE OF THAT LOVE.

JOHN xii. 43.

For they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God.

THOUGH our Saviour wrought a surprising variety of beneficial miracles in confirmation of a reasonable doctrine, yet the Jews, as St. John tells us in this chapter, that is, the greater part of the Jews, believed not in him; the number of those who professed themselves his disciples was very small. But besides those who followed him, and those who were his open enemies, there were several, says St. John, who in their hearts acknowledged him, but durst not declare their sentiments: Nevertheless, among the chief rulers also, many believed on him; but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue: for they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God.

Their sin seems not to have been of the blackest and

the most heinous nature, and there is room for a charitable conjecture that their good dispositions at last prevailed over their weakness, their vanity, and their fear, and that after the resurrection of Christ and the effusion of the Holy Spirit they joined themselves to his disciples.

But by not daring openly to declare their faith in Christ, whilst he was upon earth, they acted against their own conscience, and excluded themselves at that time from the great benefits which he came to confer upon his servants. Their state, whilst they continued in it, was very dangerous.

The love of praise is here represented as the cause, which produced these bad effects; whence we may conclude that it is a fault; yet it is easy to prove that the love of praise cannot be entirely unlawful; nor indeed are these persons here condemned because they loved the praise of men, but because they loved it more than the praise of God.

My discourse therefore upon this subject shall consist of two parts, and I will show,

I. That we may love the praise of men in some degree.

II. That our love of it should be moderate.

I. The love of praise seems to be natural to us, and a part of self-love. We love ourselves; we desire therefore that others should esteem us, should think and speak well of us: we seem to multiply ourselves by having a place in the thoughts of so many persons,

and to triumph in some manner over our *last enemy*, when our name survives with honour after we are gone hence.

We read in fabulous history of heroes and favourites of the gods, who, though they could not be preserved from death, were transformed into flowers, which annually reviving and blooming enjoyed a kind of immortality*. A poetical image of the honours paid in civilized countries to public benefactors by stated commemorations.

Not only they who are eminent in rank and abilities, but persons of all stations usually love and value a good name and a fair character, and desire that their neighbours and acquaintance should account them to be just in their dealings, skilful in their occupations, careful of their families, faithful to their friends, and grateful to their benefactors.

This general love of praise manifestly tends to the good of society. This passion, encouraged in all polite nations, hath been one of the great springs and principles of useful and commendable actions both in the subject and in the magistrate. The desire of reputation hath taught men to despise danger, and to expose their lives for the public, to undergo labour and fatigue, to study incessantly, to deny themselves many pleasures; it

* Qua licet, æternus tamen es: quotiesque repellit
Ver hiemem, Piscique Aries succedit aquoso,
Tu totus oreris, viridique in cespite vernas,
Ovid. Met. 2.

hath made them desirous of surpassing even the best and the most eminent. The love of reputation is necessarily attended with the fear of disgrace and contempt; and the fear of disgrace hath restrained some persons from base and dishonest actions, when no other tie would hold them, and religion itself was insufficient for that purpose.

Thus hath this passion often proved advantageous to civil society; for it has allured men to do those actions willingly and cheerfully which are never so well performed when they arise from compulsion; it has had an influence upon them when other motives would have failed, when there was no recompense to be expected, when their services were repaid with ingratitude. The honour which men have pursued so eagerly cost the public little or nothing, and yet hath been more valued than riches by those who acquired it. A picture, an inscription, a spear, a crown of oak or of laurel, a statue, a public commendation,—for such recompenses men have affronted dangers, and lost their lives. They who love to set things in the least favourable light, may compare these heroes to the savages often mentioned in books of voyages, who exchange sheep and oxen for a few beads or ribbands, or a bit of a looking-glass.

Reputation sometimes brings with it several real advantages, and is more valuable to us in the effects which it produces than it is in itself. A good character may serve to many useful purposes. It may raise us up

friends, it may help us to acquire what is necessary for our support in life, it may enable us to do service to the unfortunate and the deserving, by giving us credit and weight amongst those with whom we converse; our example by being observed may incite others to imitate us; our reputation may be profitable to our posterity; it may be both an advantage and an honour to them to have descended from us, and for our sake they may meet with kindness.

We may observe further in behalf of reputation, that to esteem it seems to argue a good temper and a benevolent disposition towards mankind. We pay respect and civility to our fellow-creatures when we desire their approbation, and take some pains to acquire and preserve it, and set some value upon it. It is a sign that we honour them, when we are willing that they should honour us. On the contrary, they who slight reputation are usually persons who have no desire of excelling, no industry, no shame, and whom it would be no credit to resemble.

It must be acknowledged that there have been philosophers, wise and virtuous men, recorded in history, who have professed a great contempt for the praise and good opinion of others.

But either their meaning was, that a man should persist in his duty, and despise the censures of the ignorant and vicious multitude:

Or by condemning the love of praise they intended

to condemn an immoderate love of it, and a slavish regard to it in all our actions:

Or they had, amongst many good qualities, a little pride and singularity; they despised too much the bulk of mankind, and therefore desired not their approbation:

Or perhaps they expected to be admired on that very account, and to find esteem by shunning it; as indeed it often happened to them, for Reputation[b] will fly from those who pursue her in an improper manner, and will pursue those who seem to fly from her, if they deserve her favour:

Lastly, they owned that although the applause of the populace was of no value, yet the approbation of the wise and good was a thing desirable.

These few persons excepted, the rest of the despisers of reputation have been such as had no reputation to keep or to lose.

The Stoics, a very worthy sect, but somewhat rigid and morose, refused to give fame and glory a place amongst good things. Yet, I think, they did not slight the esteem of good men. They were remarkable for logical subtilties, and, as it happens to over-acute persons, they sometimes made a distinction without a difference: but upon this subject they perhaps distinguished well enough. They said that there

[b] Καὶ φεύγει φιλέοντα, καὶ ἢ φιλέοντα διώκει.

were two sorts of reputation [c]: the first was, to be commended of many, a thing of no value; the second was, to be commended by wise and good men, and this was what a wise and good man might willingly accept.

Another observation not to be omitted is, that in the Sacred Writings a good name both during our lives and after death is represented as desirable, and promised as a reward.

God with great goodness and condescension makes use of various motives to excite our obedience, suited to the various dispositions of men.

Of these motives to righteousness the less excellent are those which work upon our fears, as the threatenings of present and future punishment; the more noble, which are adapted to better tempers, are peace of mind, everlasting life, and the beauty and dignity of virtue.

Of a middle nature between these two sorts of motives is the promise of temporal blessings, a motive very well suited to persons who have made a moderate progress in goodness, and desire to improve yet further. Temporal blessings are health, length of days, the conveniencies of life, liberty, peace, the prosperity of our families; and lastly honour, praise, reputation, which are often proposed in the Scriptures of the Old

[c] They called the first *gloria*, and the second *claritas*. *Gloria*, says Seneca, multorum judiciis constat, claritas bonorum.——[sed claritas] potest unius boni viri judicio esse contenta.

Testament, as a reward of well-doing and an encouragement to it: and our Saviour declares concerning the woman who anointed him, that what she had done should never be forgotten. Judas Iscariot censured her for wasting the ointment, which, said he, might have been sold for much and given to the poor. Our Lord, who knew the dishonesty of the one and the good disposition of the other, immediately took her part, and kindly defended the action. "Why trouble ye the woman? She hath wrought a good work upon me. For ye have the poor always with you: but me ye have not always. Verily I say unto you, Wheresoever this Gospel shall be preached in the whole world, there shall also this, that this woman hath done, be told for a memorial of her." Her action discovered a generous and a grateful mind; and therefore our Lord gave her a suitable reward, a reward very acceptable to persons of such a temper, reputation and praise, an honourable mention from his own sacred mouth, which should spread itself far and wide, and be transmitted down to the latest posterity.

From these observations concerning praise we may conclude, that the love of it, if it be not immoderate, and lead us into no faults, is lawful: for, since this love is natural to us; since the common interest requires that it should be encouraged, and those nations have flourished most in which praise and honour have been judiciously bestowed and generally pursued; since the possession of it may prove beneficial to ourselves

and to our friends and to our posterity, and hurtful to none; since a desire to stand fair in the opinion of others is a respect and civility paid to our acquaintance, to our fellow-citizens, and to human nature; since a contempt of reputation appears blameable, and often proceeds from very bad causes; since the holy Scriptures condescend to comply with our inclinations for it, and permit us to seek it, and propose it sometimes as an incitement to virtue; since our Lord conferred it as a reward upon a grateful and a generous action; it seems to follow that it may be ranked, if not amongst those things which strictly and truly deserve to be called good, yet, at least, amongst those things which are convenient, which may be in some degree esteemed, without any disgrace to our reason or injury to our religion.

They therefore may be said to have gone into extremes who have called the love of reputation a distemper of the soul, and a weakness which it ought entirely to shake off. They had done better, if they had represented the bad consequences of indulging it too far, and the necessity of keeping it in due bounds.

II. I shall then, secondly, endeavour to show, that there is an immoderate love of praise, which on many accounts we ought to avoid or restrain.

The love of reputation is a passion, and as such it may be carried to excess; but of all the passions it is perhaps the least apt to mislead us. A desire to be

esteemed by good and worthy persons incites us to imitate those whose approbation we seek. The love of riches, the love of sensual pleasures, the love of idleness and of everlasting amusements, the love of arbitrary power and dominion,—these are the inordinate affections, and these the objects which seduce men from their duty, and from the way to eternal happiness, and they lose the race whilst they stoop to gather up these golden apples.

But we must take care that our love of reputation be discreet and moderate, free from pride, affectation, vanity, forwardness, conceit, envy, detraction, and hypocrisy.

1. We must not love the praise of the world too much, because we may not be able to acquire it. It is one of the temporal rewards of virtue; it is therefore, like other recompenses of this kind, not universally bestowed upon those who deserve it; it is usually, but not constantly, given to the righteous; it naturally results from a laudable behaviour, but it may by interposing causes be stopped and prevented. Reputation is said to accompany goodness, as its shadow; but the day may be overcast, and the shadow may disappear.

Whatsoever is so far precarious, that after all our endeavours we may never obtain it, should not be permitted to possess the best place in our heart. Now reputation is to be ranked amongst these precarious things: with many virtues we may live and die almost

unknown to the world. We should therefore set no high value upon the esteem of men, we should be contented if they neglect us, we should bear without uneasiness those slights which our betters in all ages have experienced. We should remember that those good things alone are to be greatly prized, and deserve our sincerest affection, which if we diligently seek we shall certainly find, and which we can never lose except by our own perverseness and misbehaviour. Such are, for instance, the favour of God, and the approbation of our own conscience. As they are infinitely superior to reputation, so they offer themselves to every one, and may be eternally possessed by those who enjoy them: they lie out of the reach of envy and malice, of time and the world.

2. We should not be overfond of praise, because we may suffer in our reputation undeservedly, and ought to bear it patiently. It is indeed scarcely possible that an honest and worthy person should be generally disliked; but his good qualities may be known and esteemed by only a few friends, which is not what we commonly call reputation, whilst he may be exposed to slander, misrepresented by the envious, the ignorant, the credulous, the injudicious, the ambitious, the selfish, and the censorious.

3. Praise is often so ill bestowed, that even upon this account it is less valuable than it would else be. Praise or blame would less please or displease us, if we gave ourselves leave and leisure to consider what

sort of judges they often are whose good opinion we so passionately desire, and what sort of persons have their esteem, and how usual it is to pay more regard to noise than to sense, to fancy than to judgement, to vivacity than to reason, to boldness than to modesty, and to satirical and calumniating wit than to candour and good-nature.

4. Add to this, that it is almost impossible to enjoy reputation in its full extent. He possesses a great reputation who is known to many, and esteemed by all to whom he is known. Now this is an advantage so uncommon, that to expect it is folly: and yet this is what every person who is greedy of honour will desire; but he may know, if he takes the pains to inform himself about it, that if there are many who speak well of him, there are those who despise or censure him; and as they who covet applause have a quick sense and resentment of calumny or contempt, the reproaches even of a few may give him an uneasiness superior to the satisfaction which he finds in the approbation of his friends and well-wishers.

5. Reputation may be hurtful to those who possess it.

In bad times, and when they who are in high stations are greatly corrupted, and wicked men bear rule, it is a dangerous thing to be beloved by the public, and to deserve it, and history will inform us of not a few who have suffered upon that account. Even in happier ages and better ordered governments, he

who remarkably excels in any thing that is commendable, must expect as much envy as praise. Now envy, hatred, malice are more active than approbation and esteem; and the most inconsiderable person, who could do us no service if he were disposed to assist us, may be able to do us a mischief. We may be injured and hurt by spiteful adversaries, whilst they who favour us give us nothing besides good words and good wishes, and stand quietly by, and say that it is pity, and that we deserve better usage.

6. We should not be too fond of reputation, because we may not only be disappointed and little esteemed, but God may permit it in very kindness to us, and for our benefit, either to chastise us for some faults which we have committed, and to mortify in us pride and vanity, or to keep from us a reward which would spoil our best dispositions. There have been persons, who have sought reputation by laudable actions, who have obtained it, and by possessing it have lost in a great measure those commendable qualities to which they owed it; in the place of which have succeeded intolerable pride, conceit, and insolence, till at last they have outlived both their virtue and their character.

7. If by an excessive fondness of reputation we make it the principle and the end of our actions, it will certainly mislead us, and probably give us much uneasiness.

Such a person, when he behaves himself well, does it only that he may be praised. He acts therefore upon

mean and narrow views, without due regard to the will and approbation of God, or to the benefit of mankind, or to the decency of virtue, or to his own improvement and future happiness.

He who is guided by no better motives will abstain from those good actions which conduce not to his reputation, or may hurt it. There are duties which sometimes through the perverseness or ignorance of the public are out of fashion, and produce contempt or hatred. He who is greedy of applause will often neglect such duties, and fall into reputable vices; he will never have the courage and the greatness of mind to pursue what is right through good report and through evil report.

This was the case in the time of our Saviour. Many there were who believed on him, but because of the Pharisees they did not confess him, lest they should be put out of the synagogue; for they loved the praise of men more than the praise of God. Others there were on whom this passion had still a worse effect, whose deplorable condition our Lord represents, and tells them the cause of it in these words: "I know you, that ye have not the love of God in you. How can ye believe, who receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from God only?" Therefore he declares the loss of credit in a good cause to be great gain: "Blessed are ye when men shall revile you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely for my sake. Rejoice and be exceed-

ing glad, for great is your reward in heaven, for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you."

An excessive desire of praise, joined as it often is to a fear of ridicule, or to false notions of honour, hath done inconceivable mischief in the world. It hath kept multitudes from receiving or professing Christianity where other religions prevailed. It hath stirred up the ambitious vanity of princes and generals to wage unjust wars, and to spread ruin and desolation far and wide; nor have there been wanting fools or flatterers to call it valour and heroism, though it deserves no more applause than a pestilence, a famine, a fire, an inundation, and an earthquake. It hath forced many persons to engage in duels, who though they knew that it was not consistent with Christianity, and that a thousand bad consequences attended it, yet were weak enough to sacrifice all to the senseless tyrant called Honour. It hath been the cause why many a young person hath pretended to be worse than he really was; hath talked slightingly of religion, hath grown negligent of his duty, and so hath made an unhappy progress in all profaneness and immorality, because he fell into bad company, and took his notions of politeness from them, and feared their contempt, and was desirous to pass with them for a man of wit and taste, and freedom of thought.

He who hath his reputation principally in view, lies often under temptations to play the hypocrite, and to pretend that he possesses every excellence by which he

sees others obtain honour. By this vanity he may be induced to undertake things for which he hath no abilities, and to expose himself to inconveniencies, to shame and contempt.

He indulges a passion which may destroy his peace and quiet, and perhaps treasureth up to himself disappointment and uneasiness. Praise is to him food and raiment, and for it he must rely upon the charity of others. He puts it in the power of a few spiteful or injudicious persons to deprive him of satisfaction, and then may have leisure to repent that he did not set his heart upon better things.

A violent desire to be observed and commended will show itself in his discourse and behaviour, and break out in little follies and indecencies which others will not be inclined to overlook and excuse.

He who loves flattery must be very fortunate if he finds one to counsel him, and very poor if he finds not one to delude him. He will confine his favours to his flatterers, that is, to those who may be secret enemies but cannot be true friends to him; he will shun and fear and dislike those from whom he might receive the most benefit; sincerity and plain dealing will be unacceptable to him, reproof will offend him, and good advice will be thrown away upon him. He will think and speak ill of those who take no notice of him, or who are his equals or superiors in useful qualities or in reputation. The love of praise, when it is discreet and moderate, is always attended

with emulation and a strong desire of excelling; and so long as we can stop here, there is no harm done to ourselves or others; but emulation easily and insensibly degenerates into envy and censoriousness.

The world, with all its faults, is seldom so bad as to applaud vices; and St. Paul exhorts Christians to follow not only whatsoever things are right, but whatsoever things are of good report; the love of reputation, therefore, if it be not joined to a bad disposition, will scarcely of itself lead us to immoral actions. Yet the things which the world usually admires and praises most, are not the things in their own nature the most valuable; they are those bright abilities and fair endowments which are exercised about temporal objects, which relate to the present life, and terminate with it. Commendable as they are, they are not the one thing needful; they have no immediate connection with heaven and happiness; it is well if they be no impediment in the way to it. On the contrary, christian virtues are often of a more silent, modest, and retired nature. God and good angels approve them, but the busy world overlooks them. So that he who principally affects popular approbation, runs some danger of living and dying well-known to others, and little known to himself, ignorant of the state of his soul, and forgetful of the account which he has to render up to God.

From the foregoing remarks we may make this conclusion, that reputation may be numbered amongst the

things which are desirable and advantageous. We may use all lawful means to acquire it, and to secure its continuance; and if we be careful and industrious in using the proper means, we have commonly a fair prospect of succeeding. The caprice of the great and powerful cannot deprive us of this reward at least. They can neither give it, nor take it away; and it is very well for the world that they cannot. The love of reputation, when directed by reason, is allowable; but reason must govern, and not be governed. Our love of it must be moderate: we must love it as a thing which, though pleasant and profitable, is precarious, attended with some inconveniencies, not easily kept, and sometimes undeservedly lost, and lastly of no use to us beyond the grave. We, whose continuance here is so short, are scarcely born for this world, or for any thing that this world can bestow. Our reputation we can enjoy no longer than whilst we live. A reputation after death, if it only begins then, is of small value; it is like a favourable wind after a shipwreck. When we go hence, what good can arise to our own persons from it? Here we must leave it, and here it will remain and survive for a greater or a lesser number of years, as time and chance shall determine.

Good actions are a treasure which we can carry hence with us. If we are secure of these, it is no matter if the world be negligent of us, and we pass our days unregarded, and posterity know not that ever we

had a being. Our virtues are immortal, and true honour will be their recompense, an honour which we shall receive from God, from holy angels, and from just men made perfect, and which shall continue to all eternity. And this seems to suggest one reason for which we should have some taste, and entertain some value for reputation here, because reputation may be part of our reward hereafter.

DISSERTATION V.

ON THE HISTORY AND THE CHARACTER OF BALAAM.

AT VERI FRUSTRA IMPATIENS, ET MENTIS INIQUÆ,
LUCTATUR VATES, MAGNUM SI PECTORE POSSIT
EXCUSSISSE DEUM. TANTO MAGIS ILLE FATIGAT
OS RABIDUM, FERA CORDA DOMANS, FINGITQUE
PREMENDO.

DISSERTATION V.

ON THE HISTORY AND THE CHARACTER OF BALAAM.

NUMB. xxii. 12.

And God said unto Balaam, Thou shalt not go with them; thou shalt not curse the people, for they are blessed.

THE history of Balaam, recorded by Moses, is extraordinary in all its parts. It contains difficulties which have exercised the abilities and divided the opinions of religious inquirers, it hath been matter of cavilling and of sport to unbelievers, and it affords moral instruction of great importance and of general use. Upon these accounts I shall endeavour to explain and vindicate it, and then to make such practical inferences from it as the matter suggests.

The first point which offers itself to our consideration is, How came Moses to the knowledge of all these transactions? I answer, that as there is no intimation given, so there is no reason to imagine, that he had his knowledge by revelation. He had it then

by information, which he might easily obtain concerning an event in his own time, and in the neighbourhood. Balaam himself must have related to the Moabites what befel him on his journey; and when the spirit of the Lord was upon him, and he delivered his prophecies concerning the people of Israel and other nations, the Moabites, who stood by, took down his discourses, or he himself might afterwards commit them to writing; and so they came into the hands of Moses.

Balaam in his prophecies foretold the fate and fortunes of several nations, and many events which did not come to pass till after many ages. His predictions have been exactly fulfilled[a], and this is a sure proof that he was a prophet, and that Moses hath given us a faithful account of his prophecies. It serves also to confirm the truth of some extraordinary things in the character and the adventures of this extraordinary person.

Balaam[b] seems to have been a worshipper of the true

[a] Of this the reader will find a satisfactory account in Dr. Newton's learned Dissertation on this subject, p. 114.

[b] Josephus, Ant. iv. 6. and Bernard's notes. Philo, p. 436. Origen ad Num. Homil. 13. &c.

Josephus, in relating the story of Balaam, makes some additions of his own; which is no uncommon way with him. Philo throws in many embellishments and amplifications, but he suppresses the circumstance of the speaking ass:

——————————————et quæ
Desperat tractata nitescere posse, relinquit.

God[c]: he was a priest and a prophet, and he dwelt in Mesopotamia, by the river Euphrates, at a considerable distance from the Moabites. His reputation was great, and extended through the nations round about, and he was thought to have such interest in heaven, that whomsoever he blessed was blessed, and whomsoever he cursed was cursed.

The king of Moab, therefore, terrified at the approach of the Israelites, at the rapidity of their conquests, and at the destruction of the warlike nations of the Amorites and of other people, consulted with his neighbours the Midianites, what they should do for their common safety. It was agreed upon that they should send an embassy to Balaam, and prevail with him, by the force of entreaties joined to the stronger force of presents, to come and curse the Israelites in a religious and a solemn manner.

It was a general notion that the priests and prophets could sometimes by prayers and sacrifices, duly and skilfully applied, obtain such favours from the gods, and that their imprecations were efficacious. This seems to have been a very ancient notion, founded, it may be, upon the prayers, benedictions, and imprecations of the

[c] Balaam, says Jerom, primum vir sanctus et prophetes Dei, postea per inobedientiam et desiderium munerum, dum Israel maledicere cupit, *Divini* vocabulo nuncupabatur. See Bernard on Josephus, Ant. iv. 6. Le Clerc on Numb. xxiii. 7. xxiv. 2. and Whitby on 2 Peter xi. 16. who show that he was a true prophet of the Lord.

patriarchs, of men who had the prophetic spirit, and foretold the fates of their posterity.

These methods of applying to the gods, and of execrating and devoting an enemy in time of war, were practised by the Romans[d] afterwards with great solemnity[e], and doubtless by others. Thus some nations, wise enough in many respects, yet thought that the Deity could be influenced by such artifices, and brought to hate one people and love another. The Gentiles, bestowing human vices upon their deities, accounted them to be as sordid as themselves, and used to say, that gifts had a prevailing charm over gods as well as over men.

This art of religious execration observed by Rome Pagan hath been kept up by Rome[f] Christian, where

[d] Le Clerc on Num. xxii. 6. and on Genes. xiv. 19.

[e] Ταύτας φασὶ Ῥωμαῖοι τὰς ἀρὰς ἀποθέτους καὶ παλαιὰς τοιαύτην ἔχειν δύναμιν ὡς περιφυγεῖν μηδένα τῶν ἐνσχεθέντων αὐταῖς, καπῶς δὲ πράττειν καὶ τὸν χρησάμενον. Ὅθεν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσιν αὐτὰς, οὐδ' ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀρᾶσθαι. 'Has Romani arcanas et vetustas devotiones ea præditas vi ferunt, ut nemo, adversus quem conceptæ sint, evitare illas queat, nec bene cedant etiam concipientibus eas. Unde neque qualibet de caussa has, neque multos imprecari.' Plutarchus Crasso, p. 553.

[f] Here is a form of cursing, employed formerly by these spiritual fathers against unquiet and untractable children:

'By command of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, of the blessed Mary, mother of our Lord Jesus Christ, of St. Michael, John the Baptist, and of Peter and Paul, princes of the apostles, of St. Stephen and all the martyrs, of St. Silvester and all the confessors, of St. Aldegund and all the holy virgins, and of all other

the holy pontiff and his ecclesiastics denounce the most horrible, infamous, and profane curses against the

saints whatsoever, both in heaven and earth; we curse and cut off from the holy mother the Church, him, her, or them that have [done so and so] or have known thereof, or have been advising, abetting, or assisting therein. Let them be accursed in their houses, granaries, beds, fields, lands, ways, country-seats, towns, and villages. Let them be accursed in the woods, rivers, and churches: accursed in pleadings, trials, contentions, and quarrels: accursed in praying, speaking, and in silence: in eating, drinking, and sleeping: in waking, feeling, walking, standing, running, resting, and riding: accursed in hearing, seeing, and tasting; accursed in all their works. Let this curse smite their heads, eyes, and their whole bodies, from the crown of their head to the sole of their feet. I conjure thee, Satan, and all thy black guard, by the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, that ye do not rest day or night, till ye have brought them both to temporal and to eternal shame, whether it be by causing them to be drowned, or hanged, or devoured by wild beasts, or torn in pieces by vultures or eagles, or burnt with fire, or murdered by their enemies: make them odious to all creatures living: let their children be orphans, and their wives widows: let no man relieve them from this time forwards, nor have any compassion for their fatherless children: and just as Lucifer was driven out of heaven, and Adam banished out of Paradise, let them also be driven and banished out of this world, being despoiled of all their goods and possessions; and let them be buried with the burial of an ass: let them partake of the punishment of Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, of Judas, of Pontius Pilate, and of all that say to the Lord their God, Depart from us, we will have no knowledge of thy ways. [At these words the person who pronounced the curses extinguished two burning tapers, which he held in his hands, with the following dreadful expressions:] I ad-

disobedient, against schismatics and heretics, with all the pomp and grimace of Paganism, and with the same efficacy and success. Their Pagan ancestors, to give them their due, were much more reasonable petitioners, and only desired that their enemies might be conquered; but these pious Christians [g] prayed for the eternal damnation of their adversaries, and devoutly hoped that their curses were ratified in heaven and in hell [h].

But to return to Balaam: That nothing should detain him, the ambassadors brought him presents, and were willing to pay him before hand. Upon which we may observe that the temper of the eastern nations and of the Greeks was and is, in general, extremely mercenary. Ancient writers [i] show it to have

jure thee, Satan, and all thy companions, that just as these candles are extinguished in my hands, thou likewise extinguish and take from them the light of their eyes, unless they repent, and make entire amends and satisfaction. Amen. Amen." G. Brandt, Hist. of the Ref. vol. i. p. 15.

[g] The Athenian priestess seems to have had much better notions of religion, when, being required to curse Alcibiades, she replied that her office was to pray and to bless, and not to curse. Plutarch. Quæst. Rom. p. 271.

[h] See also the Annotations to Brandt's Hist. p. 7. I would not be understood to mean that such forms of execration are now in use; nor do I believe that the present bishop of Rome would approve them.

[i] Homer's heroes are often sordid and rapacious.

been so in various instances: the Pagan[k] poets have not scrupled to charge the diviners and sooth-sayers with avarice and rapaciousness; and Balaam's character is manifestly of this kind, and he stands recorded as a man greedy of lucre.

Balaam then said to the messengers, "Lodge here this night, and I will bring you word again as the Lord shall speak unto me."

From this it appears that the prophet had been accustomed to revelations, and that he used to receive them in visions, or in dreams of the night. The same appears in the sequel of the story, from his going aside after the sacrifice, to receive such information as the Lord would please to give him.

And God (that is, an angel of God,) came to Balaam by night, and said, "Thou shalt not go; thou shalt not curse the people; for they are blessed."

Then Balaam said to the princes of Balak, "Get you into your land, for the Lord refuseth to give me leave to go with you." Hitherto he seems to have committed no fault.

[k] Τὸ μαντικὸν γὰρ πᾶν φιλάργυρον γένος,

says Creon to Tiresias, in the Antigone of Sophocles, 1607, and Œedipus calls him

μάγον——μηχανορράφον,
Δόλιον, ἀγύρτην, ὅστις ἐν τοῖς κέρδεσι
Μόνον δέδορκε, τὴν τέχνην δ' ἔφυ τυφλός.

Œd. Tyr. 395.

Τὸ μαντικὸν πᾶν σπέρμα, φιλότιμον κακόν.

Euripides Iphig. in Aul. 520.

Balak, however, being very desirous of the prophet's assistance, would not acquiesce in the first refusal, but entertained hopes that he might still prevail with him by larger offers and more venerable ambassadors, and promised to promote him to very great honour, and to do for him whatsoever he should require.

Balaam answered the messengers, "If Balak would give me his house full of silver and gold, I cannot go beyond the word of the Lord my God, to do less or more." The answer was wise and religious, and thus far the man appears to advantage.

But he was staggered at this second offer, and told the messengers, that he would consult the Lord once again. This was a wrong step; for God had told him before that he would not suffer him to go and curse the Israelites, and Balaam knew that God was not fickle and inconstant, and he afterwards declared as much: "God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?"

Here then his corrupted heart got the better of his reason and his religion.

And God came to Balaam at night, and said, "If the men come to call thee, rise up[1], and go with them; but yet the word which I shall say unto thee, that thou shalt do."

[1] I, fuge; sed poteras tutior esse domi.

So he went; "And God's anger was kindled because he went, and the angel of the Lord stood in the way for an adversary against him."

Various solutions [m], and not improbable, have been offered to reconcile this account, that God should give him leave to go, and yet be offended at him because he went. But the angel of the Lord said to him afterwards, "I went out to withstand thee, because thy way is perverse before me." Hence it may be inferred, that God was offended at him, not so much for his going, as for his going with bad views and for bad purposes. He went hoping to receive honours and rewards, and to do something to deserve them from the king; to try at least whether he could by any means obtain leave from God to prophesy evil against the Israelites, and to reverse the declarations which had been solemnly made to him, that the people were blessed of God, and that he should not be permitted to curse them.

In spite of this second reprimand, and of the great danger of being struck dead by the angel, which he so narrowly escaped, when he met the king of Moab he did not act the part of a man of piety and probity, and tell him that the attempt was wicked and would be unsuccessful, but still left him some hopes. He was resolved at least to testify to Balak his zeal for him, and

[m] See a pamphlet called 'The Case of Abraham, &c.' in answer to Chubb, who might have found himself confuted in it; but he was too illiterate and too conceited to feel it and to own it.

his good will to serve him. He offered up sacrifices to God, namely seven bullocks and seven rams, upon seven altars, animals which were pure and clean, and seven in number, to show perhaps that they were offered up to Him who in seven days completed the creation of heaven and earth, and ceased from his work. Thus he strove to make God favourable to his request, but in vain; for the prophetic spirit came upon him, and compelled him to bless the Israelites, and to denounce woes to their adversaries.

It was the opinion of the Gentiles, that if one victim proved faulty, or portended evil, another victim might have a more propitious aspect, and be accepted; and this notion, doubtless, was encouraged by the whole order of soothsayers and sacrificers[n], who got the more meat by it themselves, and helped their friends the sellers of cattle. Balaam here seems to have complied with some superstitious notions of this kind, and to gratify Balak and his own ambitious views, he repeated the same experiment of sacrificing at different places, a second time, and a third time, and still with the same disappointment. And so they parted equally sorrowful and dissatisfied, the king at losing his hopes, and the prophet at losing his reward.

Moses reminds the people afterwards of this signal favour of God towards them. "The Moabite," says he, "hired against thee Balaam the son of Beor, of

[n] Le Clerc on Num. xxiii. 27.

Mesopotamia, to curse thee. Nevertheless the Lord thy God turned the curse into a blessing unto thee, because the Lord thy God loved thee."

Joshua reminds them also of the same event, speaking in the person of God: "Balak arose and warred against Israel, and sent and called Balaam to curse you. But I would not hearken unto Balaam, therefore he blessed you still: so I delivered you out of his hand."

After Balaam had thus failed in his attempt, he tried another and a worse method. He knew what had happened to this chosen people of God, who had brought them out of Ægypt, and protected and conducted them in the wilderness. He knew that they were fickle and stubborn, and apt to misbehave themselves. He knew that they were under a particular providence, and would be fortunate or unsuccessful, happy or miserable, according as their conduct should be dutiful or disobedient. He therefore laid a plot as artful as it was wicked, he counselled the Midianites to send their women amongst them, to invite them to their religious solemnities, and to try to draw them into fornication and idolatry, by which they would forfeit the favour of God, and make him their enemy. The advice was followed, the experiment was made, and succeeded so far that twenty and four thousand Israelites were cut off for their iniquity and apostasy. Moses hath expressly charged this contrivance upon Balaam; "Behold these (that is, the Midianitish wo-

men) caused the children of Israel, through the counsel of Balaam, to commit trespass against the Lord in the matter of Peor, and there was a plague amongst the congregation of the Lord."

And St. John, in the Revelation, refers to this transaction, and says that "Balaam taught Balak to cast a stumbling-block before the children of Israel, to eat things sacrificed to idols, and to commit fornication."

To revenge this injury, the Israelites, at the command of God, made war upon the Midianites and destroyed them; and having found Balaam among them, they put him also to death. And thus the evil overtook him of which he seemed to have had a strong foreboding, when he cried out, in the midst of his prophecy, "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." That is, May I be gathered to my fathers, at my own home, in peace, and in a good old age, which is the usual end and reward of the righteous.

And now I proceed to consider the things which befel Balaam on his journey, and which must be confessed to contain in them no small difficulty. The angel[a] appears in the way, the prophet sees him not,

[a] The angel who appeared to Balaam was αὐτὸς ὁ Λόγος, says Irenæus, in Fragm. p. 471. According to the ancient fathers, the Λόγος before the incarnation never acted and appeared in his own name and character, but represented sometimes God the Father, and sometimes an angel of God.

but the ass sees him, and endeavours to shun him, and hurts her master; Balaam is angry, and strikes the beast; the beast speaks with a human voice, and reasons and expostulates with him.

That God is able to work such a miracle, none but an atheist can doubt. That he should have done it for a purpose so slender in all appearance, is a supposition which may perplex even a sober and religious inquirer, and throw him into a state of doubt and hesitation. The end and design of this miracle, as far as we can discern, was to show the mercenary prophet that his passions had blinded and stupified him, that he had not even the sense and the discernment of a brute, and that it would be a dangerous and a vain attempt for him to pretend to prevaricate, and not to say to Balak what God should put in his mouth. This might have been accomplished by other methods, and the same instruction given to him without changing the order of nature in this most strange manner. But what follows is still perhaps more wonderful; for the prophet, instead of being terrified [p] beyond measure

[p] Josephus therefore adds that Balaam was frightened at the speaking of the beast—*ταραττομένε δ' αὐτε διὰ τὴν τῆς ὄνε φωνὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἔσαν*——But this is making history.

In Lucian, Micyllus the cobler curses his cock, and threatens to kill him, for waking him so early in the morning out of a golden dream: but as soon as the cock begins to talk and reason with him, he cries out very properly, 'O Jupiter, averter of portents, defend me! &c.' *Ὦ Ζεῦ τεράστιε, καὶ Ἡράκλεις ἀλεξίκακε*—

at the voice and reproof of the beast, continues to be very angry, and threatens to kill her; which is downright phrensy, and the behaviour of a man altogether beside himself, and, as such, incabable of correction and instruction.

One solution there is to these difficulties, which if it might be admitted would in a great measure remove them. I would by no means insist upon it as upon a certainty, but yet it may be offered as a conjecture not forced, or improbable, or irreligious, or contrary to the reverence which is due to the sacred writings. It is this: Balaam saw and did these things in a trance or vision, in such a vision as other prophets frequently had on other occasions.

Several considerations may be offered in behalf of this interpretation.

First, it is no new opinion. Maimonides, a learned and judicious commentator amongst the Jews, and

Somnium seu Gallus. The cock in Lucian is supposed to be Pythagoras in masquerade, in a state of transmigration.

'Mirum est prima fronte,' says Le Clerc, 'hominem tanto prodigio territum, loquente asina, non prorsus obmutuisse; sed ita respondisse bruto animanti, quasi non tum primum cum eo esset collocutus. Sed aut *insaniebat*, aut nescio quid de brutis sentiebat, quod sciremus, si haberemus libros, &c.—Fortasse transmigrationem mentium humanarum in brutorum corpora fieri credebat, &c.' Ad Num. xxii. This account will by no means remove the difficulty, any more than the Remarks of Dr. Shuckford on the same subject.

several[q] of his brethren have adopted it, as also some Christian writers[r], though indeed the stream of interpreters[s] runs against us. This may serve to take off the prejudice of novelty.

[q] Bernard, in his notes on Josephus, insults Maimonides and his followers for taking such liberties. Bernard was a learned man; but his judgement was not always equal to his erudition, and he is surely too warm upon this occasion.

[r] Hæc omnia Maimonides facta putat in visione. Neque tamen similium portentorum desunt historiæ. Agnus locutus, Bocchoride in Ægypto regnante, apud Eusebium. Bos locutus apud Livium sæpe, et apud Eusebium. Meminere et Plinius, Polybius, Plutarchus.' Grotius ad Num. xxii. 22. Bochart hath collected examples of the same kind. Grotius might have added to his list Homer's horse Xanthus, and Lucian's cock.

Τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπὸ ζυγόφιν προσέφη πόδας ἀιόλος ἵππος
Ξάνθος. Il. T. 404.

[s] The author of the 'The Case of Abraham, &c.' hath proposed this solution in a modest and sensible manner.

'Cum dictio sacræ Scripturæ sit admodum figurata, stylusque mixtus, res est judicii non exigui in singulis locis distinguere, qua utitur loquendi forma Spiritus Sanctus, quo genere sermonis, Sanctus Petrus de Balaami asina verba faciens inquit, Jumentum mutum, humanas voces edens, inhibuit prophetæ dementiam. Aiunt tamen Hebræi, hoc totum in *visione prophetiæ* factum esse; nec credunt fœdam bestiam e rauco gutture emugiisse voces humanas; ratiocinatam præterea, et injuriam expostulasse cum suo domino.—Non memini ego, in historia sacra, ullibi locutas esse bestias.' Burnet. Archæol. p. 541.

[s] Amongst these interpreters we find Le Clerc, who on so many other occasions thinks more freely. If some of my learned friends prefer the common opinion, they have too much candour to take

Secondly, this interpretation may be so stated, as not to deny and destroy the historical fact, but only to remove that part and circumstance of it which must always appear improbable and liable to exception. For, according to this solution, we may admit that an angel of the Lord did indeed come to oppose Balaam in the way, and suffered himself to be seen by the beast, but not by the prophet, that the beast was terrified, and Balaam smote her, and immediately fell into a trance or ecstasy, and in that state of vision conversed with the beast first, and then with the angel. The angel presented these objects to his imagination as strongly as if they had been before his eyes, so that this was still a miraculous or a preternatural operation. This interpretation[t] which I have here proposed is a medium

it amiss that I dissent, or rather doubt, in a point so ambiguous, and merely speculative.

[t] Mr. Wasse, in the margin of Le Clerc's Commentaries, writes thus: 'In a Dissertation printed in Germany, (see Memoirs of Lit. vol. i. p. 39.) this transaction is pretended to be visionary. But 2 Peter xi. 16. shows it to be real; which I wonder that author was not aware of.'

I have seen that Dissertation, which is a slight and a fantastical performance.

Indeed the principal argument against this interpretation is taken from the words of St. Peter—"following the way of Balaam, who loved the wages of unrighteousness; but was rebuked for his iniquity: the dumb ass speaking with man's voice, forbad the madness of the prophet."

But since Balaam related it as a fact, and Moses recorded it as Balaam gave it, and other prophets have described their visions

between the sentiments of those who take the affair to have been altogether real, or altogether visionary, and I think it hath some advantages over both.

In order to have an accurate notion of prophetic inspiration and prophetic actions, it would be necessary that a man should be a prophet himself: it is therefore no wonder if we cannot clearly apprehend how the Spirit of the Lord acted upon the prophets: but in the things which were seen and done by them, some were real and some were visionary. Thus much is allowed on all hands.

Moses stands distinguished from all the prophets in this, that he had neither dreams, nor trances, nor visions, but conversed with God face to face.

The other prophets received information and instruction in dreams, or trances and visions. What a dream is, we all know: a vision is a kind of waking dream, when a man with his eyes open sees not the objects which surround him, but other objects which some spiritual agent presents to his imagination.

Prophetic dreams and visions[v] were so very lively,

like real facts, and the moral use and application is the same either way, it is no wonder that St. Peter, mentioning the story, did not meddle with the distinction between real and visionary transactions, which concerned not his purpose in the least.

[v] See a Treatise of Smith De Prophetia et Prophetis, c. v. and vi. It is inserted by Le Clerc in his commentary on the prophets.

Sir Isaac Newton hath an observation, which in the main is very just, that the old prophets often taught by actions, and our Savi-

and affected the imagination with such force, that the prophet himself could not at the time distinguish such visions from realities. Something of this kind we experience in our dreams and rêveries, which, when they are lively and active, affect us for the time like realities, and the mind is then so occupied with the visionary object, the imagination is so busy, and the reasoning and reflecting powers are so languid, that we consider not the marvellous circumstances and the impossibilities which often attend our dreams, and which show us, when we are awake, that they must have been dreams. It is therefore no wonder if the prophet in a vision[w] conversed with his beast, and was not shocked at its speaking, as he would, if this had been real, and he in the condition of a man who is awake, and hath all his faculties about him.

St. Peter had probably experienced prophetic trances, and visions; and we have an account of one vision which was presented to him, in which he beheld a sheet descending from heaven, and full of all

our, by alluding to such objects as presented themselves. Many instances of this I have collected in the Discourses concerning the Christian Rel. Diss. vi. But sir Isaac did not consider, and I did not then call to mind, that some of those actions mentioned by him were of the imaginary kind, and performed in prophetic vision.

[w] This is what many a person hath experienced, and hath conversed in dreams with his dog and cat, and imagined

——————— veras audire et reddere voces.

kinds of creatures, clean and unclean. Afterwards he was imprisoned by Herod, and an angel came and released him, and he followed the angel, and, as it is said, wist not that it was true which was done by the angel, but thought he saw a vision. Here, as he could not distinguish reality from vision, it is to be concluded that neither could he distinguish vision from reality.

St. Paul had visions at various times, and once he was taken up into heaven; but how this was performed, whether in prophetic vision, or in reality, and whether in soul alone, or in soul and body, he seems not to have known: "Whether in the body," says he, "I cannot tell, or whether out of the body, I cannot tell; God knoweth."

All these things considered, it is no wonder if the prophets related their visions in the same manner as if they had been real transactions. How then shall we distinguish the one from the other? and by what rule must we direct our judgement? The best rule that I can discern is this: when the thing said to be done is impossible in itself, or not consistent with the divine laws, or such as may give needless scandal, or in appearance mean and absurd, and exposing the prophet to contempt, or contrary to the course of nature, and yet not answering any important purpose, or extremely grievous to the prophet himself, it is reasonable to have recourse to vision, and to suppose that such transactions were imaginary: and such a supposal is so far from being an unwarrantable liberty, that it is, on

the contrary, the most respectful manner of treating the subject, and an endeavour to defend a good cause against the cavils of profane men.

For example: the prophet Hosea is ordered by the Spirit to marry a common prostitute, and accordingly he takes her to wife, and has children by her. This must have been a very grievous command to the prophet, and also a matter of scandal to the nation. The design of this unsuitable match was neither more nor less than to be a figurative and typical representation to the Jews of God's judgements which would fall upon them. There is therefore good reason to account it a visionary scene presented to the prophet's imagination.

The prophet Jeremiah is ordered to buy a girdle, and to wear it, then to take a long journey to the river Euphrates, and there to dig a hole in the ground, and hide it: then, after many days, to go again and dig it up, when it was rotten, mouldy, and quite useless. This was to be an emblem of the corrupted condition of the Jews, and of their rejection; and this seems to be of the same nature with the action of Hosea.

Again, Jeremiah receives a cup at the hand of God, and travels about with it to various and very remote lands, and makes the kings, princes, and nobles of Judæa, Ægypt, Persia, Arabia, and twenty other nations, drink out of it. He is also sent about in the same manner with yokes, which he was to put upon the

necks of many kings. These were designed to be figurative representations of the divine judgements which would be executed upon those kings and their subjects. No reasonable man can believe that these actions were really performed: the impossibility of the thing stares you in the face; and therefore these are commonly allowed to have been visions, and should be a guide to us for the interpretation of other prophetic actions.

So also Isaiah is ordered to walk naked and barefoot for three years together, as a type and a sign to the Ægyptians, with whom he did not dwell, and as a prediction of their captivity; which may justly be ranked amongst prophetic visions, even for the sake of the grievous inconveniencies arising from the literal sense.

The prophecies of Ezechiel abound with actions of this kind, which must be thus interpreted; as his eating the book which God gave him, his besieging a pan-tile, and lying down before it three hundred and ninety days on his left side, and forty days on his right side, and all that time eating bread that was baked with dung. All this was done to foretel the dreadful calamities and desolation of Jerusalem, and must have been an imaginary scene, which answered the prophetic purpose as much as a real one, and was as much a prediction of things to come, which was verified by the event.

In the same manner may be understood his shaving[x] his head and beard, and dividing it into three parts, some to be burnt, some to be smitten with a knife, and some to be cast away; for Ezechiel was a priest, and the shaving himself in this manner seems to have been prohibited by the law of Moses.

Many other instances might be produced from the prophetic writings, where the nature of the transaction induced the most reasonable and judicious interpreters of Scripture to have recourse to the visionary sense and to prophetic scenery: whence the conclusion seems to follow which we have been aiming at, that the affair of Balaam might have been of the same kind, and a mixture of reality and of vision.

If a man will allow, and must allow some of these prophetic actions to have been visionary, and yet will not allow a possibility that the conversation between Balaam and his beast might have been of the same nature, such a person will hardly be able to give a reason why he admits the one and rejects the other.

Let us consider the alteration which befel Balaam's beast in a philosophical way.

[x] Absit ut Deus prophetas suos dementibus aut ebriis similes reddat, eosve dementium aut furiosorum in modum se gerere jubeat! præterquam quod ultimum illud præceptum Legi repugnasset. Fuit enim Ezechiel sacerdos magnus, et propterea duobus illis præceptis negativis, de non radendo angulo capitis et angulo barbæ tenebatur. Proinde non nisi in visione prophetica factum fuit. Maimonides Moreh Neb. p. ii. c. 46.

If you adhere to the letter, you must say that the ass talked, and talked to the purpose, and reasoned. She was changed[y] for a short time into a rational creature, and then returned back again to her first condition. Is this probable or conceivable? The defenders of the literal sense have granted that it is not. The ass, say they, did not know what she uttered, but was a passive instrument under the direction of a spiritual agent. They will not say that it was an evil dæmon, and introduce Satan into the machinery; and it seemeth beneath the dignity of a holy angel to enter into a brute, for a purpose which, though kind and good, yet might easily have been brought about by other methods. We do not find, from one end of the Scriptures to the other, that a good angel ever acted in a manner so fantastical in all appearance.

Thus much for the history of Balaam. I must add a few words concerning its moral use. It sets before us the infatuating power of ambition and covetousness, and the folly and danger of setting the affections on the transitory objects of this life, and of sacrificing religion and duty to dirty lucre, and to temporal advantages.

Here is a man who had the honour to be a priest and a prophet; who had a great reputation in the world; who probably was not young, and had the less reason to be anxious about rewards, honours, and pro-

[y] Nunc animal compos rationis, nuper asella,
Rursus et in speciem fato revoluta priorem.

motions; who seems to have been a worshipper of the true God, and not ignorant of the moral duties, but well apprized of the important truth, that to keep innocency and to do the thing that is right, will bring a man peace at the last, and that he who would die the death, must live the life of the righteous.

The Devil, in the form of money and preferment, comes and tempts him, and he is in danger of yielding to the importunate seducer. But God hath compassion on him, and uses all the methods to save him that are proper to be applied to a free agent. He forbids him to go with the messengers, he assures him that his designs would not prosper; he sends an angel to meet him and to terrify him in the way; he compels him, instead of uttering curses, to pronounce blessings upon the Israelites, and to foretel the prosperity of that people and the destruction of their adversaries, in such expressions as plainly showed at the same time that happiness was the reward of piety and obedience, and that wickedness brought on misery and ended in ruin. But all these kind warnings and corrections were lost upon the prophet: vexed at his disappointment, blinded by his passions, and deaf to the divine admonitions, he hardens himself still more, till at last he acts the part of the Devil, and lays projects of seducing the Israelites from their allegiance to God, and then, instead of going home, he loiters amongst the devoted nations till destruction overtakes him.

The world abounds with persons, who, like Balaam,

are slaves to covetousness and ambition, and who resemble him more or less, according as these predominant vices are checked and counterbalanced more or less by religion and conscience.

Some of them are quite estranged from virtue, have dismissed all shame and remorse, all moral sense and discernment, and judge of good and evil by arithmetical rules of gain and loss.

Others are not so far gone: by the blessing of a proper education, and by a serious temper, they are confirmed in religious principles; the fear of God and the fear of man restrain them from grosser enormities. Amongst these you shall find persons who have learning, knowledge, acuteness, dexterity, and industry. But the love of money and of power lies lurking at the heart, and betrays itself from time to time in actions suitable to such mean motives and miserable views. In many instances they are able to practise what is barely honest, but never can they do what is truly great.

The worst of all is, that these evil dispositions are seldom corrected, but length of time, which weakens the bodily powers, rather inflames than lessens the distempers of the soul. The man grows old, and his irregular passions remain young and lively; and this is most remarkably the case of avarice and rapaciousness, which survive the strength of the body and the abilities of the mind, subject to no decay, and cursed [z] with immortality.

[z] ——— Curæ non ipsa in morte relinquunt.

DISSERTATION VI.

ON THE STATE OF THE DEAD, AS DESCRIBED BY HOMER AND VIRGIL.

I.

HERODOTUS saith of Homer and Hesiod, that they were the first who *made a Theogony* for the Greeks, that is, who collected and drew it up into a kind of system: Οὗτοι δέ εἰσι οἱ ποιήσαντες Θεογονίην Ἕλλησι, καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσι τὰς ἐπωνυμίας δόντες, καὶ τιμάς τε καὶ τέχνας διελόντες, καὶ εἴδεα αὐτῶν σημήναντες. 'Illi fuere qui Græcis Theogoniam fecerunt, deisque et cognomina dederunt, honoresque et artificia separaverunt, et figuras eorum designaverunt.' ii. 53.

To suppose Homer to have been the author of the Theology and Mythology contained in his poems, would be as unreasonable as to imagine that he first taught the Greeks to read and to write. As he lived in no barbarous age or country, but when the Greek language was polished and copious, if he had been the first inventor and spreader of the fables which ascribe such wild inconsistency, weakness, folly, misery, and

wickedness[a] to the Gods, his works would hardly have been received by his contemporaries with favour and applause. We find that in the following ages, when wise men began to reason more upon these subjects, they censured Homer's theology, as highly injurious to the Gods, if it were understood in the literal sense. But when Homer wrote he had sufficient excuse and authority for the fables which he delivered; and he introduced into his poems, by way of machinery, and with some decorations, theological legends contrived in more rude and ignorant times, and sanctified by hoary age and venerable tradition. Tradition had preserved some memory of the things which the Gods had done and had suffered when they were men.

'I do not believe,' says Iphigenia, 'that Diana delights in human victims,'

Οὐδένα γὰρ οἶμαι δαιμόνων εἶναι κακόν.

'Neminem enim Deorum malum esse censeo.'

Euripides, Iphig. in Taur. 391.

Ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς θεοὺς ἅτε λέκτρ' ἃ μὴ θέμις,
Στέργειν νομίζω, δεσμά τ' ἐξάπτειν χεροῖν,
Οὔτ' ἠξίωσα πώποτ', ἅτε πείσομαι,
Οὐδ' ἄλλον ὅλλυ δεσπότην πεφυκέναι.
Δεῖται γὰρ ὁ θεός, εἴπερ' ἐς' ὄντως θεός,
Οὐδενός· ἀοιδῶν οἵδε δύς-ηνοι λόγοι.

[a] Æschylus also, in his Prometheus, describes Jupiter just as a Jew or a Christian would represent the Devil, as a hater of mankind, and a tyrant void of all gratitude and clemency.

'Ego vero Deos neque connubia illegitima
Amare puto, neque vincula a manibus suspendere:
Neque dignum hoc Diis judicavi unquam, neque credam,
Alterum alterius dominum fuisse.
Nam Deus, siquidem revera Deus sit, indiget
Nullius: Poetarum vero sunt hæ miseræ fabulæ.'

Herc. Fur. 1341.

—— ἀπό μοι λόγον
Τοῦτον, στόμα, ῥίψον.
Ἐπεὶ τόγε λοιδορῆσαι
Θεοῖς, ἐχθρὰ σοφία.

'Abjice mihi sermonem hunc, os: quoniam convitiari Diis odiosa sapientia est.'

Pindar, Olymp. ix. 54.

Whether Homer [b] looked upon any of these theological tales as allegories, in which secret senses were couched under a fabulous appearance, I shall not determine. Thus much is certain, that his scholiasts and commentators have ascribed to him many a subtile sense which never entered into his thoughts. Thus, amongst the moderns, father Harduin, the father of paradoxes, hath proposed a conceit fantastical enough to be his own, but yet borrowed partly from others, and tells us, in his

[b] Ὁππότε μιν ξυνδῆσαι Ὀλύμπιοι ἤθελον ἄλλοι—Verisimillimum est hæc non ab Homero conficta, sed ab antiquis fuisse desumta philosophis, qui elementorum mutationes, rerumque naturalium formandarum rationem, sub hujusmodi fabulis soliti sunt docere.—Strabo: Ἐκμηδενὸς δὲ ἀληθοῦς ἀνάπτειν καινὴν τερατολογίαν, οὐχ Ὁμηρικόν.—Τὸ δὲ πάντα πλάττειν,—οὐδ' Ὁμηρικόν. Clarke, ad Il. A. 398.

notes on Pliny, book ii. p. 113, 114. 'that the island Pharos, and all the islands mentioned in the voyage of Ulysses, are the whole habitable earth; that the river Nile, or Ægyptus, is death; that a day's sailing means human life; and that the provision of water, which ships take in, is the portion of care and sorrow which befalls us in this world.' All this is delivered with that self-confidence and serene complacency which the happy author enjoyed, and of which it would have been a pity to have deprived him.

'Pol me occidistis, amici,
Non servâstis, ait; cui sic extorta voluptas,
Et demtus per vim mentis gratissimus error.'

A learned countryman of Harduin's, who far surpassed him in good sense and useful abilities, gave the public in his old days an ingenious but a very obscene interpretation of the Grotto of the Nymphs in Odyss. N. an interpretation which neither suited his years nor his character.

As Homer is a writer of great simplicity, we may expect to find in him an account of the popular doctrines of Greece concerning the state of the dead, with a few poetical embellishments; I say, few, because the popular and the poetical religion seem in his days to have been nearly one and the same.

I shall therefore collect what may be found on this subject in the Ilias and the Odyssea, taking it for granted that they are both of his composition.

There are some lines in the Odyssea [c] relating to the state of the dead, which are not quite consistent with the doctrines contained in the Ilias, and which on this and other accounts have been suspected by ancient critics: but the Heathen mythology hangs together like a rope of sand, or the dream of a drunkard.

I have sometimes doubted a little whether the Odyssea were Homer's, on account of some small difference, either real or imaginary, of style and syntax; but as antiquity hath generally ascribed both poems to him, I choose to acquiesce in its determination, and should scruple to deprive the venerable father of the poets of any part of his property;

"neque illi detrahere ausim
Hærentes capiti multa cum laude *coronas*."

Pindar says,

Ἐγὼ δὲ πλέον' ἔλπομαι
Λόγον Ὀδυσσέος, ἢ πάθεν,
Διὰ τὸν ἀδυεπῆ γενέσθ' Ὅμηρον.

Ἐπεὶ ψεύδεσίν οἱ ποτανᾷ γε μαχανᾷ
Σεμνὸν ἔπεστί τι· σοφία δὲ
Κλέπτει παράγοισι μύθοις.

"Ego vero majorem arbitror famam Ulyssis, quàm passus fuit, propter suavíloquum factam fuisse Homerum. Quandoquidem figmentis ejus volucri artificio grave inest quiddam: solertiaque ejus decipit seducens fabulis." Nem. vii. 29.

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c Ἑρμῆς δὲ ψυχὰς Κυλλήνιος ἐξεκαλεῖτο
Ἀνδρῶν μνηστήρων—

"Cyllenius now to Pluto's dreary reign
Conveys the dead, a lamentable train," &c.

Odyss. Ω. 1.

The Odyssea is by no means unworthy of him; and if the Ilias hath more dignity, majesty, correctness, fire, and spirit, the Odyssea is more diverting and amusing, and abounds more with the comic, and less with the tragic. In one point it hath the advantage over the Ilias, that the reader interests himself in the fate and fortunes of the hero, and is glad to see him safe at home, and triumphant over his enemies; for the character of Ulysses, upon the whole, is insinuating, amiable, and respectable, and he is represented as a prince who ever ruled with justice and mercy, and was a common father to all his subjects:

Μήτις ἔτι πρόφρων, ἀγανὸς, καὶ ἤπιος ἔστω—
Ὡς ὅστις μέμνηται Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο
Λαῶν, οἷσιν ἄνασσε, πατὴρ δ' ὡς ἤπιος ἦεν.

"O never, never more let king be just,
Be mild in pow'r, or faithful to his trust!
Since he who like a father held his rein,
So soon forgot, was just and mild in vain."

Odyss. B. 230. Pope's Homer.

But in the Ilias, the hero is a boisterous, rapacious, mercenary, cruel, and unrelenting brute, and the reader pities none of his calamities, and is pleased with none of his successes.

Homer sends Ulysses to the infernal abodes;

Εἰς Ἀΐδαο δόμους καὶ ἐπαινῆς Περσεφονείης.

Odyss. K. 491.

He represents this adventure, sometimes as an actual descent into Aïdes, and sometimes as a Νεκυομαντεία,

an evocation of the dead to the confines of the earthly regions, and mixes both images together.

Ἦν δέ ποτε τῆς Ἰταλίας κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην Ἑλλάδα περὶ λίμνην Ἄορνον ὕτω καλουμένην μαντεῖον ἄντρον, καὶ θεραπευτῆρες τοῦ ἄντρου ἄνδρες ψυχαγωγοὶ, ὕτως ὀνομαζόμενοι ἐκ τοῦ ἔργου. Ἐνταῦθα ὁ δεόμενος ἀφικόμενος, εὐξάμενος, ἐντεμὼν σφάγια, χεάμενος χοὰς, ἀνεκαλεῖτο ψυχὴν ὁτουδὴ τῶν πατέρων ἢ φίλων· καὶ αὐτῷ ἀπήντα εἴδωλον, ἀμυδρὸν μὲν καὶ ἰδεῖν ἀμφισβητήσιμον, φθεγκτικὸν δὲ καὶ μαντικὸν, καὶ συγγενόμενον, ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐδεῖτο, ἀπηλλάττετο. Τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ Ὅμηρος γνοὺς, προσθεὶς τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὁδὸν, ἐκτοπίσαι τὸ χωρίον ποιητικῶς μάλα τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς θαλάττης.

[d] "Dicitur et in Italia circa magnam Græciam, non procul a lacu quem Aornon vocant, antrum fuisse fatidicum, cui homines præerant, qui ab animarum evocatione, quæ ibi peragebatur, nomen habebant. Huc qui oraculi caussa venisset, precibus conceptis, cæsa victima, libaminibusque rite effusis, cujuscumque vellet, sive majorum, sive amicorum suorum, umbram ciebat: quo facto, prodibat tenuis anima, nec visu facilis, nec cognitu, quæ tamen et voce prædita esset, et divinandi perita; cumque de iis, quæ quærebantur, respondisset, statim evanescebat. Hoc oraculum novisse mihi Homerus videtur, suumque eo deduxisse Ulyssem, quamvis

[d] I found it necessary to mend this Latin version in some places.

poetica licentia locum illi extra oceanum nostrum assignarit." Maximus Tyrius, Diss. xiv.

Strabo says the same, v. p. 374, and Servius, on Æn. vi. 107. whose note is very remarkable, and who says that they sacrificed human victims on this occasion.

The state of the dead is thus described by Homer:

The soul of man, separated from the body, is material[e], or clothed with a material covering and vehicle, but of so thin a contexture that it cannot be felt or handled; it resembles a shadow or a dream

Τρὶς μὲν ἐφωρμήθην, ἐλέειν τέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγε,
Τρὶς δέ μοι ἐκ χειρῶν, σκιῇ εἴκελον, ἢ καὶ ὀνείρῳ,
Ἔπτατ'.——
Οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν,
Ἀλλὰ τὰ μέν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο
Δαμνᾷ, ἐπεί κε πρῶτα λίπῃ λευκὸν ὀστέα θυμός.
Ψυχὴ δ', ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος, ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται.

Odyss. Λ. 205.

"Thrice in my arms I strove her shade to bind,
Thrice through my arms she slipt like empty wind,
Or dreams, the vain illusions of the mind.—
No more the substance of the man remains,
Nor bounds the blood along the purple veins;
These the funereal flames in atoms bear,
To wander with the wind in empty air,
While the impassive soul reluctant flies,
Like a vain dream, to these infernal skies."

[e] The ancient poets, says Cicero, Ea fieri apud inferos (finxerunt) quæ sine corporibus nec fieri possent nec intelligi. Animos enim per se ipsos viventes non poterant mente complecti: formam aliquam figuramque quærebant. Inde Homeri tota Νεκυία. Tusc. Disp. i. 16.

It retains the lineaments of the man, and appears in the same dress that the man wore in his lifetime.

Πολλοὶ δ' ὑτάμενοι χαλκήρεσιν ἐγχείῃσιν,
Ἄνδρες ἀρηΐφατοι, βεβροτωμένα τεύχε' ἔχοντες.
Odyss. Λ. 40. et passim.

"Ghastly with wounds the forms of warriors slain
Stalk'd with majestic port, a martial train."

It retains the passions, affections, sentiments, and dispositions that it had in the body.

Οἴη δ' Αἴαντος ψυχὴ Τελαμωνιάδαο
Νόσφιν ἀφεστήκει, κεχολωμένη εἵνεκα νίκης——
Odyss. Λ. 542. et passim.

"Alone, apart, in discontented mood
A gloomy shade, the sullen Ajax stood."

Though it cannot be handled, it may be seen and heard, and it can converse with other shades and with men.

It may be raised[f] with proper sacrifices and evocations, by the permission of the deities who preside over the dead. But it is a dangerous thing to have recourse to these methods; for, if those surly gods should be offended, they may send a Gorgon, a formidable monster, to terrify and perhaps destroy the bold adventurer.

Ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἐπὶ ἔθνε' ἀγείρετο μυρία νεκρῶν,
Ἠχῇ θεσπεσίῃ· ἐμὲ δὲ χλωρὸν δέος ἥρει,
Μή μοι Γοργείην κεφαλὴν δεινοῖο πελώρου
Ἐξ Ἀΐδος πέμψειεν ἀγαυὴ Περσεφόνεια.
Odyss. Λ. 633.

[f] Odyss. Λ. 21, &c.

"But swarms of spectres rose with hideous noise,
And terror seiz'd my heart, lest Proserpine
Should send forth Gorgon's head, a dreadful monster."

So in the Persæ of Æschylus, Atossa raises the ghost of her husband Darius by libations to the earth, to the dead, and to the infernal gods, and by invoking the Earth, and Mercury, and Pluto, that they would permit Darius to ascend; who says, when he appears, ver. 688.

Ὑμεῖς δὲ θρηνεῖτ' ἐγγὺς ἑστῶτες τάφου,
Καὶ ψυχαγωγοῖς ὀρθριάζοντες γόοις,
Οἰκτρῶς καλεῖτέ μ', ἐστὶ δ' οὐκ εὐέξοδον·
Ἄλλως τε πάντως χ' οἱ κατὰ χθονὸς θεοὶ
Λαβεῖν ἀμείνους εἰσὶν ἢ μεθιέναι.
Ὅμως δ' ἐκείνοις ἐνδυναστεύσας ἐγὼ
Ἥκω.

"Vos autem lamentamini stantes prope tumulum,
Et plangentes luctibus animam educentibus,
Miserabiliter evocatis me, ast exitus haud facilis est:
Et præterea subterranei Dii
Ad accipiendum, quam ad dimittendum sunt promptiores.
Tamen ego apud illos multum pollens
Venio."

The ghost likes to approach[g] the sacrifice, and drink of the blood of the victims.

It is afraid[h] of a drawn sword, and will not approach the man who thus threatens it.

It glides along like a shadow, and moves or flies with the utmost rapidity; and when the man dies, and

[g] Odyss. A. [h] Odyss. A. 146.

it departs from the body, it soon gets to the regions of the dead.

Ἐλπῆνορ, πῶς ἦλθες ὑπὸ ζόφον ἠερόεντα;
Ἔφθης πεζὸς ἐὼν, ἢ ἐγὼ σὺν νηὶ μελαίνῃ;

Odyss. A. 58.

"O say what angry power Elpenor led
To glide in shades, and wander with the dead?
How could thy soul, by realms and seas disjoin'd,
Outfly the sail, and leave the lagging wind?"

When a man dies, the soul quits the beloved body with much reluctance.

Ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη ἀϊδόσδε βεβήκει,
Ὃν πότμον γοόωσα, λιποῦσ' ἀδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην.

Il. Π. 856.

"He faints; the soul unwilling wings her way,
(The beauteous body left a load of clay)
Flits to the lone, uncomfortable coast,
A naked, wand'ring, melancholy ghost."

It cannot enter into Aïdes, till the body be buried, or funeral rites have been performed in honour to it, but roves about at the gates, in a restless condition.

Ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχὴ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο,
Πάντ' αὐτῷ μέγεθός τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' εἰκυῖα,
Καὶ φωνὴν· καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῖ εἵματα ἕστο.
Στῆ δ' ἄρ' ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς, καί μιν πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπεν·
Εὕδεις, αὐτὰρ ἐμεῖο λελασμένος ἔπλευ Ἀχιλλεῦ;
Οὐ μέν μευ ζώοντος ἀκήδεις, ἀλλὰ θανόντος.
[i] Θάπτε με, ὅττι τάχιστα, πύλας ἀΐδαο περήσω.
Τῆλέ με εἴργουσι ψυχαὶ, εἴδωλα καμόντων,

[i] I think the comma should be, as I have placed it, after θάπτε με, and not after ὅττι τάχιστα. See Clarke's note.

Οὐδέ με πως μίσγεσθαι ὑπὲρ ποταμοῖο ἐῶσιν·
Ἀλλ' αὕτως ἀλάλημαι ἀν' εὐρυπυλὲς ἄϊδος δῶ.
Καί μοι δὸς τὴν χεῖρ' ὀλοφύρομαι· ἠ γὰρ ἔτ' αὖτις
Νίσσομαι ἐξ ἀΐδαο, ἐπὴν με πυρὸς λελάχητε.

Il. Ψ. 65.

"When lo! the shade, before his closing eyes,
Of sad Patroclus rose, or seem'd to rise;
In the same robe he living wore, he came,
In stature, voice, and pleasing look the same.
The form familiar hover'd o'er his head,
And sleeps Achilles, thus the phantom said,
Sleeps my Achilles, his Patroclus dead?
Living, I seem'd his dearest, tend'rest care;
But now forgot, I wander in the air.
Let my pale corse the rites of burial know,
And give me entrance in the realms below.
Till then the spirit finds no resting-place,
But here and there th' unbodied spectres chase
The vagrant dead about the dark abode,
Forbid to cross th' irremeable flood.
Now give thy hand; for to the further shore
When once we pass, the soul returns no more.
When once the last funereal flames ascend,
No more shall meet Achilles and his friend."

The account which Homer gives of Hercules, amongst the dead, is remarkable. Ulysses converses, not with *him*, but with his *image* or *shade*. Odyss. Λ. 600.

Τὸν δὲ μέτ' εἰσενόησα βίην Ἡρακληείην,
Εἴδωλον· αὐτὸς δὲ μέτ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
Τέρπεται ἐν θαλίῃς, καὶ ἔχει καλλίσφυρον Ἥβην.

"I also beheld Hercules, that is to say, his *idolum*; for himself feasts amongst the immortal gods, and is wedded to fair Hebe."

But the case of this hero was singular; he was the favourite son of Jupiter, and after his death he was deified, and therefore Homer divides him into two persons: his soul is a god amongst the gods, and his shadow or image dwells in Aïdes. It doth not appear that Homer thought other men to consist like him, of a σῶμα, a ψυχὴ, and an εἴδωλον, but in them the ψυχὴ and the εἴδωλον were one and the same.

This fable of Hercules and his *idolum* is ridiculed by Lucian, Dial. Mort. xvi. It seems to have produced another fable of Helena and her *image*, which is the subject of a tragedy of Euripides.

The shades form themselves into little societies, and keep company with their countrymen, friends, and acquaintances[k]. Something of this kind seems to be implied in the phrase used in Scripture of the dead being "gathered to their fathers." Jacob refused to be comforted, and said, "I will go down into Hades, to my son, mourning." "I shall go to him," says David of his dead child, "but he shall not return to me."

The unfortunate Ovid, alluding to these notions, and dwelling in exile amongst barbarians, was afraid of having his lot and department amongst them in another world also, which made him earnestly wish for annihilation, in these melancholy and pathetic lines:

[k] Odyss. A.

"Atque utinam pereant animæ cum corpore nostræ,
Effugiatque avidos pars mihi nulla rogos!
Nam si morte carens vacuam volat altus in auram
Spiritus, et Samii sunt rata dicta senis,
Inter Sarmaticas Romana vagabitur umbras,
Perque feros manes hospita semper erit."

Trist. iii. 59.

This earth which we inhabit is a wide-extended plain, all hollow underneath, and there is Aïdes, or the region of the dead:

(Aïdes or Hades is properly the name of a person, of Pluto, and εἰς Ἀΐδα is an ellipsis in which οἶκον is understood: but it is used also for the place, for the infernal regions, and I take leave to use it so.)

Ἔδδεισεν δ' ὑπένερθεν ἄναξ ἐνέρων Ἀϊδωνεὺς,
Δείσας δ' ἐκ θρόνα ἆλτο, καὶ ἴαχε, μή οἱ ὕπερθε
Γαῖαν ἀναῤῥήξειε Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων,
Οἰκία δὲ θνητοῖσι καὶ ἀθανάτοισι φανείη
Σμερδαλέ', εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ.

Il. T. 61.

"Deep in the dismal regions of the dead,
Th' infernal monarch rear'd his horrid head,
Leap'd from his throne, lest Neptune's arm should lay
His dark dominions open to the day,
And pour in light on Pluto's drear abodes,
Abhorr'd by men, and dreadful e'en to gods."

As deep beneath these mansions as the earth is beneath the heavens, lies Tartarus, where Saturn, Iapetus, and other ancient gods are confined, and never see the cheerful light of the sun, or feel the refreshing breezes of the air.

Ἦ μιν ἑλὼν ῥίψω ἐς Τάρταρον ἠερόεντα,
Τῆλε μάλ', ᾗχι βάθιστον ὑπὸ χθονός ἐστι βέρεθρον,
Ἔνθα σιδήρειαί τε πύλαι καὶ χάλκεος οὐδὸς,
Τόσσον ἔνερθ' αἰΐδεω, ὅσον οὐρανός ἐστ' ἀπὸ γαίης.

Il. Θ. 13.

"Or far, O far from steep Olympus thrown,
Low in the deep Tartarean gulf shall groan,
With burning chains[1] fix'd to the brazen floors,
And lock'd by hell's inexorable doors;
As far beneath th' infernal centre hurl'd,
As from that centre to th' ethereal world."

..... Οὐδ' εἴ κε τὰ νείατα πείραθ' ἵκηαι
Γαίης καὶ πόντοιο, ἵν' Ἰαπετός τε Κρόνος τε
Ἥμενοι, οὔτ' αὐγῆς ὑπερίονος ἠελίοιο,
Τέρπωντ', οὔτ' ἀνέμοισι βαθὺς δέ τε Τάρταρος ἀμφίς.

Il. Θ. 478.

"Fly, if thou wilt, to earth's remotest bound,
Where on her utmost verge the seas resound;
Where curs'd Iapetus and Saturn dwell,
Fast by the brink, within the steams of hell;
No sun e'er gilds the gloomy horrors there,
No cheerful gales refresh the lazy air."

..... Ὅτε τε Κρόνον εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς
Γαίης νέρθε καθεῖσε καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης.

Il. Ξ. 203.

"What time old Saturn, from Olympus cast,
Of upper heav'n to Jove resign'd the reign,
Whelm'd under the huge mass of earth and main."

Ἄγρει νῦν μοι ὄμοσσον ἀάατον Στυγὸς ὕδωρ,
Χειρὶ δὲ τῇ ἑτέρῃ μὲν ἕλε χθόνα πουλυβότειραν,
Τῇ δ' ἑτέρῃ ἅλα μαρμαρέην· ἵνα νῶϊν ἅπαντες

[1] Homer hath no *burning chains*.

Μάρτυροι ὦσ' οἱ ἔνερθε θεοὶ Κρόνον ἀμφὶς ἐόντες—
Ὧς ἔφατ'· ἐδ' ἀπίθησε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη,
Ὤμνυε δ' ὡς ἐκέλευε, θεὲς δ' ὀνόμηνεν ἅπαντας
Τὲς ὑποταρταρίες, οἱ Τιτῆνες καλέονται.

Il. Ξ. 271.

"Swear then, he said, by those tremendous floods
That roar thro' hell, and bind th' invoking gods:
Let the great parent Earth one hand sustain,
And stretch the other o'er the sacred Main.
Call the black gods that round Saturnus dwell,
To hear and witness from the depths of hell.
The queen assents, and from th' infernal bow'rs
Invokes the sable subtartarean pow'rs,
And those who rule th' inviolable floods,
Whom mortals name the dread Titanian gods."

See also Il. O. 224.

These Titans are called the parents of gods and men, or the most ancient of all gods, in the Hymn to Apollo, which is ascribed to Homer. 335.

Τιτῆνές τε θεοὶ, τοὶ ὑπὸ χθονὶ ναιετάοντες
Τάρταρον ἀμφὶ μέγαν, των ἐξ ἄνδρες τε, θεοί τε.

Thence came the proverb, Ἀρχαιότερος Ἰαπετῦ, *Older than Iapetus.*

But man is fond of variety, and the Pagans liked young gods and goddesses better than old ones; as in the church of Rome the new saints have often supplanted the ancient, and Saint Thomas à Becket hath received ten times more compliments and more presents than Saint Thomas called Didymus.

Aïdoneus or Pluto, and Proserpine are the formi-

dable gods who preside and rule over the infernal regions, and the furies are their ministers of vengeance,

——Ἀΐδης τοι ἀμείλιχος, ἠδ' ἀδάμαστος,
Τέκνεκα καί τε βροτοῖσι θεῶν ἔχθιστος ἁπάντων.

Il. I. 158.

"Pluto, the grizly god, who never spares,
Who feels no mercy, and who hears no pray'rs,
Lives dark and dreadful in deep hell's abodes,
And mortals hate him, as the worst of gods."

.... συγεραὸς δ' ἐπεκέκλετ' Ἐρινῦς.
.... θεοὶ δ' ἐτέλειον ἐπαρὰς,
Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος, καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια.

Il. I. 454.

"My sire with curses loads my hated head,
And cries, Ye Furies! barren be his bed!
Infernal Jove, the vengeful fiends below,
And ruthless Proserpine confirm'd his vow."

Κικλήσκουσ' Ἀΐδην καὶ ἐπαινὴν Περσεφόνειαν
Παιδὶ δόμεν θάνατον· τῆς δ' ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρινὺς
Ἔκλυεν ἐξ Ἐρέβευσφιν, ἀμείλιχον ἦτορ ἔχουσα.

Il. I. 565.

"She beat the ground, and call'd the pow'rs beneath
On her own son to wreak her brother's death:
Hell heard her curses from the realms profound,
And the red fiends that walk the nightly round."

Cerberus guards the place, and is called Pluto's dog, Il. Θ. 368. As to Charon, Homer, I think, never once names him. He is often mentioned in the Alcestis of Euripides, 252, 361, 439. and in Herc. Furens, 432.

They who are punished there, as Tantalus, Tityus,

Sisyphus[m], are persons who had been guilty of particular impieties against the gods. Concerning the impiety of Sisyphus, see Munker on Hyginus, p. 108, for the Dictionaries are very deficient in this article. Odyss. Λ. 575, &c.

Hence, by way of conjecture and inference, it may be supposed that, according to Homer's system, those men also should be punished, who dared to burn or rob temples, to destroy the images of the gods, to spoil pious pilgrims, and those who came with oblations, or to insult and misuse the priests.

There is only one crime specified in Homer for which men would be punished hereafter, and that crime is perjury.

——καὶ οἳ ὑπένερθε καμόντας
Ἀνθρώπους τίννυσθον, ὅ,τίς κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ.

These gods, says a scholiast, are two, Pluto and

[m] He was so artful and insinuating, says Theognis, that he prevailed with Proserpine to let him return to this world again, after he was dead: 701.

Οὐδ' εἰ σωφροσύνην μὲν ἔχοις Ῥαδαμάνθυος αὐτῷ,
Πλείονα δ' εἰδείης Αἰολίδα Σισύφου·
Ὅς τε καὶ ἐξ Ἀϊδέω πολυιδρίῃσιν ἀνῆλθε,
Πείσας Περσεφόνην αἰμυλίοισι λόγοις.—
Ἀλλ' ἄρα κἀκεῖθεν Σίσυφος πάλιν ἦλυθεν ἥρως.

Where, since the first syllable of *Sisyphus* is long in all other poets, we should read

Πλείονα δ' εἰδείης Σισύφου Αἰολίδα.

and

Ἀλλ' ἄρα κἀκεῖθεν πάλιν ἦλυθε Σίσυφος ἥρως.

Proserpine: for the poet useth the dual number, τίνυσθον." Il. Γ. 279.

"Infernal furies, and Tartarean gods,
Who rule the dead, and horrid woes prepare
For perjur'd kings, and all who falsely swear."

The office of punishing perjury is given to the Furies.

..... καὶ Ἐριννύες, αἵ θ' ὑπὸ γαῖαν
Ἀνθρώπους τίνυνται, ὅτις κ' ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ.
Il. Τ. 258.

Minos the son of Jupiter sits in Aïdes, as a judge over the dead, who plead their cause before him.

Ἔνθ' ἤτοι Μίνωα ἴδον, Διὸς ἀγλαὸν υἱόν,
Χρύσεον σκῆπτρον ἔχοντα, θεμιςεύοντα νεκύεσσιν,
Ἥμενον· οἱ δέ μιν ἀμφὶ δίκας εἴροντο ἄνακτα,
Ἥμενοι, ἑςάοτες τε κατ' εὐρυπυλὲς Ἀΐδος δῶ.
Odyss. Λ. 567.

"High on a throne, tremendous to behold,
Stern Minos waves a mace of burnish'd gold;
Around ten thousand thousand spectres stand
Through the wide dome of Dis, a trembling band.
Still as they plead, the fatal lots he rowls—

This looks a little as if punishments were allotted, not only to the perjured, but to all wicked persons in Aïdes; yet so important a doctrine deserved to be more clearly delivered.

Aïdes, or the region of the dead, is represented by Homer as a gloomy melancholy place [n], where there is no joy and contentment, and where even the heroes are

[n] Tiresias calls it ἀτερπέα χώρον. Odyss. Λ. 93.

disconsolate and out of humour with their condition. Achilles says to Ulysses,

> Μὴ δή μοι θάνατόν γε παραύδα, φαίδιμ' Ὀδυσσεῦ.
> Βελοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ
> Ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρῳ, ᾧ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς εἴη,
> Ἢ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.
>
> Odyss. Λ. 487.

> "Talk not of ruling in this dolorous gloom,
> Nor think vain words, he cried, can ease my doom:
> Rather I choose laboriously to bear
> A weight of woes, and breathe the vital air,
> A slave to some poor hind that toils for bread,
> Than reign the sceptred monarch of the dead."

But, considering the disposition and the character of Achilles, he could not be happy in a state which deprived him of his usual occupations. Homer, however, with much art, contrives to dismiss this hero in better temper, and not a little pleased with the account which Ulysses gave him of the courage and prosperity of his son Neoptolemus. Λ. 537.

> Ὣς ἔφαμεν· ψυχὴ δὲ ποδώκεος Αἰακίδαο
> Φοίτα, μακρὰ βιβῶσα, κατ' ἀσφοδελὸν λειμῶνα,
> Γηθοσύνῃ, ὅ οἱ υἱὸν ἔφην ἀριδείκετον εἶναι.

> "Sic dixi: anima autem velocis Æacidæ
> Abiit, magnis passibus gradiens per herbosum pratum,
> Læta, quòd ei dixissem filium ejus egregium esse."

Homer wrote before the Greek philosophy was cultivated; and we find in his doctrine of the soul no mataphysical speculations, nothing concerning the immateriality of the soul, or its præexistence, or its past eter-

nity, or its transmigration, or its being a portion of the soul of the world, or of the Deity.

His notions of the soul seem not to be the result of reasonings upon the nature of God or of man; but the remains of an old tradition, delivered down, in all probability, from the beginning of the world, and spread through all nations. The ancient fable of Pluto, as Le Clerc somewhere observes, is a probable proof that, before the days of this son of Saturn, it was an opinion commonly received, that the souls of men, after death, went to subterraneous abodes.

His description of the dead is so uncomfortable, that it was not at all calculated to inspire either courage or virtue; but rather to make men poltroons and knaves. Therefore the learned Greeks and the poets in the following times mended that part of his system, and gave more encouragement to valour, to probity, and to piety [o].

And yet, even in Homer's gloomy system, the souls in the state of separation seem in some few respects to approach rather nearer to the divine nature than they did when they inhabited the body. They move with the swiftness of a deity, and they subsist and act and converse without standing in need of raiment, food,

[o] Piety, saith Sophocles, doth not die along with good men, but,

Κἂν ζῶσι, κἂν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται.

"Et, seu vivant, seu moriantur, numquam perit."

Philoct. 1490.

drink, or sleep. The substance also of which the soul is composed seems to be like that of the gods, and to partake of immortality.

Homer's gods eat ambrosia and drink nectar; but it seems that they can live without it, for Saturn and the other gods in Tartarus have nothing to eat or drink, and Mars was thirteen months kept in prison and in fetters by two furious giants, who hardly gave him even the jail allowance of bread and water.

Yet they can at pleasure assume an human shape and body, and then they can eat and drink like human creatures, and perform τὰ ἀφροδίσια,

"And works of *love* or *enmity* fulfil."

So angels also are represented sometimes in the Old Testament, as appearing in an human shape, and eating and drinking. Genes. xviii, 8. xix, 3. The author of the Book of Tobit philosophizes upon the occasion, and makes his angel say; "All these days I did appear unto you; but I did neither eat nor drink, but you did see a vision."

Hesiod, in those poems of his which are extant, is silent about a state of retribution. He, indeed, hath a Tartarus wherein the Titans are confined, and an Aïdes, as well as Homer. He also speaks of the men of the golden age as of persons who after their decease became good dæmons, a kind of lesser gods, and tutelar deities to men; and of those of the silver age as obtaining some honours likewise after death; and of the heroes of the fourth age as being removed,

when they left this world, to the Fortunate Islands: but he never affirms, or even intimates, that he and his contemporaries had any rewards to expect, or any punishments to fear in a future state. Ἔργ. 121, &c.

If Hesiod wrote "The Descent of Theseus to Hades," which is ascribed to him by Pausanias, Bœot. p. 772, and if that work were extant, we might perhaps find something concerning his notions of the state of the dead. In all likelihood they very much resembled those of Homer.

In Homer we find punishments expressly threatened only to the perjured, and indirectly to the wicked, and rewards promised to none; unless, perhaps, by way of inference, we should allow to his virtuous shades the poor negative rewards of not being tormented with Tantalus and Tityus:

"Non Divos læsi. Non pasces in cruce corvos."

There are no pleasures and no rewards to be found in Homer's Aïdes.

But Homer's Elysium is no gloomy and melancholy place, and must not be confounded with his Aïdes, his ἀσφόδελος λειμών, his regions of the dead. It is impossible that the Greek Elysium should be a disagreeable abode. Whence had Virgil his fair ideas of Elysium? He will tell you himself, that he had them from the Greeks.

"Quamvis Elysios miretur Græcia campos."

Homer, in his Odyssea, Δ. 561, hath described

Elysium accidentally, and *en passant*, where Proteus consulted by Menelaus tells him his fortune, and thus concludes: "It is not decreed for you, O Menelaus, to end your days and die in Argos; but the immortal gods will send you to the extremities of the earth, to the Elysian fields, where dwells Rhadamanthus, where men live at their ease[p], where there is no coarse weather, no snow, no showers, but where the soft Zephyrs blow from off the ocean, to refresh the inhabitants. Thither the gods will send you, because you are the husband of Helena, and the son-in-law of Jupiter."

[q] Σοὶ δ' ἐ θέσφατόν ἐ-ι, διοτρεφὲς ὦ Μενέλαε,
Ἄργει ἐν ἱππο-ότῳ θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν.
Ἀλλά σ' ἐς Ἠλύσιον πεδίον καὶ πείρατα γαίης
Ἀθάνατοι πέμψουσιν, ὅθι ξανθὸς Ῥαδάμανθυς,
Τῇ περ ῥηί-η βιοτὴ πέλει ἀνθρώποισιν·
Οὐ νιφετὸς, οὔτ' ἄρ χειμὼν πολύς, οὔτέ ποτ' ὄμβρος,
Ἀλλ' αἰεὶ Ζεφύροιο λιγυπνείοντας ἀήτας
Ὠκεανὸς ἀνίησιν, ἀναψύχειν ἀνθρώπους·
Οὕνεκ' ἔχεις Ἑλένην, καὶ σφιν γαμβρὸς Διός ἐσσι.

This is short and sweet, and all that he hath discover-

[p] The Essenes, if we may believe Josephus, adopted Homer's account of Elysium, and made that happy region the receptacle of the souls of the righteous. B. Jud. ii. 12. Concerning the real situation of these *Fortunate Islands* see Plutarch in Sertorius, p. 572. Lucian did not forget to give a ludicrous description of Elysium in his *True History*.

[q] Euripides, Helena, 1692.

Καὶ τῷ πλανήτῃ Μενέλεῳ θεῶν πάρα
Μακάρων κατοικεῖν νῆσόν ἐ-ι μόρσιμον.

ed to us concerning Elysium; and from this cursory account we learn that the Elysian fields were situated beyond the sea, and bounded by the sea, and separated from the earth in which others dwell. But we are not told who were the inhabitants of those happy regions. Only we find that they were men, and not ghosts; and from Horace we may conjecture that they were the men, or the posterity of the men, who flourished in the first and golden age of the world, and who were separated from the rest of mankind when the next age ensued.

> "Jupiter illa piæ secrevit litora genti,
> Ut inquinavit ære tempus aureum."
>
> Carm. v. 16.

According to Hesiod, the inhabitants of this agreeable place were the heroes of the fourth age.

"Jupiter," says he, "removed them from the rest of mankind to the islands of the blessed, where they live without care or trouble, near the ocean, and where the fertile earth, thrice in the year, produces pleasing fruits for their sustenance."

> Τοῖς δὲ δίχ' ἀνθρώπων βίοτον καὶ ἤθε' ὀπάσσας
> Ζεὺς Κρονίδης κατέναασσε πατὴρ ἐς πείρατα γαίης.—
> Καὶ τοὶ μὲν ναίουσιν ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες
> Ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι παρ' Ὠκεανὸν βαθυδίνην,
> Ὄλβιοι Ἥρωες· τοῖσιν μελιηδέα καρπὸν
> Τρὶς ἔτεος θάλλοντα φέρει ζείδωρος ἄρουρα.
>
> Ἔργ. 167.

We may infer from Homer, that an admission into those fortunate regions, and a conversation with those

happy men, was the reward neither of valour nor of virtue; but granted to a few special favourites of the gods[r], and to Menelaus, only because he had the honour to be the husband of Helena, and the son-in-law of Jupiter. Jupiter might show him this kindness, in pity to him, and to make him amends for the bad present he had bestowed upon him of his daughter, who had plagued him so much with her gallantries.

Pindar imitates Homer, in his description of Elysium, or the *island* of the *blessed*: but he hath in some points improved and mended Homer's moral and religious system. A good man, says Pindar[s], knoweth what will come to pass hereafter; namely, that the souls of the incorrigibly wicked, when they go to the infernal regions, must suffer horrible punishments, to which they will be condemned by a just, an impartial, and an inexorable judge. On the contrary, the good will dwell there, with Pluto and Proserpine, free from toil and trouble, in regions where there is a perpetual sunshine and serenity. But they who have passed through three transmigrations and trials, both here upon earth, and in the realms below, and have per-

[r] In the Andromache of Euripides, Thetis promises her husband Peleus to make him a god, and to show him his son Achilles in the *happy islands*. Cadmus also and Harmonia were to be sent thither. Bacch. 1336.

[s] Plutarch hath given us some other passages of Pindar, which describe the happiness of the good in Aïdes or Elysium. Consol. ad Apoll. p. 120.

severed in their good temper and behaviour, will be sent to the city of Saturn, to the island of the blessed, where Saturn and Rhadamanthus preside, where the refreshing breezes blow from off the ocean, and where the most beautiful and resplendent flowers adorn the fields and the trees, &c.

> ..... Εἰ δέ μιν ἔχει
> Τὶς, οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον, etc.
>
> Olymp. ii. 102.

You see here, that the Pythagorean system of transmigration had soon spread itself, and that Pindar made some use of it.

In the Alcestis of Euripides, the Chorus wishes all happiness to the deceased lady, in the realms below, *If* any rewards are bestowed there upon the deserving, 743.

> Χαῖρε· πρόφρων σε χθόνιός Θ' Ἑρμῆς
> Ἀΐδης τε δέχοιτ'· εἰ δέ τι κἀκεῖ
> Πλέον ἔς' ἀγαθοῖς, τούτων μετέχουσ'
> Ἅδου νύμφα προσεδρεύοις.

"Vale: benevolus vero te subterraneus Mercurius,
Et Pluto excipiat: si vero et illic
Plus bonorum contingit bonis, horum particeps
Plutonis conjugi assideas."

Ἑλλήνων δὲ Ὅμηρος μὲν φαίνεται κοινῶς ἀμφοτέροις χρώμενος τοῖς ὀνόμασι, καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἔστιν ὅτε δαίμονας προσαγορεύων. Ἡσίοδος δὲ καθαρῶς καὶ διωρισμένως πρῶτος ἐξέθηκε τῶν λογικῶν τέσσαρα γένη, θεοὺς, εἶτα δαίμονας πολλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς, εἶτα ἥρωας, εἶτα ἀνθρώπους· ἐξ ὧν ἔοικε ποιεῖν τὴν μεταβολὴν, τοῦ μὲν χρυσοῦ γένους εἰς δαί-

μονας πολλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς, τῶν δὲ ἡμιθέων εἰς ἥρωας ἀποκριθέντων.—ἐκ μὲν ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἥρωας, ἐκ δὲ ἡρώων εἰς δαίμονας, αἱ βελτίονες ψυχαὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν λαμβάνουσιν. ἐκ δὲ δαιμόνων ὀλίγαι μὲν ἔτι χρόνῳ πολλῷ δι' ἀρετῆς καθαρθεῖσαι παντάπασι θεότητος μετέσχον.—ὁ δὲ Ἡσίοδος οἴεται καὶ περιόδοις τισὶ χρόνων γίνεσθαι τοῖς δαίμοσι τὰς τελετάς.—

"De Græcis Homerus videtur promiscue deorum ac geniorum usus nominibus, ut diis quoque aliquando dæmonum nomen imposuerit. Hesiodus pure et distincte primus quatuor genera præditorum ratione exposuit: primum deos, deinde genios, post heroes, denique homines, atque hinc mutationem instituit aurei generis in genios multos ac bonos, semideorum autem in heroes. (Alii statuunt) meliores animas ex humanis in heroicas, ex heroibus in genios mutari: e geniis quasdam paucas, longo tempore virtutis ope prorsus purgatas, divinæ naturæ participes reddi.—Hesiodus vero certis temporum conversionibus mortem geniis obtingere censet." Plutarch. De Orac. Def. p. 415, et Xylander, p. 15. To which may be added his treatise *De Facie in Orbe Lunæ*, p. 943.

If we consider the doctrines in Homer concerning the state of the dead, and compare them with the Old Testament, we shall find some resemblance between the notions of the ancient Greeks (as also of the Ægyptians) and their contemporaries the Hebrews, with relation to the evocation of spirits, the art of magic and necromancy, the apparition of ghosts, the

gates of Hades, the dark regions of the dead, and the shades dwelling together, according to their tribes and families.

The difference is this, that the Pagans had adopted fabulous traditions of the state of separate souls in Hades, and the Jews or Hebrews had no express revelation concerning it, and therefore knew no more of it than they could collect from some historical facts contained in their sacred books, from the nature of man, from the perfections of God, from the inequalities of providence in this life, from promises made to the righteous which did not receive their completion in this world, &c.

We may also observe from Homer, that the doctrine of the soul's separate existence, and of a future state, is different from the doctrine of a just distribution of rewards and corrections, and that men might entertain the first without the second, or at least without any rational and consistent notions of a perfectly wise and good providence.

Homer hath not affirmed directly, and in so many words, that the soul is immortal; but this doctrine seems manifestly deducible from his system, and connected with it.

Pythagoras, as Maximus Tyrius says, was the first assertor of the soul's immortality: and Porphyrius and Jerom say the same. Others give it to Pherecydes, or to Thales.

Πυθαγόρας δὲ ὁ Σάμιος πρῶτος ἐν τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν σῶμα τεθνήξεται, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀνάπτασα οἰχήσεται ἀθανὴς καὶ ἀγήρως· καὶ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτὴν, πρὶν ἥκειν δεῦρο.

"Primus vero Pythagoras Samius dicere ausus est, interiturum esse corpus suum, animam vero mortis immunem, seniique, evolaturam esse; priusquam enim huc veniret, extitisse olim." Dissertat. xvi.

It gives us pleasure to trace in this most ancient poet the important doctrines of a supreme God, a providence, a free agency in man, supposed to be consistent with fate, or destiny, or prescience, a differencee between moral good and evil, inferior gods, or angels in the Jewish and Christian system, some favourable to men, others malevolent, and the immortality of the soul: but it gives us pain to find these notions so miserably corrupted, that they must have had a very weak influence, to excite men to virtue, and to deter them from vice.

II.

Homer having sent Ulysses to the regions of the dead, to raise the ghost of Tiresias, and to consult with him how he should settle his domestic affairs and overcome his enemies, Virgil imitates his great master, and sends Æneas to the infernal regions on much the same errand, to advise with his father Anchises; and

upon this plan he hath contrived the sixth book, which is the most resplendent part of the Æneis; for, if Virgil any where surpasseth Homer, it is here. Here he hath taken an opportunity, as also in the *shield* of Æneas, to compliment Augustus, and other great men who adorn the Roman annals. Here he hath also given a more elegant and poetical account of the dead, by adopting in some measure the Pythagorean and the Platonic philosophy.

Æneas is described as an accomplished hero, and under his character that of Augustus is frequently delineated, as his *fidus Achates* represents Mecænas [t]. This is one reason for which the poets of that age extolled the Æneis so much, to make their court to Augustus and his family. This made Ovid say to Augustus,

> "Et tamen ille TUÆ felix Æneidos auctor
> Contulit in Tyrios arma virumque toros."
>
> Trist. ii. 533.

And Virgil, in his "Dedicatio Æneidos," (if that little and elegant poem be his,) represents Cæsar as concerned no less than himself in the success of that work:

> "Si mihi susceptum fuerit decurrere munus,
> O Paphon, O sedes quæ colis Idalias, &c.

---

[t] Mæcenas was to Augustus, says Propertius, ii. 1.
"Et sumta, et posita pace, fidele caput."

Adsis, O Cytherea: tuus te Cæsar Olympo,
Et Surrentini litoris ora vocat."

The resemblance between Æneas and Augustus hath been observed by others. I shall only mention one or two particularities relating to it which have occurred to me.

Æneas is represented in Virgil as very handsome, and the beauty of his eyes is not forgotten; Æn. i. 593.

"Os humerosque deo similis; namque ipsa decoram
Cæsariem nato genetrix, lumenque juventæ
Purpureum, et lætos oculis adflarat honores."

This answers exactly to the person of Augustus:

"Formâ fuit eximiâ, et per omnes ætatis gradus venustissimâ.——vultu tranquillo serenoque—oculos habuit claros ac nitidos: quibus etiam existimari volebat inesse quiddam divini vigoris: gaudebatque, si quis sibi acrius contuenti, quasi ad fulgorem solis, vultum submitteret.—capillum leviter inflexum et sufflavum." Suetonius.

Virgil hath given offence to every modern reader, who is not void of humanity, when he makes his pious Æneas seize upon several young prisoners of war, and send them to be murdered at the funeral of Pallas, Æn. x. 517. xi. 81. It may be said in excuse for him, that he follows Homer, who represents his brute, Achilles, doing the same thing. But Homer himself censures it as an inhuman action:

.....κακὰ δὲ φρεσὶ μήδετο ἔργα. Iliad. Ψ. 176.

Here then Virgil seems to have designed to represent, and to excuse, in some measure, Augustus Cæsar, as only following the example of ancient heroes; for in the civil wars he is said to have been guilty of the same barbarity.

"—— In splendidissimum quemque captivum, non sine verborum contumelia sæviit, &c. Perusiâ captâ, in plurimos animadvertit: orare veniam, vel excusare se conantibus una voce occurrens, *moriendum* esse. Scribunt quidam, trecentos ex dedititiis electos, ad aram divo Julio exstructam,—hostiarum more mactatos." Suetonius.

So Æn. x. 599.

"Pluribus oranti Æneas: haud talia dudum
Dicta dabas. *Morere*, et fratrem ne desere frater."

Augustus fought his way to empire, and was engaged in a civil war, which terminated in a general peace and tranquillity. Æneas is in much the same situation, is involved in a kind of civil war, in Italy, and fights against a people, with whom he was entering into alliance, and with whom afterwards he and his Trojans were blended and incorporated, and lived in peace.

Æn. xii. 503.

"—— Tanton' placuit concurrere motu,
Jupiter, æterna gentes in pace futuras!"

Tacitus, Ann. i. 1, 2.

"Augustus—cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa, no-

mine principis sub imperium accepit.—cunctos dulcedine otii pellexit."

Suetonius, Aug. 22.

"Janum Quirinum—terra marique pace parta, ter clusit."

Virgil says of Æneas, i. 267.

"Bellum ingens geret Italia, populosque feroces
Contundet, moresque viris et mœnia ponet."

This suits exactly with Augustus, who valued himself particularly upon being the reformer of manners, and the repairer and beautifier of Rome, of which you may see proofs collected in Bentley's notes on Horace, Epist. ii. 1.

"Cum tot sustineas——
Res Italas armis tuteris, moribus ornes,
Legibus emendes."

Ovid. Met. xv. 833.

"——— Legesque feret justissimus auctor:
Exemploque suo mores reget."

Every one knoweth that the Æneis was not completed to the author's satisfaction, and that he wanted much to destroy it. The sixth book is more finished than some of the rest, and is beautiful in the parts, but upon the whole it is obscure, a fault from which Virgil is by no means free; and he who shall try the experiment, will find it hard enough to make out of it a system tolerably consistent, and to ascertain the sense of the author in some places.

Here then is a field open for criticism, and all of us who attempt to explain and illustrate Virgil, have reason to hope that we may make some discoveries, and to fear that we may fall into some mistakes; and this should induce us to conjecture with freedom, to propose with diffidence, and to dissent with civility. Ἀγαθὴ δ' ἔρις ἥδε βροτοῖσι, quoth old Hesiod.

Virgil is a great borrower, and hath collected from ancient poets and philosophers whatsoever suited his purpose. As to his mythology, he had a right to take it from his predecessors, and is sufficiently justified by their authority in the use of poetical fables delivered by tradition, or of new fictions bearing a due resemblance to the ancient ones. His transforming the ships of Æneas into sea-nymphs hath been thought a fiction too violent and glaringly absurd; but he had sufficient vouchers for such a metamorphosis. The Greek poets had represented some ships as living creatures. The ship Argo was a great talker [u], and a prophetess, *vocalis* and *fatidica*, and at last was turned into a constellation or a deity. She was made of sacred trees, and so were the ships of Æneas. See Apollonius, iv. 580.

[u] The pretended Orpheus calls her εὔλαλον Ἀργὼ, *loquacem Argo*. Argonaut. 242. 707. And she makes a long speech, v. 1153.

Valerius Flaccus, i. 2.

"Fatidicamque ratem, Scythici quæ Phasidis oras
Ausa sequi, mediosque inter juga concita cursus
Rumpere, flammifero tandem consedit Olympo."

Manilius, v. 13.

"Et ratis heroum, quæ nunc quoque navigat astris."

The Phæacians, says Alcinous to Ulysses, have no pilots, nor have their ships any rudders, like other vessels. Our ships are endued with sense, and know their way to every place in the world, and glide swift and invisible through the waters, without fear or danger.

Εἰπὲ δέ μοι γαῖάν τε τεὴν, δῆμόν τε, πόλιν τε,
Ὄφρα σε τῇ πέμπωσι τιτυσκόμεναι φρεσὶ νῆες.
Οὐ γὰρ Φαιήκεσσι κυβερνητῆρες ἔασιν,
Οὐδέ τι πηδάλι' ἐστὶ, τά τ' ἄλλαι νῆες ἔχουσιν·
Ἀλλ' αὐταὶ ἴσασι νοήματα καὶ φρένας ἀνδρῶν·
Καὶ πάντων ἴσασι πόλιας καὶ πίονας ἀγροὺς
Ἀνθρώπων· καὶ λαῖτμα τάχιστ' ἀλὸς ἐκπερόωσιν,
Ἠέρι καὶ νεφέλῃ κεκαλυμμέναι· οὐδέ ποτέ σφιν
Οὔτέ τι πημανθῆναι ἔπι δέος, οὐδ' ἀπολέσθαι.

Odyss. Θ. 555.

By the transformation of the ships into sea-deities, Virgil would insinuate, I suppose, the great advantages of cultivating a naval power, such as extended commerce, and the dominion of the ocean; which in poetical language is becoming *deities of the sea* [w], &c.

In favour of this opinion it may be further observed, that Augustus owed his empire in a great measure to his naval victories.

[w] Div. Legat. b. ii. § 4.

As to the bleeding myrtles which grew from the body of Polydorus, Æn. iii., it seems to be a fable hardly worthy of a place in the Æneis; and Ovid did well not to insert it in his Metamorphoses, where he follows Virgil, and relates the adventures of Æneas, l. xiii. The ancient critics blamed it, as we see in the note of Servius, Æn. iii. 46, and I incline to their opinion, though without censuring those friends of Virgil who undertake his defence.

In Virgil's *Aïdes* there are rewards for virtue, and punishments for vice; a state of purgation for those who are not incorrigible, and most of whom are to transmigrate into new bodies, an Elysium for those who are eminently good, a Tartarus for those who are very wicked, and a state, not of purgation, but of introduction, for those who are left for the present (the poet hath not told us how long) to the natural result of their separation from the body, and with a continuance of the same passions and affections which they had upon earth. Amongst these latter are the infants, the unjustly condemned, the self-murderers, the lovers, and the warriors. None of these, I think, are described as in purgatory, though some commentators have thought so. They are described, for the most part, as Homer hath represented his ghosts in Aïdes; and the Greek poet hath not given us even any hint of a purgatory.

Of the lovers, for example, the poet saith:

"Hic quos durus amor crudeli tabe peredit,
Secreti celant calles, et myrtea circum
Silva tegit. Curæ non ipsa in morte relinquunt."

Here is no purification of the mind; nor is melancholy a cure for love, either in the upper or in the lower realms. According to an old Greek poet and philosopher [x], the cure for love in this world, is first, *fasting* [y], secondly *time*, and thirdly *a halter*: according to Virgil, in the infernal regions, the purgation of irregular passions and bad habits is performed by *air*, by *water*, or by *fire*, 740.

"..... aliæ panduntur inanes
Suspensæ ad ventos: aliis sub gurgite vasto
Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni."

"Novem circulis (says Servius) Inferi cincti esse dicuntur, quos nunc exsequitur: nam primum dicit animas infantum tenere; secundum eorum qui sibi per simplicitatem adesse nequiverunt; tertium eorum qui evitantes ærumnas se necarunt; quartum eorum qui

x Crates Thebanus.

y Ἔρωτα παύει λιμός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, χρόνος.
Ἐάν δε τούτοις μὴ δύνῃ χρῆσθαι, βρόχος.
In Diogenes Laertius, l. vi. p. 356.

These lines are interpolated in Stobæus, and in the Anthologia, p. 56, edit. Brod., by some unpoetical man, who either thought that the last syllable of the word θεραπεία was short, or that an iambic verse would admit a spondee in the second foot.

Θεραπεία σοι τὸ λοιπὸν ἠρτήσθω βρόχος.

amaverunt; quintum virorum fortium esse dicit; sextum nocentes tenent, qui puniuntur a judicibus; in septimo animæ purgantur; in octavo sunt animæ ita purgatæ, ut redeant; in nono, ut jam non redeant, scilicet campus Elysius." Ad vers. 426.

Thus this ancient and useful commentator.

According to Plato, the greater part of human souls descend after death to the Acherusian lake, where they remain, some for a longer and some for a lesser time, and then are sent into new bodies.—

When the shades are carried, each to the place where the dæmon conducts them, then the good and the bad take their trial: and they who have behaved themselves neither very well nor very ill, go to Acheron, and there undergo purgations.—

The incurably wicked are cast into Tartarus, whence they never are to be released. They who have been wicked, but not to so great a degree, are also cast into Tartarus, and let out, and cast in again; and so on, till they have made their peace with those whom they had injured.—

The souls which have been eminently good, when they are released from this life, ascend up to the pure regions of the air, and will never more be reunited to a body, but continue in peace and happiness to all eternity [z].

[z] — ἄνευ τε σωμάτων ζῶσι τοπαράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.—

This is the doctrine delivered in the Phædo.

Virgil's regions of the dead may be thus divided. There is:

1. A state of exclusion, on the borders of the infernal realms, for the unburied.

2. A state of introduction, where are placed those who had shortened their days, or had not lived out their appointed time, according to the common course of nature. In this are the apartments of the infants, the unjustly condemned, the self-murderers, the lovers, and the warriors.

3. A state of purgatory, which Æneas did not see; nor was it proper that he should enter there to disturb the penitents, whilst they were undergoing their purifications. Whether this purgatory were in Tartarus or not, the poet hath not told us: but it seems to have been distinct from it.

4. A state of punishment in Tartarus, which also Æneas did not see.

5. A state of recompense and of happiness in Elysium.

In Æn. v. 731, the infernal regions seem to be divided into Tartarus, Elysium, and a middle state. Anchises appears to Æneas by night, and says:

"——————— Ditis tamen ante
Infernas accede domos, et Averna per alta
Congressus pete, nate, meos. Non me impia namque
Tartara habent, *tristesve umbræ*; sed amœna piorum
Concilia, Elysiumque colo."

In Masvicius it is,

"Tartara habent, tristes umbræ;—"

appositivè. But I take *tristesve* to be rather a better reading, *disjunctivè*. See Pierius.

Virgil follows the old poetical fable concerning the restless state of the unburied; but he censures it as an unjust decree of providence. Æn. vi. 325, &c.

"Constitit Anchisa satus, et vestigia pressit;
Multa putans, sortemque animo miseratus *iniquam*."

The same sort of superstition crept into the Christian world concerning the state of unbaptized infants.

The note of Servius upon this passage is ingenious: "*Sortem iniquam*. Iniqua enim sors est, puniri propter alterius negligentiam: nec enim quis culpâ suâ caret sepulcro. Bene autem *animo*, quasi re præsaga, ut alibi: *Præsaga mali mens*. Ipse enim Æneas insepultus jacebit, ut: *Mediaque inhumatus arena*: periit enim in flumine Numico: unde et Juvenalis:

"—et ipse tamen contingens sanguine cælum,
Alter aquis, alter flammis ad sidera missus."

Lucan philosophizes better upon this subject, vii. 809.

"———— Tabesne cadavera solvat,
An rogus, haud refert: placido Natura receptat
Cuncta sinu, finemque sui sibi corpora debent.—
Libera fortunæ mors est: capit omnia tellus,
Quæ genuit: cælo tegitur, qui non habet urnam."

And conformably to this opinion Virgil says, Æn. ii. 646,

"Facilis jactura sepulcri."

Virgil places Theseus in Tartarus, and says of him,

"sedet, æternumque sedebit."

This alone will not perhaps fully prove the *eternity* of punishments; for both the word *æternus* itself is sometimes of a lax signification, as every learned man knows, and *sedet, æternumque sedebit*, may mean; there he sits, and there he will always sit—namely, as long as he remains in Tartarus.

But if to this passage you add the Platonic doctrine, that very wicked spirits were never released from Tartarus; and the silence of Virgil as to any dismission from that jail; and the censure of the Epicureans, who objected to religious systems the eternity of punishments,

"Æternas quoniam pœnas in morte timendum;"

and the general doctrine of the mythologists; and the opinion of Servius that Virgil was to be taken in this sense,—we may conclude that the punishments in his Tartarus were probably eternal.

But then it must be supposed, on the other hand, that the rewards in his Elysium were eternal. A religious system, consisting of punishments which are *eternal*, and of rewards which are only *temporary*, appears so very unreasonable, that one would not be easily persuaded to think that Virgil could adopt it, even by way of poetic fiction; for it is a more shocking monster than any that he hath stationed at the gates of hell.

There is indeed one passage in Virgil which seems to favour this notion, but which may easily be rectified.

We may suppose that Elysium was the receptacle of two sorts of shades, of transmigrating and of untransmigrating souls.

The shades of accomplished and excellent men, after a short purgation, were sent to Elysium, there to dwell at large, and to dwell for ever. They were few, for so large a territory, and few compared with the souls which were doomed to transmigration, 743;

> "Quisque suos patimur manes: exinde per amplum
> Mittimur Elysium, et pauci læta arva tenemus."

And 673;

> "Nulli certa domus. Lucis habitamus opacis," &c.

Anchises says—"læta arva tenemus." The verb *tenere* may mean to have the sure and certain possession of any thing, and may be elegantly here used, in opposition to being inmates only for a time.

But the shades of those who had been less perfect, and had not behaved so well in this world, had not the same privilege. After their long purgations, they had their station in a certain part, or in the suburbs of Elysium, and they were very numerous, 680;

> "At pater Anchises penitus convalle virenti
> Inclusas animas, superumque ad lumen ituras
> Lustrabat."

And 703;

> "Interea videt Æneas in valle reducta
> Seclusum nemus,—
> Hunc circum innumeræ gentes, populique volabant," &c.

And these were———

"Animæ quibus altera fato
Corpora debentur." 713.

Here Servius notes:

"Sciendum, non omnes animas ad corpora reverti. Aliquæ enim propter vitæ merita non redeunt; aliquæ *redeunt* propter malam vitam; *aliquæ* propter fati necessitatem."

This is absurd, and contrary to Virgil's system, and to other interpretations which Servius himself hath given. But it only wants emendation. The verb *redeunt* is misplaced, and the last *aliquæ* should be *reliquæ*, and then we have good sense, and a reasonable remark. You are to observe, says Servius, that all the shades do not return, to dwell again in human bodies: "Aliquæ enim propter vitæ merita non redeunt; aliquæ propter malam vitam; *reliquæ redeunt* propter fati necessitatem." For some do not return, because they are too good, and are settled in Elysium; others, because they are too bad, and are cast into Tartarus; and the rest return, because the laws of fate have so appointed it.

The soul of every living creature, says Anchises, proceeds from the Soul of the world, which is diffused through the whole. So it is naturally divine and pure, but it contracts some pollution from its union with the body, and wants a purgation.

As to the destination of the souls of brutes, the poet declines that point, judging it to be foreign from

his purpose. In Georg. iv. 219, he mentions it, as the opinion of some of the learned, that every soul of man or brute is derived from the Deity, the universal Soul, and, upon death, immediately returns to it again:

"His quidam signis, atque hæc exempla secuti,
Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis, et haustus
Ætherios dixere: Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque, tractusque maris, cælumque profundum.
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.
Scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac resoluta referri
Omnia, nec morti esse locum; sed viva volare
Sideris in numerum, atque alto succedere cælo."

Human souls then must be purified, v. 739;

"Ergo exercentur pœnis.—
——— aliæ panduntur inanes—
Suspensæ ad ventos: aliis sub gurgite vasto
Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni.
Quisque suos patimur manes: exinde per amplum
Mittimur Elysium, et pauci læta arva tenemus:
Donec longa dies, perfecto temporis orbe,
Concretam exemit labem, purumque reliquit
Ætherium sensum, atque auraï simplicis ignem.
Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,
Lethæum ad fluvium Deus evocat agmine magno:
Scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant,
Rursus et incipiant in corpora velle reverti."

Has omnes, &c. That is, (says Servius on 745 and 748.) all the purified souls, without exception, and all the inhabitants of Elysium, must return at last, though late, to human bodies. But either Ser-

vius contradicts himself, or this is not Servius; it is some other commentator, whose notes are mixed with those of Servius.

Now there is no necessity at all to suppose that *has omnes* refers to the *pauci læta arva tenemus*, nor indeed doth the construction proceed regularly in that manner. A parenthesis will remove the perplexity, and solve the difficulty.

> "Ergo exercentur pœnis—
> ——aliæ panduntur inanes—
> Infectum eluitur scelus, aut exuritur igni:
> (Quisque suos patimur manes: exinde per amplum
> Mittimur Elysium, et pauci læta arva tenemus.)
> Donec longa dies———
> Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos—

And then *has omnes* hath nothing to do with the more excellent souls in Elysium, but refers to the more vulgar souls which underwent a long purgation, and to the *animæ quibus altera fato corpora debentur*, of which he had spoken before.

The parenthesis proposed is necessary, because the words *donec longa dies* are plainly connected with *ergo exercentur pœnis*, &c., and not at all with *pauci læta arva tenemus*.

The word *donec* hath only two senses. First, it means *quamdiu*, as long as: Secondly, *quousque*, *quoad*, *usque dum*, until. Virgil constantly, and in seventeen other places, uses *donec* in the second sense, for *until*; and Ruæus is much mistaken when

he takes *donec*, in this passage, to mean *quando* or *postquam*.

Charon is described as carrying over the *shades* of those who were buried; and yet Virgil says of him, 303,

"Et ferruginea subvectat *corpora* cymba:"

alluding, as it should seem, to the Ægyptian Charon, whose office it was to ferry over the dead bodies.

Æneas pacifies Charon, by showing him the golden bough, Æn. vi. 408.

Great is the power of gold;

"Aurum per medios ire satellites,
Et perrumpere amat saxa, potentius
Ictu fulmineo."

So Horace perhaps would have interpreted the fable.

"——— ille admirans venerabile donum
Fatalis virgæ, longo post tempore visum,
Cœruleam advertit puppim."

If forty or fifty years had passed since Charon's eyes had been blessed with the sight, that would have sufficiently justified the expression, *longo post tempore*. But it cannot be collected from poetical records that he had seen it so lately; for Hercules, Theseus, and Pirithous, who took the same journey to Aïdes before Æneas, carried no bough for a *passe-par-tout*, and did not enter in peaceably, but by violence; and as to Orpheus, his persuasive voice and enchanting lyre opened the passage for him.

Virgil hath placed in the infernal regions the souls of infants[a] weeping and wailing, 426;

"Continuo auditæ voces, vagitus et ingens,
Infantumque animæ flentes in limine primo;
Quos dulcis vitæ exsortis, et ab ubere raptos,
Abstulit atra dies, et funere mersit acerbo."

It is an ingenious conjecture proposed in the Divine Legation, that the poet might design to discountenance the cursed practice of exposing and murdering infants. It might be added, that Virgil had perhaps also in view to please Augustus, who was desirous of encouraging matrimony and the education of children, and extremely intent upon repeopling Italy, which had been exhausted by the civil wars.

"Audiet pugnas vitio parentum
Rara juventus."

But if these infants were to be left in this lamentable state for all eternity, the poet's system would be horribly shocking, and only fit for a supralapsarian professor. How long then were they to weep and wail? Perhaps, as long as they ought to have lived upon earth, according to the common course of nature.—After this period we may suppose that they took a

[a] The author of The Life of Sethos, in his learned romance, supposes these infants to be the children of Ægyptian priests, who were educated in subterraneous mansions; and the purgation by fire, air, and water, to be the trials which the initiated passed through.

small sip of the Lethean water, and were sent into new bodies.

Plutarch mentions it as an ancient opinion of the Greeks, that the souls of infants entered immediately into a happier and a more divine state.

Τοῖς γὰρ αὐτῶν νηπίοις ἀποθανοῦσιν οὔτε χοὰς ἐπιφέρουσιν, οὔτ' ἄλλα δρῶσι περὶ αὐτὰ οἷα εἰκὸς ὑπὲρ θανόντων ποιεῖν τοὺς ἄλλους. οὐ γὰρ μέτεστι γῆς οὐδὲν οὔτε τῶν περὶ γῆν αὐτοῖς. οὐδ' αὐτοῦ[b] περὶ ταφὰς καὶ μνήματα, καὶ προθέσεις νεκρῶν φιλοχωροῦσι καὶ παρακάθηνται τοῖς σώμασιν, οὐ γὰρ ἐῶσιν οἱ νόμοι τοὺς τηλικούτους, ὡς οὐχ ὅσιον εἰς βελτίονα καὶ θειοτέραν μοῖραν ἅμα καὶ χώραν μεθεστηκότας.

"Suis enim infantibus mortuis neque inferias libant, neque aliud quicquam faciunt eorum quæ fieri mortuis apud alios solent. Neque enim terræ aut terrestrium infantes ullam partem percipiunt, neque circum eorum sepulcra et monumenta ac cadaverum expositionem commorantur aut adsident. Nam leges id non permittunt: quia hoc nefas sit, cum ii in meliorem ac diviniorem conditionem simul locumque concesserint." Consol. ad Uxorem, p. 612.

Next appear they who had suffered death by an unjust sentence, 430;

"Hos juxta falso damnati crimine mortis."

Damnati mortis, subaudi, *supplicio:* condemned

[b] F. αὐτῶν.

to die: *falso crimine*, for a crime falsely laid to their charge. It is an ellipsis, like that in Horace;

"——————— damnatusque longi
Sisyphus Æolides laboris."

Persons falsely accused, and unjustly sentenced to die, have frequently been public-spirited men, patriots, philosophers, and lovers of their country, who were oppressed by vile factions and insolent tyrants. It seems hard that such persons should not be more decently provided for in Virgil's Aïdes. A conjecture occurred to me, which, as it lies within the bounds of probability, shall not be suppressed, but shall take its chance amongst those of other interpreters.

These persons, then, like the infants, the warriors, &c. had not lived out the time intended for them [c], and therefore were left for the present in the state preceding that of purification and of recompense.

But besides this; it is a notion as old as mankind, and spread through all nations, that the ghosts of persons unjustly condemned, or basely murdered, were permitted to pursue their enemies, and to haunt and torment them, and were not at rest till vengeance was satisfied. You find something of this in Genesis iv. 10;

"The voice of thy brother's blood crieth unto me from the ground."

[c] See Mr. Addison's remarks on this subject, in the Tatler, No. 152 and 154.

You find it in Revelat. vi. 9;

"I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and for the testimony which they held. And they cried with a loud voice, saying, How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not judge and avenge our blood on them that dwell on the earth?"

So Dido, considering Æneas as her murderer, threatens to haunt him, iv. 384;

"———— sequar atris ignibus absens:
Et cum frigida mors anima seduxerit artus,
Omnibus umbra locis adero. Dabis, improbe, pœnas."

In Horace, Carm. v. 5, the boy says to the witches, who intended to murder him;

"Diris agam vos: dira detestatio
Nulla expiatur victima.
Quin ubi perire jussus expiravero,
Nocturnus occurram Furor;
Petamque vultus umbra curvis unguibus,
Quæ vis Deorum est Manium,
Et inquietis assidens præcordiis
Pavore somnos auferam."

Upon this supposition, when revenge had been executed on the guilty, then these much-injured shades were disposed of according to their deserts.

The supposition that the souls in Aïdes had liberty thus to return, and to pass and repass, or to send dreams in their own image and likeness, is poetical and Virgilian:

"Nocte vagæ ferimur. Nox clausas liberat umbras,
Errat et abjecta Cerberus ipse sera.
Luce jubent leges Lethæa ad stagna reverti."

Propertius, iv. 7. p. 449. where see Broukhusius; as also on i. xix. 10.

Tibullus ii. 7;

"Ne tibi neglecti mittant nova somnia manes,
Mœstaque sopitæ stet soror ante torum."

Æn. iv. 351;

"Me patris Anchisæ,—quoties astra ignea surgunt,
Admonet in somnis, et turbida terret imago."

Æn. vi. 695;

"——— Tua me, genitor, tua tristis imago,
Sæpius occurrens, hæc limina tendere adegit."

Æn. v. 99;

"——— animamque vocabat
Anchisæ magni, manesque Acheronte remissos."

Where Servius;

"Aut venientes de Acheronte ad hanc parentationem; aut certe remissos Acheronte, qui jam in Acheronte non essent, post apotheosin factam."

The first of these interpretations is the more natural and probable.

As, upon the transmigrating system, there was a constant demand for separate souls to return into human bodies, it may be supposed that the lovers, the suicides, the warriors, &c., were to remain in the situation wherein the poet hath placed them, till their turn should come to enter, first into a state

of purgation, and then into a state of transmigration: Æn. vi. 760;

> "Ille, vides, pura juvenis qui nititur hasta,
> Proxima *sorte* tenet lucis loca; primus ad auras
> Ætherias Italo commixtus sanguine surget."

After the line

> "Hos juxta falso damnati crimine mortis:"

Virgil adds 431;

> "Nec vero *hæ* sine sorte datæ, sine judice sedes."

But *hæ sedes* can be referred to nothing that the poet hath mentioned; and I think this conjecture of a learned friend to be plausible:

> "Nec vero *his* sine sorte datæ, sine judice sedes."

There is nothing in the note of Servius that forbids this emendation. Suppose that the first copy had HISSINE, and that afterward one s was dropped, it would then be HI SINE, which might be changed into HÆ, to make it agree with *sedes*.

Æneas, when he was conducted through the infernal regions, beheld the outside of Tartarus, and heard the noise within, and saw the formidable guards who kept watch at the gate, but was not permitted to enter in. He received an account of those dreadful mansions from the mouth of the Sibyl, who had been there, 559;

> "Constitit Æneas, strepitumque exterritus hausit.—
> Tunc vates sic orsa loqui: dux inclute Teucrum,
> Nulli fas casto sceleratum insistere limen:
> Sed me cum lucis Hecate præfecit avernis,
> Ipsa Deum pœnas docuit, perque omnia duxit." etc.

Here Virgil differs from Homer; for in Homer, Ulysses sees Tityus, Sisyphus, and Tantalus suffering punishments; but in Virgil, Æneas is only informed by the Sibyl how they are punished.

Amongst those who suffer in Tartarus, Virgil mentions Theseus and Phlegyas. The place is remarkable on several accounts. 617;

"——————— Sedet, æternumque sedebit
Infelix Theseus: Phlegyasque miserrimus omnes
Admonet, et magna testatur voce per umbras;
Discite justitiam, moniti, et non temnere divos."

Here Servius notes; "Si Phlegyas est *nominativus singularis*, hoc dicit: *Phlegyas omnes admonet apud inferos pœnas ferentes.* Si autem Phlegyas *accusativus pluralis* est, *Theseum omnes Phlegyas admonentem* debemus accipere." Ainsworth, in his dictionary, speaking of Phlegyas, and sending his reader to Virgil, as Faber hath done, adds; "Cujus tamen loci ambiguus est sensus, potest enim esse accusativus pluralis vocis *Phlegyæ*." And some of Virgil's interpreters have voted for the *accusative case.* But the other construction is the more natural and probable. Theseus and Phlegyas seem to be the two persons here described, and each hath his proper epithet; Theseus is called *infelix*, and Phlegyas, *miserrimus*.

Statius and Valerius Flaccus understood Virgil as I do.

Statius, Theb. i. 712;

"——————— Ultrix tibi torva Megæra
Jejunum Phlegyam subter cava saxa jacentem

Æterno premit accubitu, dapibusque profanis
Instimulat: sed mista famem fastidia vincunt."

Valerius Flaccus, ii. 192;

"——— Inferni qualis sub nocte barathri
Adcubat attonitum Phlegyan et Thesea juxta
Tisiphone, sævasque dapes, et pocula libat,
Tormenti genus, et nigris amplectitur hydris."

Homer places Theseus, and Pirithous also, amongst the deceased heroes in Aïdes, but not amongst those who were tormented in those regions. In Odyss. A. 629, Ulysses wanted much to have a sight of them, but dared not stay any longer:

Καί νύ κ' ἔτι προτέρους ἴδον ἀνέρας, οὓς ἔθελόν περ,
Θησέα Πειρίθοόν τε, θεῶν ἐρικυδέα τέκνα.

Let us not conceal the remark of Hereas of Megara, who suspected that Pisistratus foisted this line into Homer, to please the Athenians. Plutarch in Theseus, p. 8, 9. Others may as justly suppose that the suspicion of Hereas was groundless.

Virgil, however, thought fit to put Theseus into Tartarus without proper vouchers, and *contra opinionem*, says Servius, ver. 617; and he places him there, not for *injustice* to men, but for *impiety*, and only one act of impiety, for an attempt to carry off Proserpine; as Charon says, ver. 392;

"Nec vero Alciden me sum lætatus euntem
Accepisse lacu, nec Thesea Pirithoumque:
Diis quanquam geniti, atque invicti viribus essent.
Tartareum ille manu custodem in vincla petivit;
Ipsitis a solio regis traxitque trementem:
Hi dominam Ditis thalamo deducere adorti."

Virgil being sensible that the punishment of Theseus was too severe, as he was an illustrious warrior, who did great services to the public, and cleared the world of many a villain and many a monster, and had a better character than most of the ancient heroes, and had divine honours and worship paid to him by the Athenians, and who was betrayed into the rash attempt upon Proserpine by too much affection [g] for his beloved friend Pirithous, bestows upon him the compassionate epithet *infelix*, as justly belonging to one

[g] After having tried in vain to dissuade him: ἐπειδὴ συμβουλεύων οὐχ οἷός τ' ἦν ἀποτρέπειν. Isocrates, Helen. Encom. who takes all opportunities to extol Theseus as an accomplished hero.

Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ Θησεὺς μετέπειθεν αὐτὸν, ἀποτρέπων τῆς πράξεως, διὰ τὴν ἀσέβειαν. Τοῦ δὲ Πειρίθου βιαζομένου, συνηναγκάσθη διὰ τοὺς ὅρκους ὁ Θησεὺς μετασχεῖν τῆς πράξεως· καὶ πέρας καταβάντων αὐτῶν εἰς τοὺς καθ' ᾅδου τόπους, συνέβη διὰ τὴν ἀσέβειαν ἀμφοτέρους δεθῆναι, καὶ Θησέα μὲν ὕστερον διὰ τὴν Ἡρακλέους χάριν ἀπολυθῆναι, Πειρίθουν δὲ διὰ τὴν ἀσέβειαν ἐν ᾅδου διατελεῖν τιμωρίας αἰωνίου τυγχάνοντα. ἔνιοι δὲ τῶν μυθογράφων φασὶ μὴ τυχεῖν ἀμφοτέρους τοῦ νόστου.

Id dissuadere initio Theseus, hominemque ab incepto, quod impium esset, retrahere. Sed instante Pirithoo vehementius, ille juramenti religione coactus, in societatem hanc consensit. Plutonis ergo regiam ingressi, ob impietatem ambo in vincula conjiciuntur, sed Theseus postea, in gratiam Herculis exsolutus abiit. Pirithous vero apud inferos detentus, sempiternas impietatis pœnas luit. Quamvis neutrum inde reversum quidam scriptores fabularum dicant. Diodorus Siculus, l. iv. p. 265.

But he had said before that Hercules, Θησέα μὲν ἀνήγαγεν ἐκ δεσμῶν μετὰ Πειρίθου. Theseum e vinculis exemit cum Pirithoo, p. 232.

who deserved a better fate and gentler usage. The punishment allotted to Theseus was a state of inactivity; he was to sit still, which must have been irksome enough to a sprightly hero; but it was far from being as bad as the condition of Tityus, Ixion, Sisyphus, and the rest of the criminals in Tartarus; and therefore Virgil could not with any propriety call him *miserrimus*, as he must do in the sense and construction which we have rejected.

As to Phlegyas, he, as Servius informs us, "habuit Coronidem filiam, quam Apollo vitiavit. Quod pater dolens, incendit Apollinis templum, et ejus sagittis est ad inferos trusus."

We know very little of the history of Phlegyas, and Virgil might follow ancient accounts, now lost, which represented him guilty of *injustices* and *violences*, as well as of *impiety*. So the poet, in his account of Eriphyle, seems to allude to some story now sunk in oblivion. He places her amongst the love-sick ladies; and she had been in love indeed, but it was with a diamond necklace, for the sake of which she sold and betrayed her husband. Therefore Ruæus supposes that her love was of another sort; "Cum autem inter amantes a Virgilio statuatur, necesse est eam non solo monilis dono, sed stupro fuisse corruptam." But what shall we say of Virgil's introducing Cænis amongst the disconsolate lovers, for no reason that his commentators can discern?

Without having recourse to this solution, in the case

of Phlegyas, his burning a temple may pass in some sense for an act of injustice, since the priests and the servants of the temple must have been driven out of doors, and the inhabitants of the country put to the expense of building another.

Phlegyas is said to have been the son of Mars, the king of the Lapithæ, and the father of Ixion. It may be supposed that he was one of those who feared neither gods nor men, and that his son Ixion was κακὸς κόρακος κακὸν ὠόν. It hath been thought also that the Phlegyæ, a very wicked people, had their denomination from him.

According to the account of Servius, Phlegyas seems to have had hard measure, and Apollo deserved to have his temple fired for ravishing the man's daughter. But upon the Pagan system, men were obliged to bear all sorts of insults and injuries from their mischievous gods, without pretending to take revenge. The poet, however, hath not specified either the crimes or the torments of Phlegyas, but represents him in general as unjust and impious and very miserable; and we must take his word for it.

The poetical gods are most insolent and unreasonable tyrants. Homer's *Neptune* pursues Ulysses with implacable malice, only because the hero would not suffer himself to be devoured by Polyphemus [h], and

[h] Euripides hath made this adventure of Ulysses the subject of a play called Cyclops, which indeed is offensive, as it is obscene,

had put out the eye of the monster, who had the honour to be Neptune's child; and *Sol* takes unmerciful vengeance of the companions of Ulysses, because they had made bold to eat some of his cattle, when they were wind-bound and half-starved. The reader, I hope, will give me leave to step aside, and correct a passage in Libanius relating to this story.

It was never publicly known by whom the emperor Julian was killed. "Possibly it was a Christian," says Sozomen, "who was animated by considering how the destroyers of tyrants had been celebrated in ancient times. Scarcely can any one blame him, if for the sake of God and of religion he performed so heroic an action," vii. 2. An odd sort of doctrine this, that a Christian subject and a soldier might assassinate his emperor and his general!

Libanius complains bitterly that no search was made into it, and exhorts the emperor Theodosius to revenge Julian's death. He plainly intimates that a Christian did the deed, instigated by some of his brethren; and it may be conjectured from his way of speaking concerning it, that if the emperor would have encouraged an inquiry, there were Pagans who would have charged it upon the Christians; whether truly or falsely, it is impossible to say: but no notice was

but hath perhaps more of *wit*, and of what the English call *humour*, than any play of Aristophanes.

taken of it, and so it never came to light. See Libanius Orat. de ulciscenda Juliani Nece, and his Parental. in Julianum, in Fabricius Bibl. Gr. vii. 145. 363.

Libanius must have possessed a consummate impudence, who could address to a Christian emperor a mere panegyric on Paganism, and a lampoon on Christianity; for such is his oration.

There is a passage in it, which, as it stands, is very senseless and stupid, and yet may be easily mended. It is a wonder that the translator Olearius, and the editor Fabricius, did not perceive and correct it. "Why should not the immortal gods," says Libanius, "be grievously offended at us, and punish us for the death of Julian, when Apollo could be so angry about the daughter of Chryses," &c.—ὅτω μὲν χαλεπήναντος τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀποδοῦναι τῷ Χρύσῃ τὴν θυγάτερα τὸν δεῖνα, ὅτω δὲ ΒΟΩΝΤΟΣ τινων εἵνεκα τοῦ Ἡλίου, ὥστε τοιαῦτα ἀπειλῆσαι τοῖς ἄλλοις θεοῖς, εἰ μὴ λάβοι δίκην.—

"Cum tamen Græcis adeo irasceretur Apollo, quod Chrysæ filiam non redderet Agamemnon, cumve adeo propter (paucos) quosdam VOCIFERATUS SIT Phœbus, ut tanta reliquis Diis quoque fuerit minatus, nisi vindictâ placetur," &c.

The companions of Ulysses ate the oxen of the Sun, upon which the god made his complaint to Jupiter;

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἠδ' ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες,
Τίσαι δὴ ἐτάρους Λαερτιάδεω Ὀδυσῆος,

Οἵ μεῦ βῶς ἔκτειναν—
Εἰ δέ μοι ὑ τίσουσι βοῶν ἐπιειικέ' ἀμοιβὴν,
Δύσομαι εἰς 'Αΐδαο, καὶ ἐν νεκύεσσι φαείνω.

"Jupiter pater, aliique Dii immortales,
Fac luere socios Läertiadæ Ulyssis,
Qui meas boves occiderunt—
Quod si mihi non luant boum talionem,
Descendam in Orcum, et inter mortuos lucebo."

Homer. Odyss. M. 377.

Here is the anger, and here are the menaces. Correct therefore in Libanius, *meo periculo*, as the critics say,—ἔτω δὲ ΒΟΩΝ τινων εἵνεκα τῦ 'Ηλίυ—

"Why should not the gods hate us and punish us for the murder of Julian, when *Apollo* could be so angry, because Agamemnon would not restore to Chryses his daughter, and when *Sol* was so incensed, upon account of *a few paltry oxen*, as to threaten the rest of the gods, that if he had not proper satisfaction, he would descend into Hades and shine amongst the dead?"

Some transcriber took βοῶν to be the participle of βοάω, and then turned it into βοῶντος, to make it agree with 'Ηλίυ.

Such is the childish and ridiculous argument of Libanius, to exhort the emperor and the Romans not to suffer the murder of Julian to go unrevenged!

Olearius translates Ἥλιος, *Phœbus*. It should have been *Sol*: for *Phœbus* or *Apollo*, and *Sol*, seem to be two distinct gods in Homer and Hesiod, though afterwards they were confounded; and Libanius in this very

passage distinguishes them, and so doth Lucian in Bis Accus. in the beginning of that dialogue. The Assyrians also accounted them two gods, as you may see in Lucian De Dea Syria, 34, 35; and they could not think them to be one and the same, who called the planet Mercury, *Apollo*. Pliny N. H. ii. 6. p. 76.

I now return to Virgil, and to Phlegyas. The speech of Phlegyas,

"Discite justitiam, moniti, et non temnere divos,"

is thus ridiculed, it seems, by the French poet Scarron:

"Cette sentence est bonne et belle:
Mais en Enfer de quoi sert-elle?"

Th' advice is wise; but can you tell
What service it will do in Hell?

Virgil here follows Pindar, as Ursinus and others have observed, and imitates the bold poet, who makes Ixion upon his wheel a preacher of justice and gratitude.

Θεῶν δ' ἐφετμαῖς
Ἰξίονα φαντὶ ταῦτα
Βροτοῖς λέγειν ἐν πτερόεντι τροχῷ
Παντᾶ κυλινδόμενον,
Τὸν εὐεργέταν ἀγαναῖς ἀμοιβαῖς.
Ἐποιχομένοις τίνεσθαι. Pyth. ii. 39.

"Deorum autem mandatis, Ixionem aiunt hæc mortalibus dicere in celeri rota perpetuo volutatum, ut benefactorem benevolis compensationibus excipientes remunerent."

Scarron's remark may perhaps pass off well enough for a piece of buffoonery; but if intended for a serious argument, is inconclusive, as others have observed. I account it to be so, for the following reasons:

1. It is the objection of a man who applies his own Christian notions of hell to the poetical hell, which is ridiculous enough.

2. To preach to the damned, says he, is labour in vain. And what if it is? It might be part of his punishment to exhort himself and others, when exhortations were too late. The admonition, so far as it relates to himself and to his companions in misery, is to be looked upon not so much as an admonition to amend, but as a bitter sarcasm, and reproaching of past iniquities.

It is labour in vain. But in the poetical system, it seems to have been the occupation of the damned to labour in vain, to catch at meat and drink that fled from them, to fill a leaky vessel with water, to roll a stone up-hill that fell down again, &c.

3. According to Plato, there were shades in Tartarus which were capable of amendment; and to such Phlegyas might prove an useful monitor, if you will admit such into Virgil's Tartarus.

4. Phlegyas proclaims his doctrine with a very loud voice,

"——magna testatur voce per umbras."

He might then be heard in the infernal regions by

some shades which were intended for transmigration; and Virgil seems to have had some such thing in view, by taking notice of his most audible voice.

5. His instruction, like that of Ixion in Pindar, might be for the use of the living. You will say, "How can that be?" Surely nothing is more easy and intelligible. The Muses hear him;

Ἶμεῖς γὰρ θεαὶ ἐσ-ε, πάρεσ-έ τε, ἴσ-ε τε πάντα.

The Muses reveal it to the poet, and the inspired poet reveals it to mankind. And so much for Phlegyas, and Monsieur Scarron.

Virgil hath placed in his Elysium inhabitants worthy of the abodes, 660;

"Hic manus ob patriam pugnando vulnera passi, &c."

and amongst other excellent persons are,

"Quique sui memores alios fecere merendo."

And these are surely the most amiable and respectable part of mankind.

Yet in these happy regions the poet seemeth not to have introduced one female, though the Roman and Grecian history might have furnished him with several who deserved admittance as much as the best of his heroes. But it is an observation of Dryden, I think, that he hath been uncomplaisant to the fair sex.

The Arabian impostor had very different notions about Elysium or Paradise; and so had Tibullus, i. 3;

"Hic choreæ cantusque vigent, passimque vagantes
Dulce sonant tenui gutture carmen aves.—
Hic juvenum series teneris immixta puellis
Ludit, et assidue prelia miscet Amor."

And Propertius, iv. 7;

"Ecce coronato pars altera vecta phaselo,
Mulcet ubi Elysias aura beata rosas:
Qua numerosa fides, quaque æra rotunda Cybebes,
Mitratisque sonant Lydia plectra choris:
Andromedeque et Hypermnestre, sine fraude maritæ,
Narrant historiæ pectora nota suæ."

According to Ovid, the dead parrot of Corinna was there, amongst other birds of good reputation:

"Psittacus has inter, nemorali sede receptus,
Convertit volucres in sua verba pias."

Amor. ii. 6.

Virgil hath also introduced music, vocal and instrumental, into Elysium, having placed Orpheus in those happy regions, as Horace hath admitted Sappho and Alcæus, 645;

"Nec non Threicius longa cum veste sacerdos
Obloquitur numeris septem discrimina vocum,
Jamque eadem digitis, jam pectine pulsat eburno."

In these lines, which I do not remember to have seen well explained, *septem discrimina vocum* are the seven notes of music, or musical sounds in general. *Numeri* are airs, or tunes, as in Ecl. ix. 45;

"—— numeros memini, si verba tenerem."

"I remember the tune, if I could recollect the words."

Obloqui is to sing the same notes that the strings sound.

Orpheus therefore accompanies his lyre with his voice, in his melodious airs; singing and striking the chords, now with his fingers, now with the *plectrum*, or *pecten*, or *bow*, or *quill*, or what you please to call it.

The sacrifice which Æneas offers to the infernal deities of a black sheep, and a virgin cow, and his drawing his sword to keep off the ghosts, Æn. vi. 243, 260, is copied from his master Homer, Odyss. K. 527, Λ. 30, &c.

That the subterraneous adventures of Æneas were intended by Virgil to represent the initiation of his hero, is an elegant conjecture, which hath been laid before the public, and set forth to the best advantage, by a learned friend. The observations which I shall offer, a few pages lower, upon magic arts, and upon the abomination in which they were held, may serve his purpose as well as mine.

Virgil might have drawn up a system of a future state not less poetical, and more pleasing, upon the supposition that, as far as human souls are concerned, *all shall terminate in good.* He might have supposed,

1. That even the punishments of vicious shades in Tartarus were purgatory, expiatory, and temporary.

2. That, souls, after death, entered immediately into a state of purgation, harsher or gentler, longer or shorter, according to their respective deserts.

3. That the souls which had been virtuous entered, after a short and slight purification, into Elysium.

4. That less accomplished shades, after their purgations, transmigrated into new bodies; that then, if they acted well in the next trial, they should no more travel from body to body, but enter into Elysium; if they misbehaved themselves, and their evil deeds preponderated, then they must undergo another revolution of penance and transmigration.

5. That when they were admitted into Elysium, they drank of the *fountain of memory*, and recovered their personal identity, so as to remember all the changes and purgations which they had undergone.

6. That virtuous love is immortal, and that death and time break not those amiable bonds, but that such persons are united in Elysium, and know no second separation.

7. That lest Elysium should be too full of inhabitants, the souls should be removed from thence, according to merit and seniority, to the celestial mansions, and there be delfied, and become *Dii minorum gentium*, inferior good dæmons, and tutelar spirits to the children of men.

And so the moral and application of the whole would have been, according to the Golden Verses ascribed to

Pythagoras; Keep innocency, and behave yourself well here upon earth, and then, when you are released from the prison of the body;

Ἔσσεαι ἀθάνατος θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκ ἔτι θνητός.
"Eris Deus immortalis, et non amplius homo."

But if our poet was an Epicurean, (a point which we will consider presently,) it was not his business to guard the doctrine of the soul's immortality against the objections with which his brethren and friends used to assault it.

Virgil, after having shone out with full splendour through the sixth book, sets in a cloud. He first represents the state of departed souls in Aïdes as a reality, and this he was obliged to do by the very nature of his subject; and then he intimates that the whole is a lying fable, and he intimates it in such a manner, that it seems scarcely possible to clear him from this imputation.

But then, on the other hand, it is hard, say Virgil's friends, to suppose the serious and judicious poet would act so strangely as to overset an elegant system which he had put together and embellished with no small pains, and which was partly calculated to promote religion and morality, and the hopes and fears of a future state of retribution.

The objection is by no means contemptible; indeed it is so far from deserving that character, that, I believe, most of us readers and admirers of Virgil have felt

the force of it, have been offended more or less at the close of this book, and have been very willing so to interpret it, as to discharge the poet from Epicurism, and to listen with a favourable prejudice to all attempts of this kind.

But I am afraid that such attempts cannot invalidate the obvious and the natural way of interpreting him, which hath been adopted by Servius, Ruæus, and other critics; whom if I follow, it is with some reluctance, and from whom I should be glad to differ.

Virgil drew up a poetical description of the infernal regions, upon the commonly received notions of posthumous rewards and punishments. His system might pass on still as true or probable in the main, and might have its use and influence, such as it was, though he thought fit to intimate at the same time that he himself was of another school. Indeed he had done that already in the Eclogues, and in the Georgics, and he took care always to do it decently and obliquely, and so as not openly to attack and insult the public religion.

"Cum igitur Virgilius Æneam eburnea porta emittit, indicat profecto, quicquid a se de illo inferorum aditu dictum est, in fabulis esse numerandum." Ruæus. "Vult autem intelligi falsa esse omnia, quæ dixit." Servius.

Let us suppose that Virgil by the descent of Æneas intended to represent his *initiation*, still the troublesome conclusion remains as it was; and from the man-

ner in which the hero is dismissed after the ceremonies, we learn that in those initiations the machinery and the whole show was (in the poet's opinion) a representation of things which had no truth and reality.

Virgil lets Æneas out at the *gate of Sleep*. The consequence of this seems to be, that the hero had been asleep, and had seen all these marvellous things in a dream or vision. If the poet had said no more, I should have suspected that he alluded to the ancient and common custom of consulting the gods by sleeping in sacred places, and receiving information by dreams. Let the reader consider these lines of Virgil, and compare them with the descent of Æneas, and his adventures below, and thence he may perhaps be inclined to think that Æneas had slept, like Don Quixote, in the *cave of Montesinos*.

"At rex sollicitus monstris, oracula Fauni,
Fatidici genitoris, adit, lucosque sub alta
Consulit Albunea: nemorum quæ maxima sacro
Fonte sonat, sævamque exhalat opaca Mephitim.
Hinc Italæ gentes, omnisque Oenotria tellus,
In dubiis responsa petunt. Huc dona sacerdos
Cum tulit, et cæsarum ovium sub nocte silenti
Pellibus incubuit stratis, somnosque petivit,
Multa modis simulacra videt volitantia miris:
Et varias audit voces, fruiturque Deorum
Conloquio, atque imis Acheronta adfatur Avernis."

vii. 81.

Pomponius Mela says;

"Augilæ Manes tantum Deos putant: per eos dejerant, eos ut oracula consulunt; precatique quæ

volunt, ubi tumulis incubuere, pro responsis ferunt somnia."

Pausanias, Attic. p. 65. ed. Wech., speaking of those who consulted Amphiaraus;

Κριὸν θύσαντες αὐτῷ, καὶ τὸ δέρμα ὑποστρωσάμενοι, καθεύδουσιν ἀναμείναντες δήλωσιν ὀνείρατος.

"Ariete ei immolato, in substrata ejus pelle dormiunt, somnii monitum expectantes."

See also Servius on Virgil.

That Æneas saw these things in a dream is a conjecture much strengthened by this remarkable passage in Cicero:

"His adjungatur etiam Æneæ somnium: quod in Numerii Fabii Pictoris Græcis Annalibus ejusmodi est, ut omnia, quæ ab Ænea gesta sunt, quæque illi acciderunt, ea fuerint, quæ ei secundum quietem visa sunt." i. 21.

But let us proceed to Virgil's famous conclusion; vi. 894;

"Sunt geminæ Somni portæ: quarum altera fertur
Cornea; qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris;
Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto:
Sed falsa ad cælum mittunt insomnia Manes.
His ibi tum natum Anchises, unaque Sibyllam
Prosequitur dictis, portaque emittit eburna."

"In this account of the *geminæ Somni portæ*, the particle *sed* is very oddly used, and I know not what to make of it. Surely instead of *sed* it should be *qua*." Trapp.

He is certainly much mistaken, and the particle *sed* is extremely just and proper. The sense is this: the horn gate, plain, homely, and transparent, lets out true dreams: the ivory gate,

"——————————— fertur
Candenti perfecta nitens elephanto,"

is far more elegant and resplendent, BUT it sends forth false dreams. Truth is artless and simple: poetic fiction is far more laboured and adorned, more striking and alluring, *but* it is all mere error and illusion. Or, as Pindar says very honestly of his own trade,

Ἦ θαύματα πολλὰ
Καί πω τι καὶ βροτῶν φρένας,
Ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον
Δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις
Ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι·
Χάρις δ' ἅπερ ἅπαντα τεύ-
χει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς,
Ἐπιφέροισα τιμὰν,
Καὶ ἄπιστον ἐμήσατο πιστὸν
Ἔμμεναι τὸ πολλάκις. Olymp. i.

"——————— So ancient tales record;
And oft those tales unheeding mortals charm;
While gaudy Fiction deck'd with art,
And dress'd in ev'ry winning grace,
To Truth's unornamented face
Preferr'd, seduces oft the human heart.
Add to these sweet Poesy,
Smooth inchantress of mankind,
Clad in whose false majesty
Fables easy credit find." G. West.

Hesiod also insinuates, that the proper office of a poet is to tell lies which have the appearance of truths, and to mix some truths with those lies. He introduceth the Muses saying to him;

> Ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα·
> Ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα μυθήσασθαι.
>
> "Scimus mendacia multa dicere veris similia:
> Scimus etiam, quando voluerimus, vera loqui."
>
> Θεογ. 27.

Virgil's description of the two gates of Sleep is taken from Homer [f], Odyss. T. 562. where Penelope, speaking of true and false dreams, represents them as issuing out from two different gates:

> Δειαὶ γάρ τε πύλαι ἀμενηνῶν εἰσιν ὀνείρων·
> Αἱ μὲν γὰρ κεράεσσι τετεύχαται, αἱ δ' ἐλέφαντι.
> Τῶν οἳ μέν κ' ἔλθωσι διὰ πριστοῦ ἐλέφαντος,
> Οἱ δ' ἐλεφαίρονται, ἔπε' ἀκράαντα φέροντες.
> Οἳ δὲ διὰ ξεστῶν κεράων ἔλθωσι θύραζε,
> Οἵ β' ἔτυμα κραίνουσι, βροτῶν ὅτε κέν τις ἴδηται.
>
> "Duæ enim portæ debilium sunt somniorum;
> Nam alteræ cornibus factæ sunt, alteræ ebore.
> Horum quæ veniunt per sectum ebur,
> Hæc decipiunt, verba irrita ferentia:
> Quæ vero per polita cornua iverint foras,
> Hæc vera perficiunt, hominum quando aliquis viderit."

Here Homer, speaking of the perfidiousness of the *ivory dreams*, seems to give us a *pun* for a *reason*. The dreams which come δι' ἐλέφαντος, says he, ἐλεφαί-

[f] See Lucian's description of the Island of Dreams, Ver. Hist. ii. 32.

ρονται, *deceive us.* There is not the same near resemblance, or *alliteration* (if I may use that word), between κέρας and κραίνω, and yet some resemblance there is.

Virgil, following Homer, divides dreams into true and false; for *veræ umbræ* are *true dreams*, as Servius rightly interprets it: "Per *umbras veras, somnia* indicat *vera.*—Vult autem intelligi falsa esse omnia quæ dixit."

The Latin language hath no word for a dream, but *somnium* or *insomnium*; and therefore Virgil, to vary his phrase, calls dreams first *umbræ*, and then *insomnia*; nothing being more like a *dream* than a *shadow.*

Dreams, in general, may be called *vain* and *deceitful*, *somnia vana*, or *somnia falsa*, if you will, as they are opposed to the *real* objects which present themselves to us when we are awake. But when *false* dreams stand opposed to *true* dreams, there the epithet *falsa* hath another meaning. True dreams represent what is real, and show what is true; false dreams represent things which are not, or which are not true. Thus Homer and Virgil and many other poets, and indeed the nature of the thing, distinguish them.

Nonnus Dionys. xxxiv. 89;

——— Ὑπνώοντα παρήπαφεν ὄψις ὀνείρου
Κλεψινόων ἐλέφαντος ἀναΐξασα πυλάων.

Horatius, Carm. iii. 27;

"——— Ludit imago
Vana, quæ porta fugiens eburna
Somnium ducit."

Moschus, Idyll. ii. 1;

Εὐρώπῃ πότε Κύπρις ἐπὶ γλυκὺν ἧκεν ὄνειρον,
Νυκτὸς ὅτε τρίτατον λάχος ἵσταται, ἐγγύθι δ' ἠώς·
Ὕπνος ὅτε γλυκίων μέλιτος βλεφάροισιν ἐφίζων,
Λυσιμελὴς, πεδάα μαλακῷ κατὰ φάεα δεσμῷ·
Εὖτε καὶ ἀτρεκέων ποιμαίνεται ἔθνος ὀνείρων.

"Europæ olim Venus suave somnium immisit
Quum tertia pars noctis stat, et aurora prope est;
Quum somnus melle dulcior in palpebris sedens,
Membra resolvens, oculos molli vinculo ligat,
Quum et veracium pascitur turba somniorum."

Horatius, Serm. i. x. 33;

"——————— vetuit tali me voce Quirinus,
Post mediam noctem visus, cum somnia vera."

Ovid. Epist. xix. 195;

"——— sub auroram, jam dormitante lucerna,
Somnia quo cerni tempore vera solent."

Tertullian, De Anima, 48;

"Certiora et colatiora somniari adfirmant sub extimis noctibus, quasi jam emergente animarum vigore, producto sopore."

Plinius, x. § 98;

"A vino et a cibis proxima, atque in redormitatione vana esse visa, prope convenit."

Propertius, iv. 7;

"Nec tu sperne piis venientia somnia portis.
Quum pia venerunt somnia, pondus habent."

See also Seneca, Troad. 438.

Here perhaps are more proofs brought than are wanting; *in re non dubia testes non necessarii;* but I

had my reasons, and they serve to confirm what follows.

Virgil, by letting Æneas out at the gate of *Sleep*, intimates that his descent was not real; and, by letting him out at the gate of *false dreams*, intimates that all which had been related concerning the state of the dead, and the infernal regions, was fiction and falsehood. Let us offer some reasons for this conduct of the poet; and if they amount to *probabilities*, it is as much as ought to be expected.

First; Why doth Virgil intimate that the descent of Æneas was not real?

Æneas is described as an accomplished hero, and under his character, as we observed before, that of Augustus is frequently delineated. His descent into Aïdes is a beautiful piece of poetry; but it seemeth to have one defect, and to lie open to one objection. It is this: incantations, evocations of the dead, conversation with the shades, communications with the infernal powers, necromantic divinations, all these belonged to the art magic, and magic was held in abomination by the Romans in Virgil's time, and before it: and hence Christian emperors found it no difficulty to make very severe laws against such practices, which were already in bad repute. The poet therefore might choose to close the narration with a hint that it was entirely a fiction.

In Homer's days, necromancy was not so odious, in all probability, and he makes no difficulty to send

Ulysses to the regions of the dead. The Greek hero is assisted and directed by Circe, a goddess indeed, but a witch of the first magnitude, and a very mischievous one.

Οὕτω δὲ αὐτέοισι (τοῖς παλαιοῖς) χρῆμα ἱρώτατον ἡ μαντοσύνη ἐδόκεεν, ὥστε δὴ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἐπειδὴ ἔκαμε πλανεόμενος, ἐθελήσας ἀτρεκὲς ἀκοῦσαι περὶ των ἑωυτοῦ πρηγμάτων, ἐς τὸν ἀΐδην ἀπίκετο—εἰς λόγους ἐλθεῖν Τιρησίῃ ἐπιθυμέων.

"Adeo illis (veteribus) res sanctissima visa divinatio est. Itaque Ulysses cum in errore illo suo laboraret, verum audire cupiens de rebus suis, ad inferos descendit—in colloquium Tiresiæ venire desiderans." Lucian. De Astrol. 24.

But Virgil, when he introduces the unhappy Dido deceiving her sister, and pretending to seek a cure for her love by the aid of a priestess and a sorceress, makes her apologize for having recourse to magic arts, and excuse herself by the plea of cruel necessity. Æn. iv. 480;

"Oceani juxta finem, solemque cadentem,
Ultimus Æthiopum locus est.—
Hinc mihi Massylæ gentis monstrata sacerdos,
Hesperidum templi custos, epulasque draconi
Quæ dabat.—
Hæc se carminibus promittit solvere mentes
Quas velit; ast aliis duras immittere curas;
Sistere aquam fluviis, et vertere sidera retro:
Nocturnosque ciet manes. Mugire videbis
Sub pedibus terram, et descendere montibus ornos.

"Testor, cara, deos, et te, germana, tuumque
Dulce caput, magicas invitam accingier artes."

Where Servius:

"*Invitam*—quia cum multa sacra Romani susciperent, magica semper damnarunt: probrosa enim ars habita est. Ideo excusat."

Apuleius, ix. p. 197;

"—ad familiares feminarum artes accenditur: magnaque cura requisitam veratricem (l. veteratricem) quandam feminam, quæ devotionibus ac maleficiis—quidvis efficere posse credebatur, multis exorat precibus. Tunc saga illa et divinipotens primis adhuc armis facinorosæ disciplinæ suæ velitatur."

Augustin. De Civ. Dei, viii. 19;

"Porro adversus magicas artes—ipsam publicam lucem testem citabo. Cur enim tam graviter ista plectuntur severitate legum? An forte istas leges Christiani instituerunt, quibus artes magicæ puniuntur, secundum quem alium sensum nisi quod hæc maleficia generi humano perniciosa esse non dubium est? Ait Poëta clarissimus,

Testor, cara, Deos, &c.

Illud etiam quod alio loco de his artibus dicit:

Atque satas alio vidi traducere messes:

Eo quod hac pestifera sceleratagque doctrina, fructus alieni in alias terras transferri perhibentur, nonne in Duodecim Tabulis, id est, Romanorum antiquissimis legibus, Cicero commemorat esse conscriptum, et ei

qui hoc fecerit supplicium constitutum? Postremo, ipse Apuleius numquid apud judices Christianos de magicis artibus accusatus est?"

The venerable Sibyl in the Æneis seems to have been one of the trade, though Virgil sets a handsome gloss upon it.

The disciples of Epicurus must have had a more particular detestation for magical arts, because they looked upon the whole science as imposture and villainy, contrived to deceive the credulous, to keep up superstition, and to do mischief.

I come now to answer the second question. Why did Virgil intimate, that all which had been related by him concerning the state of the dead and the infernal regions, was fiction and falsehood?

I know of no better reply than this, that Virgil had studied and embraced the Epicurean philosophy; and whatever use he may have made, as a poet, of the doctrines of other sects, yet this was his favourite system, and he was willing to let the learned reader know it, and not to pass for a deserter of his own principles, which in the philosophical world was held a dishonourable thing.

Servius was so persuaded of Virgil's Epicurism, that he often takes notice of it, and collects it even from some passages which will not prove it.

As Virgil's poetical labours are comprised in three great and distinct works, the Eclogues, the Georgics, and the Æneis, he hath taken particular

care in each of the three to give hints of his sentiments, that posterity might know to what sect and party he belonged. He hath not done it bluntly and dogmatically, but rather politely and indirectly.

His sixth Eclogue is inscribed to Varus, who also was an Epicurean, in which he introduces Silenus describing the formation of the world according to the Epicurean system. A cruel insult upon this poor drunken god, to make him sing an atheistical ballad! 31;

"Namque canebat, uti magnum per inane coacta
Semina terrarumque, animæque, marisque fuissent,
Et liquidi simul ignis: ut his exordia primis
Omnia, et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis.—
Hinc lapides Pyrrhæ jactos," &c.

So Lucretius, i. 420;

"Omnis, ut est, igitur, per se, Natura, duabus
Consistit rebus; nam *corpora* sunt, et *inane*,
Hæc in quo sita sunt, et qua diversa feruntur."

The god first discovers the grand secret, that there was no providence, and that all was made by chance, and then proceeds to the popular and the fabulous religion.

"Hortatur Virgilius Musas, ver. 13. ad referenda ea quæ Silenus cantaverat pueris: nam vult exsequi sectam Epicuream, quam didicerant, tam Virgilius quam Varus, docente Scirone; et quasi sub persona Sileni, Sironem inducit loquentem. Chromim autem et Mnasylum, se et Varum vult accipi. Quibus ideo conjungit puellam, ut osteridat plenam sectam Epicuream, quæ nihil sine voluptate vult esse perfectum." Servius.

In his Georgics also he gives us his philosophical sentiments, ii. 490.

"Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum
Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis avari."

Here are not only the sentiments of Epicurus, but the expressions of Lucretius:

"Cætera, quæ fieri in terris cæloque tuentur
Mortales, pavidis cum pendent mentibu' sæpe,
Efficiunt animos humiles formidine Divûm,
Depressosque premunt ad terram, propterea quod
Ignorantia caussarum conferre Deorum
Cogit ad imperium *res*, et concedere regnum." vi. 49.

"Quare Relligio *pedibus subjecta* vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo." i. 79.

"Et *metus* ille foras præceps *Acherontis* agendus
Funditus, humanam qui vitam turbat ab imo." iii. 37.

"——— declinando faciunt primordia motus
Principium quoddam, quod *fati* fœdera rumpat, &c.
——— *fatis* avulsa voluntas." ii. 253.

"Happy, says the poet, in the first place is the philosopher; in the second, the country-man. Now under the notion of a philosopher, he describes an Epicurean, having been bred under his master Sciron, a teacher in that sect: and in three lines he has admirably couched the principal opinions they were known by, or valued themselves upon, that there is no divine Providence, no destiny or divination, and no immortality of the soul, &c.

"And yet, *the* DIVINE *Virgil*, says our judicious

author. He is very easily satisfied, if what little he comprehends of him appears to have *divinity* in it." Bentley, Remarks on Free-thinking.

The third mark which he hath given of his attachment to Epicurus, is in the close of the sixth book of the Æneis, where, after a laboured description of the infernal regions, and in it a very formidable representation of future punishments, he dismisses his readers with the comfortable suggestion that it is all a fable, and a dream from the *ivory-gate*; or, in the words of Seneca;

"Post mortem nihil est, ipsaque mors nihil.—
Tænara, et aspero
Regnum sub domino, limen et obsidens
Custos non facili Cerberus ostio,
Rumores vacui, verbaque inania,
Et par *sollicito* fabula *somnio*." Troad. 327.

So Cornelius Severus, in his *Ætna*, charges the poets with forging lies about the infernal regions, the punishment of Tityus, Tantalus, and Ixion, the tribunals of Minos and Æacus, 83;

"Quicquid et interius *falsi* sibi conscia terra est."

One of the difficulties in Virgil's description of the subterraneous regions, is his placing Elysium, *aëris in campis, in the fields of air*. He says of Æneas, Anchises, and the Sibyl, 887;

"——— tota passim regione vagantur
Aëris in campis latis."

So they were *air-walkers*, or, as you may express it

better in Greek, ἀεροβατοῦντες. But in that language, they who lose themselves in idle speculations, and run into whimsies, are said ἀεροβατεῖν. See Lucian Prometh. vi. p. 33, 34. quarto edit. and Aristophanes Nub. 225. Yet I will by no means affirm that Virgil had this double sense in view, or that his words will not bear another interpretation. See Servius and Ruæus.

"Cum de Inferis agit Virgilius, id laxe intelligendum est, ut cum Græci verba faciunt περὶ τοῦ Ἅδου, quod vita defunctorum statum potius, quam locum, significat. Ita Inferi apud poetam: quid enim umbris et locis subterraneis cum sole et sideribus, cum largo æthere, et lumine purpureo:—Atque hic etiam Platonem imitari Virgilium, ut alibi non raro, suspicor." &c. Burnet, Archæol. 358.

Virgil, in his *Ciris*, if that poem be his, hath declared himself an Epicurean, ver. 3;

"Cecropius suaves exspirans hortulus auras
Florentis viridi Sophiæ complectitur umbra."

And Joseph Scaliger, in his learned notes, hath taken pains to show Virgil's attachment to that sect.

Lucan, speaking of the future state of heroic souls, takes a noble flight above the grovelling sons of Epicurus, ix. 1;

"At non in Pharia Manes jacuere favilla,
Nec cinis exiguus tantam compescuit umbram.
Prosiluit busto, semiustaque membra relinquens,
Degeneremque rogum, sequitur convexa Tonantis.
Qua niger astriferis connectitur axibus aër,

Quodque patet terras inter, lunæque meatus,
Semidei Manes habitant, quos ignea virtus
Innocuos vita patientes ætheris imi
Fecit, et æternos animam collegit in orbes.
Non illuc auro positi, nec ture sepulti
Perveniunt. Illic postquam se lumine vero
Implevit, stellasque vagas miratus, et astra
Fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte jaceret
Nostra dies, risitque sui ludibria trunci."

In the religious systems, nothing so much shocked the Epicureans as the doctrine of future punishments which might be everlasting;

"——— nam si certum finem esse viderent
Ærumnarum homines, aliqua ratione valerent
Relligionibus, atque minis obsistere vatum:
Nunc ratio nulla est restandi, nulla facultas,
Æternas quoniam pœnas in morte timendum."

Lucretius, i. 108.

Therefore they magnified their father Epicurus, who had obtained a complete victory over religion or superstition:

"Quare relligio pedibus subjecta vicissim
Obteritur, nos exæquat victoria cælo."

Tanaquil Faber, and others, have vainly endeavoured to justify Epicurus and Lucretius from the charge of impiety. Faber was very learned, and very ingenious; but I know not how, he often affected to write like a debauché and a libertine.

"Those who believed no god at all, or at least no providence, accounted all religion to be nothing but superstition. And it is a weak and silly apology a late

commentator on Lucretius [Tan. Faber] makes for his saying, so much mischief had been done by religion; *by religion*, saith he, *he meant superstition:* for he accounted all religion to be nothing else but superstition. And those in our age [Hobbes, Leviath.] who can find no other difference between them, *but that one is allowed, and the other not; or one is what we like, and the other what we dislike*, do destroy any real difference between them, and make only *religion a superstition in fashion*, and *superstition a religion out of fashion.*" Stillingfleet, serm. viii. vol. ii.

"Otio autem suo abutuntur, ut Gassendus, Faber, aliique, qui Epicuri librum περὶ ὁσιότητος, ejus sectæ pietatem erga deos, et religionem pro superstitione tantum, metuque deorum inani a Lucretio hoc loco positam esse crepant; quasi poeta non omnem de providentia opinionem sustulit [g], aut ille esset superstitiosus, qui Deum aliquid agere, aut humana curare existimaret." Creech ad Lucretium, i. 63.

Epicurus, as his disciples boasted, had overset all religion by two demonstrations: first, that the soul perished at death; secondly, that the deity, if there was one, concerned not himself with human affairs, and had neither benevolence nor malevolence;

"Nec bene promeritis capitur, nec tangitur ira."

SINCE men have naturally a desire of immortality, and an abhorrence for death and annihilation, it may

[g] He should have said *sustulisset.*

be asked, whence came it to pass that several persons in the Pagan world not only embraced the opinion of the soul's mortality, but even received it with complacency and satisfaction?

This complacency and satisfaction might perhaps be questioned. "Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die," is a speech which may be made with a smiling countenance, and with an aching heart.

But granting the fact to be true, two causes seem to have produced this effect.

First, a dislike of the popular religion, which was absurd and oppressive, directed by priestcraft, and overrun with superstition, and which produced many vile and mischievous effects. Besides, according to those vulgar systems, human souls, when they quitted the body, repaired to the infernal regions. The gods who presided there were capricious and cruel;

"Nesciaque humanis precibus mansuescere corda."

There the poor unhappy shades, for whom those deities might entertain an unaccountable hatred, would be incessantly tormented by arbitrary masters, from whom much was to be feared and little to be hoped.

A hatred for such a religion, and a dread of such doctrines, drove them into the other extreme, and made them reject a providence and a future state.

Secondly, a bad mind and a vicious disposition. I am not willing to impute this to all those, without exception, who held the mortality of the soul. There

might be persons amongst them who had more benevolence, more honour, and more virtue, than many a believer of the contrary doctrine. But this is certain, that a vicious man must be a very partial and prejudiced judge of the question concerning a future state, that he will be plagued with just fears and apprehensions of his condition in that state, and inclined to consider annihilation on its most acceptable side, and to take refuge in it as in a shelter from divine justice.

There is something particular in the religion of the Siamese, as it is represented to us by Chaumont, La Loubiere, De Choisy, and other travellers. They acknowledge a supreme God, but believe that he lives and ever did live (if it may be called living) in perfect indolence and absolute inactivity. There are inferior deities who govern the world. They suppose a hell, or purgatory, and a paradise, or elysium, a state of temporary punishments and temporary rewards. After this ensues a transmigration of souls into the bodies of men or brutes, of princes or beggars, of lions or hogs, that is, into a better or a worse condition, through many revolutions of ages. But the souls which have behaved themselves well under various changes and trials, will at last be released from the fatigue of transmigration, and enter into a state of calm insensibility or annihilation, which is a kind of apotheosis, and the highest reward.

Observe that in Siam the climate is hot, the inhabitants poor and lazy slaves, the government most despotic and tyrannical, and the punishments arbitrary and

severe. These circumstances might incline the people to consider happiness as consisting in a sort of stupid unfeeling serenity, in an indolence of body and of mind, in an exemption from the drudgery of working and of thinking, and from the insolence of unmerciful masters. This might reconcile them to annihilation, as to a condition comparatively not undesirable[h]: "There the wicked cease from troubling, and there the weary be at rest. There the prisoners rest together; they hear not the voice of the oppressor."

It would make one smile to see poetical divines wonderfully tender and candid in their judgments of Virgil's philosophical and theological principles, looking upon him as upon a devout and religious creature, one who was honoured with glimpses of the glad tidings of salvation, and a kind of *minor prophet*. Yet I would not willingly censure them; for, after all, a man can have no more judgment than falls to his share; and besides, it seems to be an error on the right side, a good-natured mistake, an innocent simplicity which thinketh no evil.

Them who are without, God judgeth. He best knoweth how to deal with the Pagan world in general, and in particular with those Pagans who were so far estranged from him, as to fall even into the Epicurean impiety. To his righteous judgment let us leave them.

[h] Longa quiescendi tempora Fata dabunt:

But hence it appears, that the learned age of Augustus, with all its polite advantages, was sadly corrupted in matters of religion; that the Epicurean doctrine had spread itself through the Roman empire; and that persons of the brightest abilities and highest stations, being unhappily infected with it, were men of that FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which in a Christian country, and in the eighteenth century, hath been publicly recommended to us by patriots and geniuses compared with whom Epicurus was a gentleman, a philosopher, a reasoner, and a scholar.

Such was the state of the world in the days of Augustus and of Virgil. A plain proof how much it stood in need of that divine teacher, that *sun of righteousness*, who, to dispel those gloomy clouds, arose with salvation in his rays!

"Hail, holy LIGHT, offspring of Heav'n first-born!
Thee I revisit and thy vital lamp,
Escap'd the Stygian pool, and realms of Night,
And taught by thee alone to reascend."

FINIS.

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